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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars


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These seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. 

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. 

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava

For further information please contact Jane Dickson.

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calendar
Thursday  26 April 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly: A Robust Coase Conjecture

Francesco Nava (Economics, LSE) , joint with Pasquale Schiraldi

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  03 May 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Desirability

Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University) , joint with David Schmeidler

32L 1.04, 1st Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


Please note new venue
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Thursday  10 May 2018  15:30 - 17:00

CANCELLED

Kristof Madarasz (London School of Economics)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  17 May 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Bargaining and Competition in Thin Markets

Francesc Dilmé (University of Bonn)

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  24 May 2018  15:30 - 17:00

"Auctions" by Invitation

Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern)

∙ Focus is on costly recruitment of bidders - Rounding up bidders is costly - Obviously an important aspect of auction-like market situations ∙ Different issues to be discussed in the context of costly recruitment - Observability - Bidders' costly participation - Bidders' costly information acquisition. - Bidders' "excessive caution" in bidding. - Auctioneer's private information. ∙ Will use different variations on a basic auction model to highlight these different issues. ∙ The Lessons/insights include: - systematic inefficiencies. - certain effects of auctioneer's information on the price.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  31 May 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Competitive Information Design

Frederic Koessler (Paris School of Economics) , joint with Marie Laclau and Tristan Tomala

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  07 June 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Groupthink and the Failure of Information Aggregation in Large Groups

Philipp Strack (Berkeley) , joint with Matan Harel, Elchanan Mossel and Omer Tamuz

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH