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STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars

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These seminars are held on Mondays in term time at 12:30-14:00 in room 32L 2.04 (2nd Floor, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, WC2A 3PH), unless specified otherwise.

Entry is on a first-come first-served basis. No registration is required but places are limited. A light lunch will be available for everyone attending.

Seminar organisers: Alessandro Gavazza and Pasquale Schiraldi.

For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe. 

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  • Full list for Summer Term 2019

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Monday  13 May 2019  12:30 - 14:00

Structuring Subcontracting in Procurement Markets

Elena Krasnokutskaya (Johns Hopkins) , joint with Jorge Balat and Tatiana Komarova

This paper provides a novel evidence (based on a new dataset) on bidding and subcontracting behavior of primary contractors participating in California highway procurement market. We develop a model of procurement auction with subcontracting stage which is capable of rationalizing the patterns documented in the data. Next, we use this framework to evaluate the welfare implications of several alternative subcontracting arrangements that are frequently employed in government procurement.

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
calendar
Monday  20 May 2019  12:30 - 14:00

Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction

Ulrich Doraszelski (Wharton School) , joint with Katja Seimz, Michael Sinkinsonx, Peichun Wang

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We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently-concluded incentive auction that re-purposed spectrum from broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the U.S. We document significant multi-license ownership of TV stations. We show that in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their licenses, multi-license owners have an incentive to withhold some TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations. Using a large-scale valuation exercise, we find that this strategic supply reduction conservatively increases payouts to TV stations by between 7.0% and 20.7%.

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


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