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Abstract for:

Implementation and Renegotiation

Eric Maskin, John Moore, December 1998
Paper No' TE/1998/366: | Full paper (pdf)
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Keywords: social choice rule; implementation; renegotiation

JEL Classification:

Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: Theoretical Economics
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Abstract:

The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

This paper has been published as:
'Review of Economic Studies', vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.

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