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Abstract
The world’s poorest people lack capital and skills and toil for others in occupations that others shun. Using a large-scale and long-term randomized control trial in Bangladesh this paper demonstrates that sizable transfers of assets and skills enable the poorest women to shift out of agricultural labor and into running small businesses. This shift, which persists and strengthens after assistance is withdrawn, leads to a 38% increase in earnings. Inculcating basic entrepreneurship, where severely disadvantaged women take on occupations which were the preserve of non-poor women, is shown to be a powerful means of transforming the economic
lives of the poor.
Keywords: asset transfers, capital constraints, vocational training, occupational
choice, structural change, poverty.
Link to the paper
News Posted: 29 April 2013 [
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This is part of a series of workshops on this theme that Thierry Verdier (Paris School of Economics), Gani Aldashev (Namur), Emmanuelle Auriol (Toulouse School of Economics) and Maitreesh Ghatak (LSE), have been co-organizing for the last two years.
The importance of non-profits in developed countries in the social sectors is well-recognized. At the same time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an ever-increasing and fundamental role in designing and carrying out development projects.
Therefore, the formulation of effective policies towards the development NGO sector requires a good understanding about how NGOs function, how they perform their activities, what is the effect of the NGOs on development.
Given such knowledge, the optimal regulatory framework of the NGO sector can be designed. Thus, both demand for comprehensive body of knowledge about the functioning and performance of the NGO sector is high, both from the policy-makers, the general public,
and the NGOs themselves.
With this in mind, the Economic Organization and Public Policy programme at LSE is hosting the workshop NGO (Non-Profits, Governments, and Organizations) which is being funded by STICERD."
The event will take place 25th and 26th of May 2012. The preliminary program can be found
here
News Posted: 25 April 2012 [
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Abstract
We develop a model of electoral accountability with primaries. Prior to the general
election, the supporters of each of two parties decide which candidates to nominate. We
show that supporters suffer from a fundamental tension: while they want politicians
who will faithfully implement the party's agenda in office, they need politicians who can
win elections. Accountability to supporters fails when supporters fear that by punishing
or rewarding their incumbent for her loyalty or lack thereof, they unintendedly increase
the electoral prospects of the opposing party. Therefore, accountability decreases with
the importance that supporters assign to the elections, and it breaks down in two
cases. First, a popular incumbent safely defects as she knows she will be re-nominated.
Second, an unpopular incumbent defects because she knows she will be dismissed even
if she follows the party line. These behaviors are labeled impunity and damnation
respectively, and are illustrated with case studies.
"The
Lesser Evil: Executive Accountability with Partisan Supporters" (with Erik Snowberg), forthcoming in Journal of Theoretical Politics.
News Posted: 21 November 2011 [
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The paper is joint work with Parikshit Ghosh and was published in
Economic and Political Weekly of India, October 8, 2011, Vol. XLVI, No 41, it is available
here. A shorter version can be accessed
here.
Abstract: The 2011 Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill on land acquisition recently tabled in Parliament is well-intentioned but seriously flawed. Its principal defect is that it attaches an arbitrary mark-up to the historical market price to determine compensation amounts. This will guarantee neither
social justice nor the efficient use of resources. The Bill also places unnecessary and severe conditions on land acquisition, such as restrictions on the use of multicropped land and insistence on public purpose, all of which are going to stifle the pace of development without promoting the interests of farmers.
We present an alternative approach that will allow farmers to choose compensation in either land or cash, determine their own price instead of leaving it to the government’s discretion, and also reallocate the remaining farmland in the most efficient manner. Our proposed method involves a land auction covering not only the project site but also the surrounding agricultural land.
News Posted: 14 October 2011 [
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