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Paper No' CEPDP0741: | Full paper
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Keywords: Meritocracy; Family firms, Financial Development, TFP
JEL Classification: E1; E2; G1; G3; O1; O4
Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: CEP Discussion Papers
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Abstract:The most striking difference in corporate-governance arrangements between rich and poor countries is that the latter rely much more heavily on the dynastic family firm, where ownership and control are passed on from one generation to the other. We argue that if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, dynastic management is a failure of meritocracy that reduces a firmís Total Factor Productivity. We present a simple model that studies the macreconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends, among other factors, on the imperfections of contractual enforcement. A plausible calibration suggests that, via dynastic management, poor contract enforcement may be a substantial contributor to observed crosscountry differences in aggregate Total Factor Productivity.
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