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STICERD Economic Theory SeminarsThese seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00 in room 32L 3.05 (3rd floor, 32 Lincolns Inn Fields, London), unless specified otherwise. Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis
and
Dr Francesco Nava You can subscribe or unsubscribe to our mailing list (etheory).
Thursday
21 February 2019
15:30
- 17:00
Quantifying information and uncertaintyEmir Kamenica (Chicago Booth) , joint with Alexander Frankel![[pdf]](/images/pdf.gif){kind=small} Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
01 November 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Asymmetric Information and Security Design under Knightian UncertaintyAnton Tsoy (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) , joint with Andrey Malenko Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
15 November 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Price Discovery in a Large Auction with Costly InformationAlp Atakan (Queen Mary University of London) , joint with Mehmet Ekmekci32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
22 November 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Choosing Joint Distributions: Theory and Applications to Information DesignMargaret Meyer (Oxford) Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
29 November 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Fake PersuasionHelios Herrera (University of Warwick) , joint with Jacob Glazer and Motty Perry Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
06 December 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Repeated Choice: A Theory of Stochastic Intertemporal PreferencesJay Lu (UCLA) , joint with Kota SaitoAbstract: We provide a repeated choice foundation for models of stochastic choice. An agent chooses from a menu repeatedly over time generating a time series of choices. We study the limit frequency of these choices and characterize when they are generated by a subjective ergodic utility process. All parameters of the model can be fully identified from binary choices. When the agent satisfies Independence of Continuation Menus (ICM), inference can be performed without modeling repetition and continuation problems explicitly. On the other hand, if ICM is violated, then ignoring continuation menus will lead to biased estimates and inferences. We show that ICM holds if and only if the utility process is standard, i.e. additively separable across time. Moreover, it is equivalent to indifference to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and a repeated version of the classic independence axiom. Applications include elicitation of risk-aversion under stochastic Epstein-Zin preferences and estimation under dynamic discrete-choice models. 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Thursday
13 December 2018
15:30
- 17:00
Reputation and Information DesignLaurent Mathevet (NYU) , joint with David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti Download Paper
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH |
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- 2018
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699 | Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 19 December 2018
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