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STICERD Work in Progress Seminars

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These seminars are held on Fridays in term time at 13:00-14:00 in the Michio Morishima Room, 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH).

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. A light lunch will be available.

Seminar organisers: Miguel Espinosa and Dana Kassem.

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  • Next:

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Friday  09 December 2016  13:00 - 14:00

The gender of grandchildren and its vital role in old-age support in China

Xuezhu Shi (London School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH

  • Full list for Michaelmas Term 2016

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Friday  04 November 2016  13:00 - 14:00

CANCELLED

Jun Goto (Hitotsubashi University)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  11 November 2016  13:00 - 14:00

Trust and CO2 Emissions: Cooperation on a Global Scale

Ara Jo (LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  18 November 2016  13:00 - 14:00

Spying in Contests

Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen (LSE)

Two players compete for a prize and their valuations are private information. Before the contest, each player can covertly acquire a costly, noisy and private signal regarding the opponent's valuation. In equilibrium, each player's effort is non-decreasing (non-increasing) in the posterior probability that the opponent has the same (a different) valuation. Accounting for the cost of spying, players are strictly better off than not spying on each other at all. Suppose instead that without incurring any cost to any player, each player can ex ante commit to disclose a signal about her valuation to the opponent, but cannot observe realizations of the signal. Then there does not exist any equilibrium in which both players disclose an informative signal to the opponent, even though doing so would benefit both players.

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  25 November 2016  13:00 - 14:00

Sorting with Misperceptions: An Application to Income Inequality

Lisa Windsteiger (STICERD, London School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Friday  09 December 2016  13:00 - 14:00

The gender of grandchildren and its vital role in old-age support in China

Xuezhu Shi (London School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


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