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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars


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These seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. 

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. 

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava

For further information please contact Jane Dickson.

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calendar
Thursday  12 December 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Rationalizing Committee Votes

Ludovic Renou (QMUL) , joint with Rahul Deb

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  31 October 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Acquisition of/Stochastic Evidence

Bart Lipman (Boston) , joint with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  07 November 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Inferring Cognitive Heterogeneity from Aggregate Choices

Paola Manzini (University of Sussex) , joint with Valentino Dardanoni, Marco Mariotti and Chris Tyson

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  14 November 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Compromise, don't optimize: A prior-free alternative to Bayesian Nash equilibrium

Andriy Zapachelnyuk (University of St Andrews) , joint with Karl Schlag

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  21 November 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Blackwell Equilibria

Costas Cavounidas (University of Warwick)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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Thursday  28 November 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents

Daniel Gottlieb (Department of Management, LSE) , joint with Xingtan Zhang

[pdf] Download Paper


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  05 December 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

Konrad Mierendorff (UCL) , joint with Yeon-Koo Che and Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion. Over time, a sender performs a series of experiments to persuade a receiver to take a desired action. Constraints on information flow force the sender's persuasion to take real time, and the receiver may walk away at any time without listening. In addition, persuasion is costly for both players. To incentivize the receiver to listen, the sender must leave rents that compensate his listening costs, but neither player can commit to her/his future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. But, for persuasion cost sufficiently small, there is a folk theorem: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s optimal persuasion and full revelation, as well as anything in between are obtained in MPE, as the persuasion cost vanishes.


32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Thursday  12 December 2019  15:30 - 17:00

Rationalizing Committee Votes

Ludovic Renou (QMUL) , joint with Rahul Deb

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH