Cookies?
Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) LSE RSS Contact Us YouTube Twitter

STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

feed/rss  Webfeed
These seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. 

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. 

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas.

You can subscribe or unsubscribe to our mailing list (etheory).

  • Full list for Summer Term 2020

calendar
Thursday  14 May 2020  15:30 - 17:00

Misinterpreting Social Outcomes and Information Campaigns

Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) , joint with Daniel N. Hauser

[pdf] Download Paper

This paper explores learning in a setting with social perception biases. Individuals learn from others’ outcomes but have a misspecified model of their preferences. When individuals systematically overestimate the similarity between their own preferences and the preferences of others - exhibiting the false consensus effect - this can lead to incorrect learning, while when individuals systematically underestimate this similarity - exhibiting pluralistic ignorance -- this can prevent beliefs from converging. We explore how information campaigns - releasing (costly) information about the state - can counteract these inefficient choices. We show that the duration - temporary or permanent - and the target - correct inefficient action choices or reinforce efficient action choices - of the optimal information campaign depend crucially on the form of misspecification.

ONLINE,

Please note new venue
calendar
Thursday  28 May 2020  15:30 - 17:00

Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

Daniel Garrett (TSE) , joint with Francesc Dilme

[pdf] Download Paper

We study relational contracting with an agent who has consumption-smoothing preferences as well as the ability to save to defer consumption (or to borrow). Our focus is the comparison of principal-optimal relational contracts in two settings. The first where the agent’s consumption and savings decisions are private, and the second where these decisions are publicly observed. In the first case, the agent smooths his consumption over time, the agent’s effort and payments eventually decrease with time, and the balances on his savings account eventually increase. In the second, the agent consumes earlier than he would like, consumption and the balance on savings fall over time, and effort and payments to the agent increase. Our results suggest a possible explanation for low savings rates in certain industries where compensation often comes in the form of discretionary payments.

ONLINE,

Please note new venue


Copyright © STICERD & LSE 2015 - 2020  |  LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE  |  Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699  |  Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk  |   Site updated 01 June 2020
Use of this website is subject to, and implies acceptance of, its Terms of use (including Copyright and intellectual property, Privacy and data protection, and Accessibility).
The London School of Economics and Political Science is a School of the University of London. It is a charity and is incorporated in England as a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Acts (Reg no. 70527).The registered office address of the School is: The London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK; Tel: +44 (0)20 7405 7686