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STICERD Economic Theory SeminarsThese seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis
and
Dr Francesco Nava You can subscribe or unsubscribe to our mailing list (etheory).
Thursday
02 May 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Normative Equilibrium: The permissible and the forbidden as devices for bringing order to economic environmentsAriel Rubinstein (Tel-Aviv University and New York University) , joint with Michael Richter![[pdf]](/images/pdf.gif){kind=small} Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
16 May 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Self-enforcing agreements and forward induction reasoningEmiliano Catonini (HSE, ICEF, Moscow) Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
23 May 2019
15:30
- 17:00
An Attention-Based Theory of Mental AccountingFilip Matejka (CERGE-EI, Prague) , joint with Botond Koszegi Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
30 May 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Coalition Formation and History DependenceBhaskar Dutta (University of Warwick) , joint with Hannu Vartiainen Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
06 June 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Information Choice in AuctionsNina Bobkova (EUI, Florence) Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
13 June 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Fostering CollaborationElliot Lipnowski (University of Chicago) , joint with Aditya Kuvalekar and Joyee DebWe study optimal project selection by a firm that must choose between different workers’ preferred projects. The firm faces a basic tradeoff between fostering collaboration among its employees and efficiently adapting its decisions to its circumstances. If the firm commits to choosing the project which is most profitable ex-post, it undermines its employees’ motive to collaborate, causing ex-ante inefficiency. We solve for the firm’s optimal policy. It entails an early phase of intense competition, followed by a permanent regime of collaboration. In service to ex-ante optimality, arbitrarily severe ex-post inefficiencies must be tolerated. 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH |
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- 2019
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699 | Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 17 June 2019
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