![]() | |
![]() | Cookies? |
| |||||||
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() | |||
![]() |
Abstract:![]()
Political Economy and Public Policy Paper
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation Franz Dietrich and Christian List August 2005 Paper No' PEPP 09: Full Paper ![]() In the theory of judgment aggregation on logically connected propositions, an important question remains open: Which aggregation rules are manipulable and which are strategy-proof? We define manipulability and strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation, characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules, and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Among other escape-routes from the impossibility, we discuss weakening strategy-proofness itself. Comparing two prominent aggregation rules, we show that conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof, but generates incomplete judgments, while premise-based voting is only strategy-proof for 'reason-oriented' individuals. Surprisingly, for 'outcome-oriented' individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy. |
![]() |
| ||||
Copyright © STICERD & LSE 2015
- 2019
| LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE | Tel: +44(0)20 7955 6699 | Email: STICERD@lse.ac.uk | Site updated 13 December 2019
|