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Irma Clots-Figueras

London School of Economics and STICERD

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Women in Politics. Evidence from the Indian states*

Irma Clots-Figueras[†]

London School of Economics and STICERD

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Abstract

This paper uses panel data from the 16 main states in India during the period 1967-1999 to study the effects of having higher female representation in the State Legislatures on public goods, policy and expenditure. I find that women legislators make different decisions than men legislators. Moreover, women elected in seats reserved for scheduled castes and tribes make different decisions compared to women elected in general seats. Scheduled caste/tribe women favour capital investments, especially on low tiers of education and irrigation. They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act that give women the same inheritance rights as men. In contrast, general women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistributive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure and invest in high tiers of education.

JEL classification: D70, H19, H41, H50, O10.

Keywords: gender, caste, panel data, policy, India.

1 Introduction

In India, as in many other countries in the world, women are underrepresented in all political positions, even if they form approximately one half of the population. While the proportion of women who went to vote increased during the 1990s, women are still not well represented in political life. In a representative democracy all sectors of the society should have a voice in policy making. But, does women representation matter for policy determination? Do parliaments where women have higher representation adopt different policies?

This paper studies how women political representation influences expenditure, public goods and policy decisions using panel data from the 16 main states in India during the period 1967-1999.

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[†]email:i.clots-figueras@lse.ac.uk. Correspondence: STICERD-LSE, Houghton Street, WC2A 2AE London, UK.

In political economy models where candidates can commit to specific policies and only care about winning, political decisions only reflect the electorate's preferences (Downs (1957)). In this sense, women political representation should not have a differential impact on policy decisions as the median voter equilibrium prevails. In fact, as long as women vote, their preferences would be represented by the candidate elected, irrespective of this candidate's gender. However, if complete policy commitment is absent the identity of the legislator matters for policy decisions (Besley and Coate (1997); Osborne and Slivinski (1996)). In particular, increasing a group's political representation will increase its influence in policy.

The issue of women political representation has been increasingly important in India. In September 1996, the Indian Government introduced a Bill in Parliament, proposing the reservation of one third of the seats for women in the Lok Sabha (Central Government) and the State Assemblies. Since then, this proposal has been widely discussed in several parliamentary sessions, without an agreement being reached. Those who are in favour of this reservation argue that increasing women's political representation will ensure a better representation of their needs. Even those who oppose the reservation acknowledge the fact that women politicians behave differently than men politicians. Clearly, reservation would change the nature of political competition, by changing the set of candidates available for each seat, by altering voters' preferences or by changing the candidates' quality. This paper explores the effect of an exogenous increase in women representation that took place without any institutional change, and allows me to clearly identify the effect of women legislators in the variables of interest.

I focus on state governments as these control most of the social and economic expenditure and have the power to implement most of the development policies in India. Importantly, the different Indian states use the same budgetary classification, and have similar institutional and electoral settings. Thus, using panel data from these states not only offers the advantage of data comparability, it also solves the unobserved heterogeneity problems present in cross-country studies.¹

In India some seats can only be contested by scheduled caste or scheduled tribe candidates. These two population groups constitute the most disadvantaged sector of the Indian society, both socially and economically. Since scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (henceforth, SC/ST) women legislators might have different preferences than women legislators who won the elections for general seats, the impact of both general and SC/ST women legislators will be identified separately². Moreover, if the cost of running for election is higher for women than for men, women legislators will probably belong to the elite. This will only be the case for general women legislators, since scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are a more homogeneous group. Thus, the fact that some seats are reserved for low castes allows me to identify separately the effect of low caste women legislators and to distinguish the gender effects from the class effects.

The identification strategy used in this paper takes advantage of the detailed data I have collected on women candidates in India from 1967 until 2001. It is based on the fact that women

¹These 16 states account for more than 95 per cent of the total population in India, about 804 million people. They are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajashtan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

²Empirical evidence shows that almost no women SC/ST contested for a general seat and won the election, thus, I can safely say that all female legislators contesting the elections for a general seat belong to higher castes than female legislators contesting the election for a SC/ST seat.

candidates who won in a close election against a man will be elected in similar constituencies and under similar circumstances than men candidates who won in a close election against a woman. The fact that a man or a woman candidate wins in a close election can be considered to a high extent random, and thus, the gender of the legislator effect can be correctly identified by comparing “treated” constituencies where a woman was elected to its “counterfactuals”, where a man was elected.

In order to have a complete picture of the effect of women legislators, I have collected detailed data on the Revenue and Capital budgets, to identify the expenditure priorities of these legislators. I also use data on public goods and two types of laws, one that is targeted towards the poor and another one which is targeted towards women.

I find that women legislators have a differential impact on public goods, policy and expenditure decisions if we compare them to their male counterparts. Moreover, whether these women legislators belong to a scheduled caste (SC) or scheduled tribe (ST) reserved seat also has an impact. In particular, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women legislators favour capital investments, especially on irrigation and low tiers of education, and increase revenue expenditure on water supply. They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, designed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. On the other hand, general women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistributive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure, invest in high tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.

This paper contributes to a larger literature that analyses similar issues using US data. Thomas (1991) shows how states with higher female representation in parliament introduce and pass more priority bills dealing with issues of women, children and families than their male counterparts or women in states with lower female representation. Thomas and Welch (1991) find that women in state houses in 12 states in the US place more priority than men on legislation concerning women, family issues and children. Case (1998), finds how the state’s child support enforcement policies tightened as the number of women legislators in the state grew. Besley and Case (2000) show that the fraction of women in state upper and lower houses are highly significant predictors of state workers compensation policy. Besley and Case (2002) find that women in the legislature apply pressure to increase family assistance, and to strengthen child support laws. Rehavi (2003) finds that an increase in female representation during the 1990’s leads to an increase in Public Welfare Expenditure. This paper complements this literature by identifying the gender and class of the legislators separately and finding that both matter for policy decisions.

The existing literature on India focuses on the effect of different reservation policies. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) show how the reservation of one third of the seats for women in Panchayats (local rural self-government) of West Bengal and Rajasthan has a positive impact on investment in infrastructures relevant to women’s needs. Pande (2003), analyses how the reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the State Assemblies increases the volume of transfers that these groups receive. My paper studies the different effects of variation in both scheduled caste/tribe and general women representation due to electoral outcomes rather than reservation policies.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the econometric strategy. Section

5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Institutional background

India is a bicameral parliamentary democracy. The lower house is called Lok Sabha, and has 545 members. The upper house is called Rajya Sabha, and has 250 members. India is a federal country, and the Constitution gives the states and union territories significant control over their own government.

The Vidhan Sabhas (Legislative Assemblies) are directly elected bodies that carry out the administration of the government in the 25 states of India. In some states there is a bicameral organization of legislatures, with both an Upper and Lower House. However, it is the Lower House (Legislative Assembly) the one that takes the final budget decisions. The Vidhan Sabhas, or State Legislative Assemblies, have the freedom to decide the budget they will allocate to development policies.

Because of the nature of Indian federalism, state governments are the appropriate unit of analysis. In a process of decentralization, the states have replaced the central government in the economic decision making. The idea is that these decisions should be taken by lower levels of government, that are more directly responsible to its citizens.

In the event of elections, the states and union territories are divided into single-member constituencies. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of people in each constituency. The Assemblies vary in size, according to population.

Electors can cast one vote each for a candidate the winner being the candidate who gets the highest number of votes.

The democratic system in India is based on the principle of universal adult suffrage, and any Indian citizen who is registered as a voter and is over 25 years of age is allowed to contest elections to the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assemblies. Candidates for the Vidhan Sabha should be a resident of the same state as the constituency from which they wish to contest.

The 1950 Indian Constitution provides for political reservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. According to articles 330 and 332 of the constitution, prior to every national and state election, a number of jurisdictions will be reserved for these groups. Both scheduled castes and scheduled tribes tend to be socially and economically disadvantaged, and they constitute about 25% of the total population in India. There are two criteria for the reservation of jurisdictions: the population concentration of SC/ST groups in that constituency and the dispersion of reserved jurisdictions within a particular state.

Women belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are those who suffer a major degree of discrimination in India. Being a particularly disadvantaged within the Indian social structure, they will have different preferences than the other legislators in the State Assemblies. On the other hand, political parties seem to propose more women candidates for SC/ST seats than for general seats. Due to these reasons, and due to the fact that many general women candidates belong to the elite, I estimate separately the effects of these legislators on the different expenditure, public goods and policy measures under study.

In each one of the states, the budget is approved by the legislature after the enactment

of the Appropriation Act which gives authority to the government to withdraw money from the Consolidated Fund.³ Usually a budget speech is given to the legislature by the Finance Minister of each state, two days after there is a general discussion in the legislature about the budget proposal presented. This discussion lasts 6 days. After that, and during a maximum period of 18 days, individual demands made by the individual legislators are voted in the Legislative Assembly. Then, the introduction, consideration and passing of the Appropriation Bill in the Legislative Assembly with the Governor's consent lasts for about two days. In total, the budget discussion takes a maximum of 26 days.

3 Data Description

I use data on the sixteen main states in India during the period 1967-1999. Tables A1-A4 report descriptive statistics of the variables used. My aim is to test the effects of having higher female representation in the State Legislatures on revenue and capital expenditure, public goods and policy. I also test whether women legislators in scheduled caste or scheduled tribe seats (SC/ST) have a different impact than those in general seats.

The electoral data has been collected from the different reports on the State Elections published by the Election Commission of India.

As an indicator for female representation in general seats I use the fraction of the total number of general seats in the State Legislature occupied by a woman legislator for each state and election.

As an indicator of female legislators in SC/ST seats I use the fraction of the total number of SC/ST seats occupied by a female legislator. The fraction of seats serves as an indicator of the relative power of these state legislators.

The data on individual candidates for the state elections in India from 1967-2001 allows me to calculate how many candidates were involved in a close election⁴ against a candidate of the opposite sex for each state and year and for both SC/ST and general seats. I also use the fraction of seats won by each political party.

All the electoral data used in this paper has been collected from the different Statistical Reports of the Election Commission of India. Figure (1) in the Appendix shows the variation across election years and states for both SC/ST and general women representation. Women representation has been low in all states during the time period under consideration, both for SC/ST and general seats. In fact, at most 24% of the SC/ST seats and 14% of the general seats have been won by a woman in an election between 1967-2001.

Despite the fact that women political representation is very low for all states in India, both general and SC/ST women representatives are shown to have an effect on both capital and revenue expenditure, public goods and policy decisions. Due to the way decisions are taken in the State Legislatures in India, even if female legislators do not constitute a "critical mass" in

³Defined by the Constitution as "all revenues received by Government, all loans raised by Government by issue of treasury bills, loans or ways and means advances and all money received by Government in repayment of loans".

⁴A close election is defined as one in which the winner won the runner up by a very small margin. In this paper I define close elections as those in which the margin was less than 2.5%.

any voting procedure, they can still convince other legislators during or before the discussions, and they can also introduce proposals that are then voted by the legislature. Mishra, R.C. (2000), shows how evidence from the debates in the Orissa Legislative Assembly indicates that women legislators introduce proposals in the legislature, participate in the debates and try to convince their male counterparts of their ideas. This is true for both general and SC/ST women legislators. Moreover, they could as well be the "swing vote" when a given decision is taking place.

3.1 Dependent Variables

I study the impact of female legislators on different components of the state budget. For this I have collected data on actual Revenue and Capital expenditure for each state and year.

Revenue expenditure is defined as expenditure on current consumption of goods and services of the departments of Government, expenditure on Legislature, State Administration, tax collection, debt servicing and interest payments and grants-in-aid to various institutions. Capital expenditure is defined as expenditure devoted to acquiring or creating assets of a material and permanent character or to reduce recurrent liabilities.

Revenue expenditure in each one of the state's budgets is divided among two main categories: Development expenditure and Non-Development expenditure. Development expenditure is money allocated to the maintenance of capital assets, both economic and social. Non-Development expenditure is directed towards current and consumption expenditures of the government.

Total Capital Disbursements are divided into two main categories: Total Capital Outlay and Discharge of Internal Debt. Total Capital Outlay is mainly composed of Development expenditure, which includes both Social and Economic Services. Discharge of Internal Debt includes different types of loans. Figure 2 in the appendix shows graphically how all the different expenditure categories are organized in both the capital and the revenue budgets in all the Indian states.

I use the share of Total Revenue expenditure and the share of Total Capital Disbursements devoted to each type of expenditure as an expenditure measure. Summary statistics for the expenditure variables appear in Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix. Results in this paper are for the 12 biggest subdivisions in each one of the budgets.

All the states in India use the same budgetary classification. The variables are deflated using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) and the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW). The reference period used is October 1973-March 1974.

I also use some public goods measures. As educational measures I use the total number of schools and the number of secondary, middle, and primary schools per every thousand individuals. This will give an approximate idea of the supply of education. I also use the number of teachers per thousand individuals. Data on kilometres of surfaced state roads per km² is used as a measure of infrastructure.

The policy variables I use are cumulative number of land reforms designed to tackle poverty enacted by the different states in India during 1967-1999. The types of land reforms used are Tenancy Reforms, Abolition of Intermediaries reforms and Land Ceiling legislation.⁵

⁵I use the land reform measure created by Besley and Burgess (2000). Details on this variable can be found

The “women-friendly” policy variable I use is a dummy variable which equals one the year a given state has made an amendment to the Hindu Succession law to ensure that both women and men have the same inheritance rights.

3.2 Control variables

Control variables in the regressions include the proportion of seats won by each one of the parties in each election, in order to distinguish the effect of gender from the effect of party ideology⁶.

Other control variables include the real net state domestic product per capita, total grants received by the central government in real per capita terms, population in each state, the share of rural population over total population and a dummy for the year before the elections took place.

All these variables could affect the dependent variable in different ways: the higher the amount of grants received by the state, the higher will be their expenditure capacity, and this can affect their expenditure decisions. On the other hand, the population variables and real per capita state net domestic product could also give an idea of the economic backwardness of the state, which can also influence the policy decisions adopted.

The dummy variable for the year before the elections takes into account that legislators might adopt different policies just before elections, in order to increase their probability of being re-elected. I also include a time trend in the regressions.

Since in 1985 there was a budgetary reclassification, I also include a dummy variable for the years before 1985 in the expenditure regressions. This will be specially relevant for the Economic expenditure in the Revenue Account, since this was the expenditure category which changed the most after the reclassification took place. Another budget reclassification took place in 1972, however, budget data for the period 1967-1972 can not be safely compared for all the expenditure categories to budget data from later periods. For this reason I focus on the time period 1972-1999 for the expenditure variables.

4 Econometric Specification

To analyse the effects of having higher female representation in both SC/ST and general seats in the State Assemblies in India on government expenditure, public goods and policy measures, I use panel data for the 16 main states in India during the period 1972-1999.

The first empirical specification is:

there.

⁶There are eight main party groups: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional, Independent candidates and other parties. Congress parties include Indian National Congress, Indian National Congress Socialist Parties and Indian National Congress. Hard Left parties include Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist Parties. Soft Left parties include Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party. Janata parties include Janata, Lok Dal, and Janata Dal parties. Hindu parties include the Bharatiya Janata Party. Regional parties include Telegu Desam, Asom Gana Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Akali Dal and other state specific parties.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma W_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where Y_{it} is the measure of expenditure, public goods or policy for state i in year t . α_i and β_t are state and year fixed effects, W_{it} is the fraction of seats occupied by women in the state assemblies elected in the previous elections, and X_{it} stands for other control variables included in the regression which vary over state and over time and can also have an effect on the dependent variables of interest.

For the election years I use female representation as it was in the previous elections, under the assumption that newly elected legislators might not have much power during the first election year.⁷ Moreover, some of the elections are held at the end of the year, when decisions have already taken place.

The year fixed effects control for nationwide shocks or policies that were implemented in all states at the same time. The state fixed effects control for state specific characteristics that do not vary over time.

Since women legislators who won the election for a general seat might have different policy preferences than women legislators who won the election for a SC/ST seat, I include both general and SC/ST women representation variables in the regression. Moreover, in this way I can provide more evidence on the difference between gender and class effect. If the cost of running for election is higher for women than for men politicians, women legislators will be of comparatively higher classes than men legislators. Thus, the women representation variable may only indicate class, not gender. India provides the opportunity of dividing the women representation variable among general and SC/ST legislators. The latter, being a socially and economically disadvantaged group will be more homogeneous, and thus, SC/ST women legislators will be directly comparable to SC/ST men legislators. General legislators are not such an homogeneous group, and thus, gender and class effects could be confused when comparing women and men politicians. Moreover, the comparison of SC/ST and general women legislators is very interesting by itself, since it provides evidence that the identity of the legislator is defined by both gender and caste. The equation I am then testing is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \lambda Wgen_{it} + \theta Wscst_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (2)$$

Where, as before, α_i and β_t are the state and year fixed effects and X_{it} are other controls. $Wgen_{it}$ is the fraction of general seats won by women as elected in the previous elections and $Wscst_{it}$ if the fraction of SC/ST seats won by women as elected in the previous elections.

Even though the state fixed effects control for permanent differences across states in female representation and the outcome variables, I can not rule out the existence of an omitted variable that varies over states and over time and affects both female representation and the outcome variables. Thus, there might be some endogeneity concerns. In this case, the OLS estimates reported in this econometric specification would be biased and specifications (1) and (2) would

⁷Results are robust to including the contemporaneous women representation variable in the election years. Results are available from the author.

not allow me to correctly identify the effect of having higher women representation on the dependent variables of interest.

To be clear, if women are elected in constituencies where there is a “preference for women politicians”, this variable might also affect the dependent variables in my regressions, thus, biasing the results obtained.

As reported in Table A5 in the appendix, however, states where female representation is above the median and states where female representation is below the median do not differ on variables that might be correlated with “preference for women politicians”. States above and below the median are very similar in both male and female literacy rates, infant mortality rates, income inequality, newspaper circulation per capita, the percentage of voters who are women and voter turnout.

To identify the effect of women legislators on the variables of interest I have collected data on the votes’ share received by each one of the women candidates in state elections in India during then period 1967-2001, together with the margins of votes obtained against the winner or, in the case they won the elections, data on the runner-ups and the margin of votes obtained against them .

I can then use the information on women candidates who barely won the elections against a man. This should happen in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for women” politicians. If we consider that the last few votes received by both candidates are random, both the women and the men candidates could have won the elections and, thus, the fact that the woman candidate won the seat instead of the man is random as well.

This identification strategy is based on the regression discontinuity approach, although it is not directly used in this study.⁸ The fact that there have been close elections between a woman and a man candidate generates “near-experimental” causal estimates of the effect that women political representation has on the policy variables.⁹

The second type of regressions I run are based on these assumptions. In fact, I take as a separate explanatory variable the fraction of women who barely won the elections against a man over the total number of seats, for total women representation and for both general and SC/ST seats as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma_1 Wclose_{it} + \gamma_2 Wnoclose_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (3)$$

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \lambda_1 Wgenclose_{it} + \lambda_2 Wgennoclose_{it} + \theta_1 Wscstclose_{it} + \theta_2 Wscstnoclose_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (4)$$

These two specifications are very similar to (1) and (2), but the political representation variables are partitioned as follows: $Wclose_{it}$ is the fraction of total seats won by women who

⁸For this I should be able to relate each particular legislator to an expenditure measure number. Since in India, State Assemblies are composed by many legislators who choose a single expenditure measure each year, I had to rule out the discontinuous regression and exploit the discontinuity in the OLS regression.

⁹Lee(2003) takes advantage of close elections to generate “near-experimental” causal estimates of the electoral advantage to incumbency using the discontinuous regression approach.

won in a close election against a man. $Wnoclose_{it}$ is the fraction of seats won by women who did not win in a close election against a man. $Wgenclose_{it}$ is the fraction of general seats won by women in a close election against a man. $Wscstclose_{it}$ is the fraction of SC/ST seats won by women who won in a close election against a man, while the analogous is true for $Wgennoclose_{it}$ and $Wscstnoclose_{it}$. The residual category will thus be men legislators who did not win in a close election against a woman legislator.

The close elections women representation variables account for the “exogenous” women, those who won the elections in constituencies where there is no clear “preference for women” politicians. Thus, if these variables have significant coefficients, this will mean that my results are not driven by reverse causality, and that the identity of the legislator, in this case defined by gender and caste, matters for policy decisions.

However, the no close election women representation variables account for women who either won against a woman or against a man in an election that is not close. Thus, they are women who were elected in constituencies where there might be a “preference for women legislators”, and the coefficients of these variables can be driven by reverse causality.

In other words, the omitted variable would be correlated with the fraction of seats won by women in an election that is not close, but not with $Wclose_{it}$, $Wscstclose_{it}$ and $Wgenclose_{it}$, allowing me to identify the effect of these legislators. In this paper I define close elections as elections in which the votes difference between the winner and the runner-up is less than 2,5% of the total votes in that particular constituency.¹⁰

Since there might be the case that people who won their seats in a close election behave differently than those who won by bigger margins, the coefficients for women who won in a close election against a man could be biased. In order to control for this I also include in the regressions the fraction of men who won in a close election against a woman:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \gamma_1 Wclose_{it} + \gamma_2 Wnoclose_{it} + \mu Mclose_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (5)$$

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_t + \lambda_1 Wgenclose_{it} + \lambda_2 Wgennoclose_{it} + \theta_1 Wscstclose_{it} + \theta_2 Wscstnoclose_{it} + \mu_1 Mgencclose_{it} + \mu_2 Mscstclose_{it} + \delta X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (6)$$

Where now $Mclose_{it}$ is the fraction of seats won by a man in a close election against a woman as in the previous elections, $Mgencclose_{it}$ is the fraction of general seats won by a man in a close election against a woman as elected in the previous elections and $Mscstclose_{it}$ is the fraction of SC/ST seats won by a man in a close election against a woman as in the previous elections.

Men who won in a close election are as well likely to behave differently than those who won by a larger margin. By testing whether the coefficients for men and women who won in close elections are the same, I can separate the effect of women legislators from the effect of legislators who won in close elections.

Constituencies where a woman won in a close election against a man are considered as “treated”, while those in which the men won are the “counterfactual”, since the fact that the woman did not win the seat is random. In other words, “treated” and “counterfactual”

¹⁰I have also defined close elections as those in which the margin was less than 2% or 1,5% of total votes. Results are mostly unchanged.

constituencies will be similar in all the unobservables, they only differ in the fact that by chance either a man or a woman won the election. In specifications (5) and (6), the variables corresponding to women and men who won in close elections account for the fraction of total legislators which are “treated” and “counterfactual” respectively.¹¹

There might be concerns that two different constituencies in which a woman contested in a close election against a man might not be comparable if in one of them there were many other women candidates contesting for the same seat. That would be a case in which political parties perceive that constituency as “women friendly” and tend to field women candidates on that particular constituency. If the number of women candidates contesting for the same seat as the two close candidates is significantly different for constituencies in which a man won in a close election against a woman and constituencies in which a woman won in a close election against a man, these two types of constituencies might not be comparable. As it is shown in Table A6 in the appendix, the number of other women candidates contesting against women who won in close elections against a man is not significantly different than that for men who won in close elections against a woman, and thus, this seems not to be a concern in this study. This is the case because the bias would be the same for both treated or non-treated constituencies.

On the other hand, it might be possible that women (or men) candidates in a close election are in this situation because one of them is the incumbent for that seat in that particular constituency. If this is the case, the variables for women and men legislators who won in a close election would not be directly comparable. Moreover, the policies applied by candidates who were the incumbent and won the elections again might be different than that of candidates who occupy the seat for the first time. However, as it is shown in Table A6 in the appendix, the percentage of winners in close elections who were the incumbent is statistically the same for women and men legislators. In addition, the percentage of candidates in close elections who were the incumbent is the same for women and men as well. Thus, incumbency in close elections seems not to be important for this study.

There might as well be concerns that the party composition in seats won in a close election between two candidates of different gender may not be the same as the party composition in the whole State Assemblies. That is, if some parties are more likely to contest and win in close elections, then results might only indicate differences in party platforms of parties contesting close elections rather than gender effects. I have compared the variables indicating the proportion of seats won by the different parties in the State Assemblies and the proportion of seats won by the different parties in close elections for the states and years in which they were close elections and the distribution of seats among parties is almost the same.¹²

I have also included the proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population in each state as a control in the regressions. For this I had to restrict the observations to those between 1972-1992, since I only have this population data until 1992. Results were unchanged.

The identification strategy used in this paper crucially relies on the random assignment of the winner in a close election between a man and a woman candidate. I have tested this assumption by regressing the probability of a woman winning in a close election on different

¹¹Rehavi (2003) uses the fraction of close elections between a woman and a man won by a woman as an instrument.

¹²Results available from the author upon request.

variables that could presumably affect the outcome of a woman winning the election, like both male and female literacy rates, real per capita net state domestic product, infant mortality rates, newspaper circulation per capita, political competition, the fraction of votes obtained by the Congress party, the fraction of Hindu and Muslim population and both rural and urban headcount ratios. None of the above coefficients were significant¹³.

5 Results

5.1 Capital Expenditure

Total Capital Disbursements can be divided into Total Capital Outlay and Discharge of Internal Debt. In this study I will mainly focus in Total Capital Outlay, which is the part of capital expenditure invested in the creation of capital goods. Discharge of Internal Debt includes both loans repaid and advances given by the state governments, which makes it difficult to compare over states and over time, since it might be different for each one of the states.

Columns 1-3 of Table 1 show results for the fraction that Total Capital Outlay represents in Total Capital Disbursements. Column 1 shows the OLS results, which shows no effect of women representation on this variable. In Column 2 the women representation variable is divided among those who won in a close election against a man and those who did not. In Column 3, men who won in a close election against a woman are added. However, none of these columns show significant results for women representation.

Columns 4-6 show the results for the share of total state expenditure devoted to Total Capital Disbursements. Again, women representatives do not seem to have an effect.

However, it is also interesting to study whether results remain the same when women representatives are divided among those who won in a general seat and those who won the election for a SC/ST reserved seat. Results are shown on Table 2. Columns 1-3 show how, within Total Capital Disbursements, the fraction spent on capital goods investment is affected by SC/ST women representation. In particular, women representatives who won in a close election against a man for a SC/ST seat have a positive effect which remains significant for all specifications. Moreover, as it is shown by the p-value corresponding to the difference in the coefficients test, the effect is significantly different than that of men who won in a close election against a woman for a SC/ST seat. The coefficient indicates that, by increasing SC/ST women representation by one percentage point, the share of Total Capital Disbursements devoted to investment in capital goods increases by 2.8 percentage points. On the other hand, columns 4-6 show how general women representatives have a positive effect on the share of total state expenditure devoted to Total Capital Disbursements. Moreover, once we include SC/ST and general men who won in a close election against a woman, the coefficients are significantly different.

Capital Outlay can be divided into Development and Non-Development expenditure. I use these variables as a share of Total Capital Disbursements. Results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Even if women representatives are not shown to have any effect on any of these two categories in Table 3, results in Table 4 show how women representatives who won in a close election

¹³Results for these last two robustness checks are also available from the author.

against a man for a SC/ST seat have a positive effect on Development expenditure. Moreover, their effect is significantly different than that of men who won in the same type of elections.

Development expenditure can be further divided into Social and Economic expenditure. Results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Results in Table 5 show how women representation has a positive effect on the fraction of Total Capital Disbursements devoted to Economic expenditure. However, by dividing the women representation variable among SC/ST and general representatives, in Table 6, they do not seem to affect it. In contrast, SC/ST women representatives have a positive effect on Social expenditure, which is very different than that of SC/ST men representatives, while general women representatives have a negative effect, very different as well from that of men representatives.

Tables 7 and 8 report results for the eight biggest categories within Capital Outlay. Columns 1-6 correspond to categories classified under Economic expenditure. These are Roads and Bridges, Transport and Communication, Industry and Minerals, Energy, Irrigation and Agriculture. On the other hand, columns 7 and 8 report categories within Social expenditure: Health and Water Supply and Sanitation. In these two tables only the last econometric specification used in the previous tables of this paper is reported.

Even if results in Table 7 only show a positive effect of women representation on expenditure in Irrigation, results in Table 8 offer a different picture. Only SC/ST women representatives have a positive effect on expenditure in Irrigation, which is very different than men's. In fact, by increasing SC/ST women representation by one percentage point, the share of Capital Outlay devoted to Irrigation increases by 1.7 percentage points.

In summary, SC/ST women representatives not only favour investment in capital goods, within this category they also increase Development and Social expenditures. Moreover, given that women in India, as in many developing countries, are those in charge of water transportation, and given that SC/ST women will be the ones more likely to transport water, they will also want to invest on these infrastructures once in power. On the other hand, even if general women representatives increase the fraction of total expenditure devoted to Total Capital Disbursements, they do not have an effect on the fraction of it that goes to Total Capital Outlay and they decrease Social expenditure. This shows that women representatives may have an effect on increasing loans given and repaid by the state governments, but not on investment in capital goods.

5.2 Revenue Expenditure

Revenue expenditure is devoted to the maintenance of capital goods. Within this type of expenditure there is a broad classification: Development and Non-Development expenditures. Results for these broad subcategories are presented in Tables 9 and 10.

Columns 1 and 4 show the OLS regressions, columns 2 and 5 report results when the women representation variables are divided among those who won in a close election against a man and those who did not. Columns 3 and 6 include men representatives who won in a close election against a woman, to control for the fact that maybe candidates who won in close elections will behave in a different way.

Results in Table 9 show how women representatives have a positive effect on the fraction

of Revenue expenditure devoted to Development. Even if the coefficient for women legislators is not significantly different from that of men legislators, this might be the case because the latter is not precisely estimated. On the other hand, results in Table 10 show how SC/ST are those who drive the effect, moreover this is very different than that of SC/ST men who won in a close election against a SC/ST woman. However, neither SC/ST nor general women legislators have an impact on Non-Development expenditure.

Development Expenditure can be further split into Economic and Social expenditure. Results are shown in Tables 11 and 12. Women representatives have a positive effect on Economic and a negative effect on Social expenditure. However, once the women representatives variable is divided among SC/ST and general women legislators, general women legislators are those who have a positive effect on Economic expenditure, although not very different from that of men, and a negative effect on Social expenditure. Even if for the latter the coefficients for general men and women legislators are not significantly different, this might be the case because the coefficient for men is not precisely estimated.

Tables 13 and 14 report results for the 8 biggest categories within Revenue expenditure. The first four of these belong to Social expenditure: Education, Health, Water Supply and Sanitation and Social Security and Welfare. The next two: Agriculture and Transport and Communications belong to Economic expenditure and Police and State Administration to Non-Development expenditure.

Women representatives increase expenditure in Transport and Communications, while decreasing Social Security and Welfare and Police expenditure. Once the women representation variable is divided among general and SC/ST legislators, SC/ST women legislators increase expenditure in Water Supply and decrease expenditure in Social Security. On the other hand, general women legislators also decrease expenditure in Social Security and Police and increase expenditure in Transport and Communications.

Overall, results in the last two sections show how, when looking at the coefficients for general women legislators, these may indicate class (or income), more than gender differences. Even though SC/ST women reduce Social Security and Welfare expenditure, this can be explained by the fact that it goes to disadvantaged groups, but not to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. But, while SC/ST women increase Development expenditure and expenditure in Water Supply and Irrigation, general women legislators tend to increase Economic while decreasing Social expenditure. This might be an indicator of the class of this legislators if high class legislators tend to care more about economic than social issues.

5.3 Public Goods and Education

Women representatives do not seem to have any effect on Education and Transport and Communications expenditures in the Capital Accounts¹⁴. However, the expenditure measures might be too broad to capture some of the effects. In this section I look at the effect of women representatives on some educational measures, like the number of teachers per thousand individuals for each type of school, and some public goods, like the number of schools per capita and the

¹⁴Results for capital expenditure on education are available from the author upon request. They are not shown in this study because they do not constitute one of the 12 bigger subcategories within Capital Expenditure.

kilometres of surfaced roads over the total state area. These variables will be useful because, given that, for example not all capital expenditure in education will be spent in schools' construction, these public goods measures will give a more detailed insight on how priorities are set by the legislature.

Tables 15 and 16 show the results for the women representation variable and for the SC/ST and general women representation variables respectively. In these tables only the last econometric specification is shown, which is robust to all econometric concerns.

Women representatives increase the number of teachers per thousand individuals in Primary Schools. Moreover, they increase the number of schools per capita, especially Middle and Secondary Schools.

On the other hand, women representatives have a negative impact on the kilometres of surfaced roads, which might be an indicator that this is not a relevant infrastructure for women. Even if this coefficient is not significantly different than that of men, the latter is not precisely estimated.

By looking separately at SC/ST and general women representatives, results are a little bit different. For example, it turns out that once the women representation variable is divided among SC/ST and general legislators, they do not have any effect on the number of teachers per thousand individuals in any type of school.

On the other hand, SC/ST women representatives are those who increase the number of schools per capita, especially the number of Middle schools per capita. However, general women representatives increase the number of Secondary Schools per capita.

These results are very robust and suggest that SC/ST women legislators will favour investment on lower levels education. This can be explained by the fact that SC/ST people have always had less access to education than the rest of the population in India and might not take advantage of secondary education. This effect is even stronger for SC/ST women. However general women legislators, since they are usually part of the elite, will be more interested in higher tiers of education.

As what refers to road construction, only SC/ST women legislators have a negative effect, which indicates that they might not favour investments in this type of infrastructure because they might not take much advantage of it.

5.4 Policy variables

In this section I explore the effects of having higher women representation in the State Assemblies in India in two types of policies, one which is directly targeted to women and another one which targets the poor.

The different states in India have had the power to amend different national laws and to implement different types of land reforms during the time period under consideration.

The Hindu Succession Act (1956) deals with intestate succession among Hindus¹⁵. It includes the concept of the Mitakshara Joint Family, under which on birth, the son acquires a right and interest in the family property. According to this, a son, grandson and great grandson

¹⁵Hindus constitute approximately 80% of the population in India. However, this law applies to anyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.

constitute a class of coparcenaries, based on birth in the family. No female is a member of the coparcenary. Under this system, joint family property devolves by survivorship within the coparcenary.

During the time period under consideration, five states in India have recognized that a daughter needs to be treated equally and become a coparcener in her own right in the same way as the son.

The state of Kerala in 1975 abolished the right to claim any interest in any property belonging to an ancestor during his or her lifetime. They abolished the Joint Hindu Family system, solving the gender differentials in inheritance rights¹⁶.

The other four states, namely Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka instead amended the Hindu Succession law by removing the gender discrimination in the Mitakshara Coparcenary system.¹⁷

I create a variable which is equal to one if the state has passed one of these amendments in that particular year or in the past and zero otherwise.

Land reforms can be considered redistributive policies, aimed at improving the poor's access to land in developing countries. Besley and Burgess (2000) classify land reform acts into four main categories according to the purpose they were designed for. The first category is called Tenancy Reform, which regulates tenancy contracts and attempts to transfer ownership to tenants. The second category of land reforms are attempts to abolish intermediaries. Intermediaries worked under feudal lords and collected rents for the British. They were known for extracting large rents from the tenants. The third category of land reforms implements ceilings on land holdings. The fourth category of land reforms were designed to allow consolidation of disparate land-holdings.

In this study I use a cumulative measure of the first three types of land reforms, the ones primarily designed to tackle poverty. The variable is equal to the sum of the cumulative number of land reform acts in each category passed in the state.

Results for these policies are reported in Tables 17 and 18. In these tables only the last econometric specification is used.

Women representatives who won in a close election against a man have a negative effect on land reforms that is significantly different than men's. However, once SC/ST and general women legislators are considered separately in the regressions, only general women legislators have a negative and significant effect on land reforms. This is consistent with the fact that general women legislators are part of the elite and will then oppose these reforms. It is interesting to note that also general men legislators have a negative effect, but that it is much weaker. This also confirms the fact that maybe general women legislators will belong to comparatively higher classes than general men legislators, since the cost of entering politics is higher for women. On the other hand, SC/ST men legislators have a positive effect on these land reforms, even though SC/ST women legislators have no significant effect. Given

¹⁶The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975.

¹⁷The Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act 1986.

The Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1989.

The Hindu Succession (Maharashtra Amendment) Act 1994.

The Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act 1994.

that poor and socially disadvantaged women in underdeveloped countries do not have access to land, but poor and socially disadvantaged men do, the results obtained for land reforms reflect very clearly the identity of the legislator effect.

Results for the Hindu Succession Law are reported in column 2 of these two tables. In these case women representatives do not have any impact on these amendments. However, results in Table 18 show how only SC/ST women legislators who won in a close election against a man have a positive effect on this policy variable. Moreover, general men legislators who won in a close election against a woman have a negative effect on these amendments. The fact that no effect is found for general women legislators might be due to their class position. In fact, elite women will be less likely to favour women-friendly policies if they perceive themselves as representing the higher classes instead of the women electors. On the other hand low caste women, since reservation is already made for SC/ST people, will be more likely to perceive themselves as representatives for women, apart from representatives for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

6 Conclusions

This paper shows that women legislators have different effects on expenditure, public goods and policy decisions than their male counterparts. Moreover, whether these women legislators belong to scheduled castes/tribes or won the elections for general seats also matters for policy determination.

Scheduled caste and scheduled tribe women legislators favour capital investments, especially on irrigation and low levels of education, and increase revenue expenditure on water supply. They also favour “women-friendly” laws, such as amendments to the Hindu Succession Act, proposed to give women the same inheritance rights as men. On the other hand, general women legislators do not have any impact on “women-friendly” laws, oppose redistributive policies such as land reforms, favour pro-rich expenditure, invest in high tiers of education and reduce social expenditure.

However, unlike results for SC/ST legislators, results for general women legislators are somewhat different than findings for the United States, where women politicians seem to care about social and especially family issues.¹⁸ By taking into account that general women legislators belong to the elite, i.e., they have higher income and better jobs than the average in the state and sometimes belong to a family of politicians (Mishra, R.C. (2000)), these results seem to be explained by the class of these legislators. Moreover, the fact that general women legislators favour investment in secondary schools is consistent with this hypothesis, since only relatively rich women will be likely to attend secondary education.

On the other hand SC/ST women legislators increase capital expenditure in Development, Social services and Irrigation, and also increase revenue expenditure on Water Supply. Moreover, they favour women-friendly laws. These results seem to indicate that SC/ST women legislators identify themselves with women, especially the poor and disadvantaged ones when

¹⁸Papers in the US literature do not take into account the socio-economic position of women legislators. However, US data may not provide the opportunity to do it.

taking their decisions. The fact that both types of women legislators reduce Social Security and Welfare Expenditure in the revenue account is surprising, since some part of this expenditure are transfers to women and children. However, the fact that SC/ST women legislators have a negative impact on this expenditure is less surprising if we consider the fact that this expenditure category does not include transfers to lower castes. Moreover, low caste women legislators invest in lower tiers of education. Given the historical difficulties that low caste women have had to access education, they will be more likely to benefit from this type of education.

Given the difficulties faced by women trying to enter political life, the assumption that general women legislators will belong to the elite is perfectly plausible. Moreover, some of these women decided to work in politics because of their family background. If general women legislators belong to a comparatively higher class than general men legislators, maybe results for these legislators are such that they capture more the “class” than the gender effect. However, SC/ST women legislators will indeed be comparable to SC/ST men legislators, since this is a more homogeneous group. In this case, the gender effect can indeed be captured by results in this paper.

In summary, even though reservation may have other effects on policy which are out of the scope of this paper, one of them would be to increase women representation. However, one has to keep in mind that not only an increase in women representation is important. Since both SC/ST and general women legislators have different effects on the policies adopted, the social and economic position of these women legislators also needs to be taken into account.

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7 Tables and Appendix

TABLE 1

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Capital Outlay	Capital Outlay	Capital Outlay	Capital Share	Capital Share	Capital Share
women	0.4178			0.1191		
	0.2999			0.1434		
women close		1.0796	1.0479		1.1807	1.2148
		1.6874	1.6552		0.7161	0.7556
women no close		0.3166	0.1405		0.0327	0.0685
		0.3091	0.3205		0.1392	0.1401
men close			-3.5270***			0.6935*
			1.2765			0.3713
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	376	376	376
Adjusted R-squared	0.53	0.53	0.55	0.76	0.76	0.77
women=men (pval)			0.03			0.56

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 2

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Capital Outlay	Capital Outlay	Capital Outlay	Capital Share	Capital Share	Capital Share
women	0.1388			0.001		
(SC/ST)	0.2794			0.0829		
women	0.2811			0.1251		
(GEN)	0.2333			0.1295		
women close		2.8515**	2.7900***		-0.1618	-0.0931
(SC/ST)		1.093	1.02		0.3024	0.2961
women close		-0.844	-1.0212		1.2440*	1.2998*
(GEN)		1.2674	1.2424		0.683	0.6779
women no close		0.0652	-0.0301		0.0049	0.03
(SC/ST)		0.2638	0.2727		0.0826	0.0808
women no close		0.3195	0.2085		0.0476	0.0613
(GEN)		0.248	0.2544		0.1303	0.1276
men close			-0.9298			0.8394**
(SC/ST)			1.019			0.3666
men close			-2.6666**			-0.1437
(GEN)			1.2303			0.4164
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	376	376	376
Adjusted R-squared	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.76	0.76	0.77
women=men (SC/ST)			0.01			0.03
women=men (GEN)			0.32			0.05

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 3

Capital Expenditure	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Development	Development	Development	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.
women	0.4203 0.286			-0.0012 0.0336		
women close		0.3257 1.4715	0.2927 1.3843		-0.0188 0.1342	-0.019 0.1348
women no close		0.3712 0.2858	0.1881 0.3013		-0.0008 0.0318	-0.0015 0.0307
men close			-3.6662*** 1.2539			-0.0129 0.095
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	379	379	379
Adjusted R-squared	0.54	0.54	0.56	0.37	0.37	0.36
women=men (pval)			0.04			0.97

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 4

Capital Expenditure	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Development	Development	Development	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.
women	0.108			0.0124		
(SC/ST)	0.2729			0.0258		
women	0.3133			-0.0081		
(GEN)	0.2211			0.0265		
women close		2.6403**	2.5873***		0.1182	0.108
(SC/ST)		1.0391	0.9687		0.0927	0.0947
women close		-1.3518	-1.5381		-0.1303	-0.1307
(GEN)		1.0974	0.9924		0.1063	0.1061
women no close		0.0403	-0.0592		0.0097	0.0089
(SC/ST)		0.2604	0.2697		0.0247	0.0253
women no close		0.3802*	0.2628		-0.0007	-0.0003
(GEN)		0.2196	0.227		0.0269	0.0257
men close			-0.8728			-0.0928
(SC/ST)			1.0068			0.0592
men close			-2.8966**			0.0772
(GEN)			1.1902			0.1073
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	379	379	379
Adjusted R-squared	0.54	0.55	0.56	0.37	0.37	0.37
women=men (SC/ST)			0.01			0.05
women=men (GEN)			0.36			0.17

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 5

Development Exp. (Capital)	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Social	Social	Social	Economic	Economic	Economic
women	-0.0384 0.1376			0.9501** 0.4038		
women close		-0.4696 0.5641	-0.472 0.5649		3.3112* 1.8385	3.2923* 1.875
women no close		0.0025 0.1307	-0.0105 0.1347		0.7054* 0.3652	0.6006 0.4094
men close			-0.2598 0.3943			-2.0995 1.7275
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380
Adjusted R-squared	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.42	0.42	0.42
women=men (pval)			0.71			0.01

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 6

Development Exp. (Capital)	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Social	Social	Social	Economic	Economic	Economic
women (SC/ST)	0.0178 0.0773			0.1661 0.3069		
women (GEN)	-0.0264 0.1146			0.6820** 0.3059		
women close (SC/ST)		0.9075*** 0.2956	0.8533*** 0.2885		1.5827 1.3102	1.5749 1.271
women close (GEN)		-0.9287* 0.527	-0.9388* 0.5223		1.8007 1.6066	1.6902 1.7287
women no close (SC/ST)		-0.0043 0.0784	-0.0129 0.0833		0.1211 0.3082	0.0636 0.3499
women no close (GEN)		0.0395 0.1117	0.0363 0.1155		0.5639** 0.2797	0.4927 0.2984
men close (SC/ST)			-0.5133** 0.2205			-0.3032 1.1387
men close (GEN)			0.2532 0.4065			-1.9071 1.7162
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380
Adjusted R-squared	0.67	0.69	0.69	0.41	0.41	0.41
women=men (SC/ST)			0			0.27
women=men (GEN)			0.03			0.03

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 7

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Capital Expenditure	Economic						Social	
	Roads Bridg.	Transp. Comun.	Ind. Minerals	Energy	Irrigation	Agriculture	Health	Water Sup. S.
women close	-0.0714	-0.1585	0.146	0.5438	2.3840*	0.6495	-0.4441	0.6816
	0.3278	0.4023	0.2238	1.5173	1.4162	0.647	0.4602	0.5505
women no close	0.1583*	0.2827**	-0.0007	0.5563*	0.8939*	0.1317	0.0074	0.0109
	0.0808	0.1324	0.062	0.3199	0.4482	0.1532	0.0812	0.0888
men close	0.1611	0.068	0.0923	-1.3375	-0.6329	-0.9894**	-0.1696	-0.596
	0.3249	0.3859	0.1742	1.1269	1.3544	0.4784	0.2077	0.3806
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	375	380	376	192	228	378	379	189
Adjusted R-squared	0.44	0.3	0.35	0.19	0.59	0.15	0.49	0.76
women=men	0.44	0.63	0.85	0.21	0.15	0.03	0.55	0.04

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 8

Capital Expenditure	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Economic Roads Bridg.	Transp. Comun.	Ind. Minerals	Energy	Irrigation	Agriculture	Social Health	Water Sup. S.
women close (SC/ST)	0.0191 0.1636	-0.1822 0.2293	-0.0156 0.1198	-0.6649 0.8593	1.6964* 0.888	0.1253 0.3905	0.11 0.1908	0.3639 0.2385
women close (GEN)	-0.1952 0.347	-0.1012 0.4034	0.1667 0.1982	1.406 1.3939	-0.1434 1.2379	0.392 0.6327	-0.3778 0.4174	0.3846 0.4782
women no close (SC/ST)	0.0001 0.0651	0.0018 0.0818	0.0248 0.0338	0.0138 0.2418	0.0605 0.2505	0.011 0.115	-0.0187 0.0503	0.0788 0.083
women no close (GEN)	0.1298** 0.0612	0.2159** 0.0978	-0.0327 0.05	0.4640* 0.2621	0.8808** 0.3838	0.1412 0.1062	-0.0119 0.0638	0.0226 0.0737
men close (SC/ST)	0.0116 0.16	0.0271 0.1987	-0.1944* 0.1125	-0.5354 0.7491	-1.8149* 0.9256	-0.5789** 0.2535	0.037 0.1696	-0.2045 0.2221
men close (GEN)	0.0997 0.324	-0.0166 0.4	0.2548 0.1615	-0.7859 1.0877	0.8498 1.3258	-0.4281 0.4499	-0.2351 0.2038	-0.317 0.3965
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	375	380	376	192	228	378	379	189
Adjusted R-squared	0.44	0.29	0.35	0.18	0.61	0.14	0.49	0.76
women=men (SC/ST)	0.97	0.46	0.24	0.9	0.01	0.09	0.78	0.08
women=men (GEN)	0.34	0.85	0.75	0.17	0.43	0.28	0.72	0.27

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 9

Revenue Expenditure	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Development	Development	Development	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.
women	0.3426** 0.1373			-0.8019*** 0.1854		
women close		1.2010* 0.6443	1.2079* 0.6313		0.6099 0.7141	0.5788 0.7287
women no close		0.2682* 0.1359	0.2904** 0.1356		-0.9010*** 0.181	-0.9428*** 0.1819
men close			0.4442 0.4874			-0.8748 0.6241
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	392	392	392	388	388	388
Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.55	0.55	0.56
women=men (pval)			0.32			0.12

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 10

Revenue Expenditure	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Development	Development	Development	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.	Non-Develop.
women	0.0132			-0.108		
(SC/ST)	0.1076			0.1344		
women	0.2602**			-0.6384***		
(GEN)	0.1085			0.1488		
women close		0.9210**	0.8340**		-0.1633	-0.0807
(SC/ST)		0.4137	0.4029		0.4112	0.4079
women close		0.5096	0.529		0.5516	0.481
(GEN)		0.5266	0.5105		0.61	0.6365
women no close		-0.012	-0.013		-0.1048	-0.119
(SC/ST)		0.1068	0.1062		0.1361	0.1355
women no close		0.2371**	0.2526**		-0.7071***	-0.7322***
(GEN)		0.1135	0.1174		0.1529	0.1601
men close			-0.7648***			0.5824**
(SC/ST)			0.2753			0.2829
men close			1.0313**			-1.3238**
(GEN)			0.4795			0.6409
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	392	392	392	388	388	388
Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.55	0.55	0.56
women=men (SC/ST)			0			0.12
women=men (GEN)			0.42			0.04

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 11

Development expend. (Revenue account)	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Economic	Economic	Economic	Social	Social	Social
women	0.5315*** 0.1744			-0.167 0.1582		
women close		2.4027*** 0.7748	2.4327*** 0.7272		-1.1507* 0.5995	-1.1643** 0.5859
women no close		0.3859** 0.1491	0.4293*** 0.1442		-0.0956 0.1471	-0.1152 0.1476
men close			0.9002** 0.4095			-0.4069 0.3705
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390
Adjusted R-squared	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.6	0.61	0.61
women=men (pval)			0.07			0.23

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 12

Development expend. (Revenue account)	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Economic	Economic	Economic	Social	Social	Social
women (SC/ST)	-0.1840*			0.2502***		
women (GEN)	0.0975			0.0895		
women close (SC/ST)	0.4898***			-0.2264*		
women close (GEN)	0.14			0.131		
women close (SC/ST)		0.4652	0.3757		0.3261	0.3364
women close (GEN)		0.5402	0.5414		0.3706	0.3688
women no close (SC/ST)		1.8317***	1.8862***		-1.0841**	-1.1040**
women no close (GEN)		0.6404	0.5929		0.4586	0.4569
women no close (SC/ST)		-0.2027**	-0.1940**		0.2478***	0.2418**
women no close (GEN)		0.0969	0.0964		0.0929	0.0944
men close (SC/ST)		0.4002***	0.4218***		-0.1729	-0.1794
men close (GEN)		0.1148	0.1096		0.1215	0.1212
men close (SC/ST)			-0.6882**			0.0405
men close (GEN)			0.3399			0.2984
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	390	390	390	390	390	390
Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.62	0.62	0.62
women=men (SC/ST)			0.08			0.55
women=men (GEN)			0.37			0.12

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 13

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Revenue Expenditure	Social				Economic		Non-Dev	
	Education	Health	Water supply	Soc. Sec. Welf	Agriculture	Transport Com.	Police	State Adm
women close	-0.5089	-0.2036	0.1094	-0.9575***	0.2673	0.4333*	-0.4786***	-0.3928
	0.3753	0.1577	0.1813	0.2417	0.4353	0.2606	0.1499	0.3012
women no close	-0.0048	-0.0593*	0.0509	-0.0960*	0.3889***	0.1309*	-0.0346	-0.0986
	0.068	0.033	0.0314	0.0517	0.0899	0.0728	0.0237	0.0603
men close	-0.2752	-0.0117	0.0054	-0.0618	0.4975	-0.1224	0.2871	0.6199
	0.2408	0.1182	0.0899	0.1709	0.3134	0.196	0.287	0.3744
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	390	390	225	371	371	371	368	386
Adjusted R-squared	0.74	0.81	0.6	0.52	0.63	0.81	0.71	0.55
women=men	0.63	0.26	0.58	0	0.67	0.05	0.05	0.05

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 14

Revenue Expenditure	1 Social Education	2 Health	3 Water supply	4 Soc. Sec. Welf	5 Economic Agriculture	6 Transport Com.	7 Non-Dev Police	8 State Adm
women close (SC/ST)	-0.1231 0.1932	0.0591 0.108	0.1193* 0.0672	-0.3044** 0.1251	0.2762 0.3081	-0.0308 0.1261	-0.1151 0.0785	-0.0558 0.1734
women close (GEN)	-0.3102 0.3404	-0.2195 0.1405	-0.0215 0.1581	-0.6967*** 0.219	-0.0845 0.4572	0.4249* 0.237	-0.3312** 0.1344	-0.3303 0.2387
women no close (SC/ST)	0.0572 0.0545	0.0011 0.0263	-0.006 0.0184	0.0229 0.0367	-0.069 0.0557	-0.0194 0.0338	-0.0091 0.0183	-0.0613* 0.0349
women no close (GEN)	-0.0137 0.057	-0.0571** 0.0287	0.0425 0.0255	-0.0658 0.0462	0.3714*** 0.072	0.1177** 0.0571	-0.0401* 0.0217	-0.0724 0.0491
men close (SC/ST)	-0.2277 0.1573	-0.0202 0.0864	-0.0213 0.0772	0.1269 0.1297	0.7623** 0.3821	-0.1796 0.1316	0.0447 0.0878	0.0298 0.1611
men close (GEN)	-0.0289 0.2562	-0.0118 0.126	0 0.11	-0.1144 0.1879	-0.3869 0.3665	0.0167 0.2015	0.217 0.2414	0.5221 0.3458
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	390	390	225	371	371	371	368	386
Adjusted R-squared	0.74	0.81	0.6	0.52	0.64	0.81	0.71	0.54
women=men (SC/ST)	0.68	0.57	0.13	0.01	0.2	0.37	0.19	0.72
women=men (GEN)	0.54	0.18	0.9	0.03	0.5	0.15	0.09	0.06

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend and a dummy for the years before 1985 are also included.

The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 15

Public Goods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Teacherspc Primary	Teacherspc Middle	Teacherspc Secondary	Schools pc Total	Schools pc Primary	Schools pc Middle	Schools pc Secondary	Km surf roads (over total)
women close	13.4600*	4.2053	-1.5744	4.7100*	1.0978	1.1083*	0.3751**	-7.3709**
	7.0421	4.4082	2.6892	2.4747	0.9693	0.5656	0.1751	2.973
women no close	0.8482	0.1989	1.8889**	1.7140**	0.5167**	-0.0262	-0.0169	2.8469**
	1.6162	1.2328	0.8658	0.6839	0.2105	0.1024	0.0436	1.082
men close	-2.9885	-2.387	-7.8803***	-2.0671	0.1482	-0.3437	-0.2931**	1.1153
	6.074	2.7972	1.6614	2.4397	0.7949	0.3142	0.1411	3.2756
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	268	268	268	268	316	316	268	203
Adjusted R-squared	0.71	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.95	0.94	0.9
women=men	0.1	0.14	0.02	0.04	0.4	0	0	0.11

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government. Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 16

Public Goods	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Teachers/sc Primary	Teachers/sc Middle	Teachers/sc Secondary	Schools pc Total	Schools pc Primary	Schools pc Middle	Schools pc Secondary	Km surf roads (over total)
women close (SC/ST)	14.5497 11.6761	6.5859 4.0084	-2.6012 2.4667	5.1073** 2.3325	0.3583 0.7719	1.0121** 0.4893	-0.043 0.1318	-7.2214*** 2.3551
women close (GEN)	1.1216 8.172	1.7986 4.0013	-0.3411 2.3544	1.6692 2.2587	0.6046 0.8646	0.4193 0.4812	0.4335*** 0.1418	-3.6698 2.3953
women no close (SC/ST)	0.0454 1.004	-1.7635*** 0.6387	1.0217** 0.5098	0.5708 0.4847	0.1239 0.1683	0.0206 0.0691	0.0620** 0.0296	1.7063*** 0.5732
women no close (GEN)	1.3144 1.7082	0.7966 1.0057	1.1897* 0.6575	1.0384* 0.573	0.3434* 0.1786	-0.0504 0.0898	-0.0464 0.0372	0.7549 0.5144
men close (SC/ST)	-0.5189 3.1303	-0.4306 2.5457	-1.2081 1.0642	-1.5545 1.2903	-0.3363 0.5445	-0.1454 0.2087	0.2236** 0.1087	1.2484 0.9071
men close (GEN)	-5.0367 5.6487	-4.7938* 2.4779	-5.6046*** 1.4303	-1.5268 2.4352	0.448 0.8125	-0.3527 0.3597	-0.3878*** 0.1311	4.2878 2.9132
state effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	268	268	268	268	316	316	268	203
Adjusted R-squared	0.71	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.96	0.94	0.91
women=men (SC/ST)	0.27	0.16	0.64	0.01	0.46	0.03	0.14	0
women=men (GEN)	0.49	0.15	0.03	0.29	0.88	0.14	0	0.09

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 17

Laws	1	2
	Land reform	Hindu Succession
women close	-55.2383*** 14.1678	4.5419 4.1574
women no close	-4.0744 3.1827	1.7326 1.052
men close	2.4746 8.17	-5.5914** 2.2095
state effects	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes
Observations	356	461
Adjusted R-squared	0.92	0.66
women=men	0	0.03

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions.

For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government.

Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

TABLE 18

Laws	1	2
	Land reform	Hindu Succession
women close (SC/ST)	-5.8887 10.1243	9.4976*** 3.0797
women close (GEN)	-45.8248*** 10.8614	-1.673 2.553
women no close (SC/ST)	-4.4080** 2.1691	0.3385 0.5335
women no close (GEN)	-0.9237 2.7136	1.6349** 0.812
men close (SC/ST)	10.0988* 5.1059	-2.1982 1.7095
men close (GEN)	-11.7342* 6.8077	-4.3767** 2.0192
state effects	yes	yes
year effects	yes	yes
economic controls	yes	yes
political controls	yes	yes
Observations	356	461
Adjusted R-squared	0.92	0.69
women=men (SC/ST)	0.18	0
women=men (GEN)	0	0.34

Robust standard errors clustered at the state electoral cycle are reported under the coefficients. * Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%. All columns are OLS regressions. For details on data sources and the construction of variables see the Data Description and the Econometric Specifications sections. Women and men close refers to candidates who won by less than 2.5% of votes against a candidate of the opposite sex. Economic controls include real net state domestic product per capita, state population, the fraction of rural population and grants received from the central government. Political controls include the fraction of seats held by the different parties and a dummy for the year before the elections. A time trend is also included. The p-value for the test of equality of the coefficients between men and women close is reported.

Table A1

Descriptive statistics:					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Pop. Growth	544	0.020038	0.006966	-0.01296	0.03102
Real NSDP pc	522	0.123431	0.051839	0.045215	0.309966
Grants	536	0.426942	0.694855	0.044561	6741605
Rural population	560	0.769835	0.080426	0.5614042	0.9252676
women SC/ST	542	0.041435	0.041896	0.0000	0.240741
women GEN	542	0.036653	0.027301	0.0000	0.142857
women close SC/ST	500	0.002547	0.007434	0.0000	0.044444
women close GEN	500	0.003448	0.005699	0.0000	0.02381
men close SC/ST	500	0.0033605	0.0091374	0.0000	0.0571429
men close GEN	500	0.0034694	0.0068288	0.0000	0.0454545
Congress (prop seats)	544	0.432947	0.259663	0.0000	0.928571
Hard Left (prop seats)	544	0.078792	0.148719	0.0000	0.673469
Regional (prop seats)	544	0.15039	0.240951	0.0000	0.786325
Hindu (prop seats)	544	0.079119	0.130234	0.0000	0.6875
Others (prop seats)	544	0.046261	0.083608	0.0000	0.555556
Janata (prop seats)	544	0.132581	0.203612	0.0000	0.836735
Soft Left (prop seats)	544	0.013527	0.036223	0.0000	0.27044

Table A2

REVENUE EXPENDITURE	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DEVELOPMENT	554	0.6556671	0.0698543	0.3628616	0.7980239
SOCIAL	472	0.3882371	0.0577207	0.1861978	0.6531044
Education	550	0.2140319	0.0432961	0.0854469	0.3773786
Health	550	0.0751791	0.0231543	0.0056658	0.1386906
Housing	448	0.00486	0.0039723	0.00000717	0.0247883
Labour and labour welfare	448	0.0069216	0.0059917	-0.0258231	0.0593069
Social Security Welfare	448	0.0291381	0.020329	0.0000	0.1489918
Welfare SC/ST	264	0.0212783	0.0172942	0.0000	0.0901957
Water supply and sanitation	264	0.0241165	0.0115391	0.0000	0.0594948
ECONOMIC	472	0.2750369	0.0721322	0.001213	0.5307896
General Economic Services	448	0.0160417	0.0201425	0.0003736	0.2661011
Agriculture	448	0.1031637	0.0557867	0.0017507	0.5665448
Industry and Minerals	447	0.0152988	0.0102186	0.0001165	0.0763455
Transport and Communications	447	0.0405094	0.0318742	-0.0016266	0.1781
Water and Power Development	447	0.0994694	0.0678818	-0.3958211	0.368472
NON-DEVELOPMENT	550	0.3294583	0.083895	0.0083134	0.6292282
Organs of the state	466	0.01212	0.0184369	0.0028696	0.4010231
State Administration	546	0.1018509	0.0293427	0.0038017	0.2373397
Police	446	0.0570928	0.0195838	0.0045695	0.1854423
Public Works	447	0.0099368	0.0067125	-0.0127769	0.0477026

Table A3

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DEVELOPMENT	452	0.4529742	0.1590552	-0.4363941	0.8539258
SOCIAL	452	0.0692197	0.0569918	-0.015788	0.4936851
Education	451	0.0087283	0.0088229	0.0000	0.0476581
Housing	452	0.0089661	0.0079298	-0.020768	0.0552299
Health	451	0.0212459	0.0308545	-0.0586123	0.2350102
Welfare SC/ST	258	0.0071205	0.0088164	0.0000	0.0599218
Social Sec Welf	344	0.0025188	0.0046127	-0.0142326	0.0365664
Water supply and sanit.	257	0.031623	0.0447149	0.0000	0.2105254
ECONOMIC	452	0.3780405	0.1559253	-0.482707	1.209.355
Agriculture	449	0.031976	0.0619198	-0.8110804	0.2610976
Industry minerals	447	0.023948	0.0206381	-0.0215158	0.1636151
General Economic Serv.	450	0.0151584	0.0241942	-0.0457434	0.2668729
Transport Communications	452	0.0673348	0.038521	0.0002859	0.3054822
Energy	260	0.0553519	0.0995704	-0.4845973	0.4008722
Irrigation	312	0.1913632	0.1098467	0.0006948	0.6373932
Roads and Bridges	495	0.0595343	0.0398016	0.0000	0.2496927
NON-DEVELOPMENT	451	0.0135494	0.0137817	-0.0225995	0.1072975
LOANS (repayed/given)	452	0.5341795	0.1635959	0.1238153	1384129
Capital out share	448	0.1155003	0.0554509	-0.0407726	0.3775794
Total Disburs. share	448	0.2503434	0.0818953	0.0681453	0.5285614


Table A4

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Laws					
Land reform	430	3.255814	2.616899	0.0000	12
Hindu Succession	616	0.1493506	0.3567234	0.0000	1
Public Goods/Education					
Teachers pc Primary	326	1.964101	0.7057099	0.6955931	6.617233
Teachers pc Middle	326	1.357517	0.7529265	0.2884801	3.41846
Teachers pc Secondary	326	1.501463	0.7053546	0.5054514	3.402602
Total Schools pc	326	1.98609	0.6971945	0.7483083	3.571947
Primary Schools pc	377	0.7467779	0.3089837	0.221277	1.51994
Middle Schools pc	377	0.1927244	0.1126238	0.0428238	0.441846
Secondary Schools pc	326	0.0878352	0.03267	0.0352982	0.1658901
Km surf roads/area	257	0.2709579	0.258427	0.0519514	1.381849

Variable	Fem. Rep. Below median				Fem Rep. Above median			
	Obs	Mean	[95% Conf.Interv]		Obs	Mean	[95% Conf.Interv]	
F. Literacy rate	220	26.57	24.58	28.56	166	26.01	23.76	28.27
M. Literacy rate	220	55.35	53.54	57.16	166	54.53	52.68	56.38
Infant mortality rate	97	93.81	87.57	100.06	115	94.02	88.33	99.71
Gini	241	29.44	28.91	29.96	189	29.55	29.04	30.05
Newspaper circ. Pc	264	0.06	0.05	0.07	232	0.06	0.05	0.07
women as % voters	224	0.58	0.56	0.59	228	0.58	0.56	0.6
turnout	279	0.63	0.62	0.64	281	0.63	0.61	0.64

Table A6

% winners close incumbent			
	mean	sd	Pval diff
women	0.040421	0.016029	
men	0.035501	0.015941	0.8321
% close incumbent			
	mean	sd	Pval diff
women	0.055556	0.036034	
men	0.069444	0.038341	0.8027
n women contesting against			
	mean	sd	Pval diff
women won close	0.285714	0.5603823	
men won close	0.376147	0.6496294	0.2686



year elections
Women Political Representation

Figure 1




Figure 2

DATA APPENDIX	
Electoral data	Election Commission of India: Report on State Elections (various issues)
Public Finance data	Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (various issues)
Population	Census of India
Educational data	Ministry of Education
Roads	Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance (various issues)
Deflator	Indian Labor Journal, Indian Labor Gazette, Indian Labor Journal, Reserve Bank of India Report on Currency and Finance.
Laws	Ministry of Law