Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) LSE RSS Contact Us YouTube Twitter

STICERD Work in Progress Seminars


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These seminars are held on Fridays in term time at 13:00-14:00 in the Michio Morishima Room, 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH).

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. A light lunch will be available.

Seminar organisers: Celine Zipfel and Svetlana Chekmasova.

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Friday  27 April 2018  13:00 - 14:00

Labor market regulation and hospital quality. Evidence from a working hours reform in Ecuador

Tatiana Paredes (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  04 May 2018  13:00 - 14:00

CANCELLED

Alexia Delfino (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


Please note new venue
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Friday  11 May 2018  13:00 - 14:00

The Role of Intermediaries in Quality Certification: Evidence from the Private Tutoring Industry

Will Matchem (London School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  18 May 2018  13:00 - 14:00

Happy Birthday? Manipulation and Selection in Unemployment Insurance

Kilian Russ (University of Bonn)

This paper documents strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around an age-at-layoff threshold entitling workers to a four months increase in potential UI benefit duration in Italy. Manipulation is quantitatively important and of far-reaching consequences: 12.5\% of layoffs in the manipulation region are strategically delayed with affected workers increasing their average UI benefit receipt and non-employment duration by 3.0 and 7.1 months, respectively. Manipulators are highly selected on both observables and unobservables. Manipulation is most prevalent among female, part-time, white-collar workers with longer job tenure at small firms. We show that compared to non-manipulators: (i) manipulators would have had higher exit rates from unemployment at each point during the unemployment spell, and (ii) manipulators' benefit receipt duration responds 25\% stronger to the increase in potential benefit duration. We study the welfare consequences of our results and discuss implications for standard RD-estimates.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  01 June 2018  13:00 - 14:00

Trade-offs in Broker Remuneration: The Case of the UK Mortgage Market

Claudia Robles Garcia (Department of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  08 June 2018  13:00 - 14:00

Infrastructure Complementarity and Structural Transformation: Evidence from Ethiopia

Niclas Moneke (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH