Current EOPP Research:
Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk
Gerard Padro i-Miquel (with Sylvain Chassang, Princeton University)
Abstract:
We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for
conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have
different assessments of their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to
define and distinguish predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of conflict.
We show that while weapons have an unambiguous deterrent effect under complete
information, this does not hold anymore under strategic risk. Rather, we find that
increases in weapon stocks can have a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of
peace. We also show that under strategic risk, inequality in military strength can actually facilitate peace and that anticipated peace-keeping interventions may improve
incentives for peaceful behavior.
Related Paper
Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk
