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Abstract for:
Luca Anderlini,
Leonardo Felli,
October 1998
Paper No' TE/1998/362: | Full paper Save Reference as: BibTeX File | EndNote Import File
Keywords: Ex-ante contractual costs; hold-up problem; Coase theorem; contracts over contracts; incomplete contracts. JEL Classification: Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print. This Paper is published under the following series: Theoretical Economics Share this page:
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Abstract:We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a 'contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a 'contract over a contract' which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem. |
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