

Cant work or wont work: Quasi-experimental evidence on work search requirements for single parents

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- It also increased the probability of claiming health-related benefits (IB/ESA) by between 10-14 ppt
- The probability of being in non-claimant unemployment also increased by around 6ppt
- Effects of the reform larger for those with weaker labour force attachment

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- Very large decrease!

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- LPO did not affect eligibility for other means-tested benefits (HB) or tax credits

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 - lower probability of receiving a job offer (that meets their time constraints) & lower wage

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- Significant amount of data cleaning

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- We examine only outflows from IS not inflows

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- 12 groups; 6 cohorts, 5 pre-LPO and 1 affected by LPO

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
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 - $Treatment_g$ indicator for having older children

Common trends




(a) Probability of claiming an out of work benefit




(b) Probability of being in work

Figure: Differences in outcomes between treated and control groups across cohorts


Outcomes (1/2)



(a) Phase 1



(b) Phase 2



(c) Phase 3

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
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
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- Around 15% of lone parents -not in work and not claiming benefits


LPO Impact (1/4)



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Figure: DiD estimates of LPO impact

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
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
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
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Figure: DiD estimates of LPO impact

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- Impact smaller in Phase 1 compared to Phases 2 & 3
 - LPO smaller change for parents in Phase 1
- Impact larger for lone parents with weaker labour market attachment
 - Measured as % of time spent on IS in the 36 months prior to the observation window


LPO Impact (4/4)

- Share of lone parents induced to move onto states with no search conditionality always larger than share induced to move into work
- Impact smaller in Phase 1 compared to Phases 2 & 3
 - LPO smaller change for parents in Phase 1
- Impact larger for lone parents with weaker labour market attachment
 - Measured as % of time spent on IS in the 36 months prior to the observation window
 - High: 90-100%


LPO Impact (4/4)

- Share of lone parents induced to move onto states with no search conditionality always larger than share induced to move into work
- Impact smaller in Phase 1 compared to Phases 2 & 3
 - LPO smaller change for parents in Phase 1
- Impact larger for lone parents with weaker labour market attachment
 - Measured as % of time spent on IS in the 36 months prior to the observation window
 - High: 90-100%
 - Low: 0-50%

LPO Impact by labour market attachment (1/2)




(a) Phase 1




(b) Phase 2

Figure: LPO impact by labour market attachment

LPO Impact by labour market attachment (1/2)



(a) 3 months after loss of IS entitlement



(b) 12 months after loss of IS entitlement

Figure: Difference in LPO impact on the probability of moving i) onto health-related benefits or non-claimant unemployment and ii) into work

Other results

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Other results

- LPO decreased average earnings (among lone parents with earnings)
 - Consistent with a selection effect
 - LPO induced lone parents with lower earnings potential to enter employment
- No evidence LPO induced lone parents to have another child (to maintain eligibility for IS)

Conclusion

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Conclusion

- We examine the effect of work search requirements on the employment of lone parents and their out-of-work benefits claiming
- Evaluate the LPO reform: a staggered reduction in the age of youngest child entitling lone parents to IS from 16 to 7 years
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- Increase in the probability of moving into a state with no work conditionality always larger than the increase in the probability of moving into work

Conclusion

- We examine the effect of work search requirements on the employment of lone parents and their out-of-work benefits claiming
- Evaluate the LPO reform: a staggered reduction in the age of youngest child entitling lone parents to IS from 16 to 7 years
- LPO \uparrow the inflow to employment but also the inflow into disability benefits and non-claimant unemployment
- Increase in the probability of moving into a state with no work conditionality always larger than the increase in the probability of moving into work
- Impact is higher for lone parents with weak labour market attachment

Thank you

- <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092753711630416X>
- savram@essex.ac.uk

Estimated DiD coefficients :IS

Table: LPO impact on the probability of claiming IS

| Months since predicted loss of entitlement | -9 | -6 | +3 | +9 | +12 | +15 | +24 |
|---|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Phase 1 | 1.4*** | 9.9*** | 46.2*** | 45.5*** | 42.1*** | 37.6*** | 28.7*** |
| Phase 2 | 1.3*** | 7.4*** | 58.0*** | 55.6*** | 53.9*** | 51.3*** | |
| Phase 3 | 1.1** | 4.7*** | 57.1*** | 54.6*** | | | |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Back

Estimated DiD coefficients :JSA

Table: LPO impact on the probability of claiming JSA

| Months since predicted loss of entitlement | -9 | -6 | +3 | +9 | +12 | +15 | +24 |
|---|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Phase 1 | 0.0 | 1.9*** | 24.2*** | 21.4*** | 18.0*** | 14.2*** | 7.3*** |
| Phase 2 | 0.1*** | 1.2*** | 32.8*** | 27.2*** | 25.0*** | 21.7*** | |
| Phase 3 | 0.1*** | 0.5*** | 34.3*** | 27.5*** | | | |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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Estimated DiD coefficients: IB/ESA

Table: LPO impact on the probability of claiming IB/ESA

| Months since predicted loss of entitlement | -9 | -6 | +3 | +9 | +12 | +15 | +24 |
|---|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|
| Phase 1 | 1.3*** | 4.2*** | 10.9*** | 10.7*** | 8.6*** | 7.2*** | 2.3*** |
| Phase 2 | 0.3 | 1.4*** | 12.2*** | 12.1*** | 12.0*** | 11.7*** | |
| Phase 3 | 0.0 | 0.4*** | 10.5*** | 10.9*** | | | |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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Estimated DiD coefficients: Any benefits

Table: LPO impact on the probability of claiming an out of work benefit

| Months since predicted loss of entitlement | -9 | -6 | +3 | +9 | +12 | +15 | +24 |
|---|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Phase 1 | 1.5*** | 6.3*** | 11.1*** | 12.8*** | 13.1*** | 12.6*** | 10.6*** |
| Phase 2 | 0.7** | 4.7*** | 12.6*** | 15.7*** | 16.3*** | 17.5*** | |
| Phase 3 | 0.8** | 3.5*** | 11.8*** | 15.8*** | | | |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

◀ Back

Estimated DiD coefficients: Work

Table: LPO impact on the probability of being in work

| Months since predicted loss of entitlement | -9 | -6 | +3 | +9 | +12 | +15 | +24 |
|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|-------|
| Phase 1 | 1.6*** | 4.8** | 6.9*** | 7.8*** | 8.3*** | 8.9*** | 9.0** |
| Phase 2 | 0.4 | 2.6*** | 6.8*** | 9.7*** | 10.3*** | 11.5*** | |
| Phase 3 | 0.8 | 2.9*** | 7.0*** | 9.6*** | | | |

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

◀ Back

List of controls

- In the first stage, we control for:
 - Age
 - Gender
 - Ethnicity
 - Number of children
 - Ill-health/ disability
 - Summary measure of past employment
 - Summary measure of past welfare receipt
 - Travel to work area
 - Index of Multiple deprivation (ward level)
 - Job Centre district
 - Job Centre district interacted with cohort