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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars


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These seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. 

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. 

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava

For further information please contact Jane Dickson.

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Thursday  21 February 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Quantifying information and uncertainty

Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth) , joint with Alexander Frankel

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32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  01 November 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian Uncertainty

Anton Tsoy (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) , joint with Andrey Malenko

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32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  15 November 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Price Discovery in a Large Auction with Costly Information

Alp Atakan (Queen Mary University of London) , joint with Mehmet Ekmekci

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  22 November 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Choosing Joint Distributions: Theory and Applications to Information Design

Margaret Meyer (Oxford)

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32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  29 November 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Fake Persuasion

Helios Herrera (University of Warwick) , joint with Jacob Glazer and Motty Perry

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32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  06 December 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Repeated Choice: A Theory of Stochastic Intertemporal Preferences

Jay Lu (UCLA) , joint with Kota Saito

Abstract: We provide a repeated choice foundation for models of stochastic choice. An agent chooses from a menu repeatedly over time generating a time series of choices. We study the limit frequency of these choices and characterize when they are generated by a subjective ergodic utility process. All parameters of the model can be fully identified from binary choices. When the agent satisfies Independence of Continuation Menus (ICM), inference can be performed without modeling repetition and continuation problems explicitly. On the other hand, if ICM is violated, then ignoring continuation menus will lead to biased estimates and inferences. We show that ICM holds if and only if the utility process is standard, i.e. additively separable across time. Moreover, it is equivalent to indifference to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and a repeated version of the classic independence axiom. Applications include elicitation of risk-aversion under stochastic Epstein-Zin preferences and estimation under dynamic discrete-choice models.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  13 December 2018  15:30 - 17:00

Reputation and Information Design

Laurent Mathevet (NYU) , joint with David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti

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32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
There are also future events listed for this series. Please see STICERD Economic Theory Seminars listed for Next Term