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STICERD Economic Theory SeminarsThese seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 16:00-17:30 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis
and
Dr Francesco Nava You can subscribe or unsubscribe to our mailing list (etheory).
Thursday
01 December 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion and CrimeJuan Ortner (Boston University) , joint with Sylvain Chassang![[pdf]](/images/pdf.gif){kind=small} Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
29 September 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Dynamic Nonmonetary IncentivesDaniel Bird (Tel Aviv University) , joint with Alexander Frug Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
13 October 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly VerificationMarina Halac (Columbia Business School) , joint with Pierre YaredWe introduce costly verification into a general delegation framework. A principal faces an agent who is better informed about the efficient action but biased towards higher actions. An audit verifies the agent's information, but is costly. The principal chooses a permissible action set as a function of the audit decision and result. We show that if the audit cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent can select any action up to a threshold, or request audit and the efficient action if the threshold is sufficiently binding. For higher audit costs, the principal may instead prefer auditing only intermediate actions. However, if the principal cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the audit decision and result, TEC is always optimal. Our results provide a theoretical foundation for the use of TEC in practice, including in capital budgeting in organizations, fiscal policy, and consumption-savings problems. 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
20 October 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Asset allocation and trade under heterogeneous ambiguity aversionJean-Marc Tallon (Paris School of Economics) , joint with H. Ozsolyev and S. Mukerji32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
27 October 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Collusion Constrained EquilibriumRohan Dutta (McGill University) , joint with David K. Levine and Salvatore Modica Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
03 November 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Markovian implementationJohannes Horner (Yale University)32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
10 November 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Structural Rationality in Dynamic GamesMarciano Siniscalchi (Northwestern University) Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
17 November 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Multidimensional Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency with Application to the Labour MarketHeski Bar-Isaac (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto) , joint with Ian Jewitt and Clare Leaver32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
24 November 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Private Learning and Exit Decisions in CollaborationAnne-Katrin Roesler (University of Michigan) , joint with Yingni Guo Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
01 December 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion and CrimeJuan Ortner (Boston University) , joint with Sylvain Chassang Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
08 December 2016
16:00
- 17:30
Altruism in NetworksYann Bramoulle (Marseille University) , joint with Renaud Bourlès and Eduardo Perez-Richet32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH |
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- 2016
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699 | Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 27 November 2016
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