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STICERD Economic Theory SeminarsThese seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis
and
Dr Francesco Nava You can subscribe or unsubscribe to our mailing list (etheory).
Thursday
12 December 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Rationalizing Committee VotesLudovic Renou (QMUL) , joint with Rahul Deb32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
31 October 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Acquisition of/Stochastic EvidenceBart Lipman (Boston) , joint with Elchanan Ben-Porath and Eddie Dekel![[pdf]](/images/pdf.gif){kind=small} Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
07 November 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Inferring Cognitive Heterogeneity from Aggregate ChoicesPaola Manzini (University of Sussex) , joint with Valentino Dardanoni, Marco Mariotti and Chris Tyson Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
14 November 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Compromise, don't optimize: A prior-free alternative to Bayesian Nash equilibriumAndriy Zapachelnyuk (University of St Andrews) , joint with Karl Schlag Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
21 November 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Blackwell EquilibriaCostas Cavounidas (University of Warwick)32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
28 November 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agentsDaniel Gottlieb (Department of Management, LSE) , joint with Xingtan Zhang Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
05 December 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian PersuasionKonrad Mierendorff (UCL) , joint with Yeon-Koo Che and Kyungmin (Teddy) KimWe consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion. Over time, a sender performs a series of experiments to persuade a receiver to take a desired action. Constraints on information flow force the sender's persuasion to take real time, and the receiver may walk away at any time without listening. In addition, persuasion is costly for both players. To incentivize the receiver to listen, the sender must leave rents that compensate his listening costs, but neither player can commit to her/his future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. But, for persuasion cost sufficiently small, there is a folk theorem: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s optimal persuasion and full revelation, as well as anything in between are obtained in MPE, as the persuasion cost vanishes. 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
12 December 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Rationalizing Committee VotesLudovic Renou (QMUL) , joint with Rahul Deb32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH |
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- 2019
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699 | Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 06 December 2019
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