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STICERD Work in Progress Seminars


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These seminars are held on Fridays in term time at 13:00-14:00 in the Michio Morishima Room, 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH).

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. A light lunch will be available.

Seminar organisers: Celine Zipfel and Svetlana Chekmasova.

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Friday  24 November 2017  13:00 - 14:00

TBC

Clara Martinez-Toledano (Paris School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  27 October 2017  13:00 - 14:00

Networks at Work: How Entry-level Job Links Shape Civil Servants' Careers, Performance and Skill Investment

Shan Aman-Rana (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  03 November 2017  13:00 - 14:00

Public Good Allocation and the Welfare Costs of Political Connections: Evidence from Brazilian Matching Grants

Michel Azulai (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  10 November 2017  13:00 - 14:00

Venture Capital Funds Size and Structure in a Directed Search Model

Francesco Sannino (Department of Economics, LSE)

I develop a theory of fund size and structure when fund managers add value to the companies they finance, but their human capital is scarce. I propose a matching model with directed search where managers span their nurturing activity over more projects, and entrepreneurs are privately informed about their projects' quality. Managers differ in the ability to scale up their human capital. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for positive and negative assortative matching over managerial attention and project quality to emerge. Anticipating positive sorting, managers shrink fund size below the efficient level. Entry of unskilled managers feeds back into equilibrium sorting, increases returns at the top of the distribution - consistently with empirical evidence - and always results in a Pareto-improvement. This offers a new angle to think about policies encouraging entry in the venture capital industry. When extended to a dynamic setting, the model illustrates a novel advantage of closed, finite-horizon funds, which emerge in equilibrium even when they are socially undesirable: they attract the best entrepreneurs, who value the most the exclusive relation that a closed-end fund guarantees. Managers benefit from committing to a size in the first place.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  17 November 2017  13:00 - 14:00

Reference Dependence in Retirement Behavior: Evidence from German Pension Discontinuities

Arthur Seibold (Department of Economics, LSE)

This paper documents and analyzes an important and puzzling stylized fact about retirement behavior: the large concentration of job exits at specific ages. In Germany, around 30% of workers retire precisely in the month when they reach one of three “statutory” retirement ages, although there is often no incentive or even a disincentive to retire at these thresholds. To study what can explain the concentration of retirements around statutory ages, I use novel administrative data covering the universe of German retirees, and I take advantage of unique variation in retirement incentives as well as in the location of statutory ages across individuals created by the German pension system. Measuring retirement bunching responses to more than 600 different discontinuities in pension benefit profiles, I first document that financial incentives alone fail to explain retirement patterns in the data. Second, I show that there is a direct effect of “presenting” a threshold as a statutory age, which is substantially larger than that of financial incentives. Further evidence on mechanisms suggests the framing of statutory ages as reference points for retirement as a potential explanation. A number of alternative channels including firm responses are also discussed but they do not seem to drive the results. Finally, a model of retirement with reference-dependent decision utility is employed to interpret the observed patterns. Counterfactual simulations highlight that shifting statutory ages via pension reforms can be an effective policy to increase actual retirement ages with a positive fiscal impact.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Friday  24 November 2017  13:00 - 14:00

TBC

Clara Martinez-Toledano (Paris School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Friday  01 December 2017  13:00 - 14:00

TBC

Matteo Benetton (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  08 December 2017  13:00 - 14:00

TBC

Konstantinos Tokis (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
There are also future events listed for this series. Please see STICERD Work in Progress Seminars listed for Next Term