

Cultures of Corruption: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets^{*}

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Abstract: Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats from around the world in New York City. Diplomatic immunity means there was essentially zero legal enforcement of diplomatic parking violations, allowing us to examine the role of cultural norms alone. This generates a revealed preference measure of corruption based on real-world behavior for government officials all acting in the same setting. We find tremendous persistence in corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) have significantly more parking violations. In a second main result, officials from countries that survey evidence indicates have less favorable popular views of the United States commit significantly more parking violations, providing non-laboratory evidence on the role that sentiment and affinity play in economic decision-making.

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1. Introduction

The underlying causes of corruption remain poorly understood and widely debated. Yet the study of corruption beyond the realm of attitude surveys and cross-country analyses is still in its infancy, and there is little microeconomic evidence relating corruption to real-world causal factors. For example, social norms are often mentioned as a primary contributor to corruption in both the academic literature and the popular press, yet there is no evidence beyond the most casual of cross-country empirics.¹

Research on the causes of corruption is compounded by the difficulties inherent in disentangling the effects of social norms from the effects of legal enforcement. Specifically, societies that collectively place less importance on rooting out corruption, and thus have weak anti-corruption social norms, may simultaneously have less legal enforcement. Understanding the real causes of corruption is of central importance in reforming economic and social institutions: if corruption is predominantly norm-based, interventions that focus exclusively on boosting legal reforms will likely fail.

We develop an empirical approach for evaluating the role of social norms in corruption by studying parking violations among international diplomats living in New York City during 1997-2005. Consular personnel and their families benefit from diplomatic immunity, a privilege which allows them to avoid paying parking fines. We examine differences in the behavior of government employees from different countries, all living and working in the same city, all of whom can act with impunity in (illegally) parking their cars. The act of parking illegally fits remarkably well with a standard definition of corruption, i.e., “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,”² suggesting that the comparison of parking violations by diplomats from different societies serves as a credible measure of the extent of corruption cultural norms.

This setting has a number of advantages. Most importantly, our approach avoids the problem of differential legal enforcement levels across countries, and more generally strips out enforcement effects,

¹ See Lambsdorff (2005) for an overview of findings on culture and corruption based on cross-country comparisons. Witzel (2005) provides one of many discussions on the topic in the popular press.

² This is the definition used by the international anti-corruption organization Transparency International (see http://www.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html, accessed online March 9, 2006).

since there was essentially no enforcement of parking violations for diplomats during the main study period. We thus interpret diplomats' behavior as reflecting their underlying propensity to break rules for private gain when enforcement is not a consideration. Additionally, because U.N. diplomats are largely co-located in Midtown Manhattan, we avoid many concerns of unobserved differences across living circumstances.

The first contribution of this approach lies in allowing us to construct a “revealed preference” measure of corruption for government officials across 146 countries. This objective measure, based on real rule-breaking, is arguably an improvement over existing country corruption indices that are typically based on subjective surveys of investors, and it is certainly much cheaper data to collect.³ Existing measures are also difficult to interpret – what does moving from a score of “1” to a score of “2” on a cross-country index really mean? – while our parking violations measure has a much more precise definition and explicitly cardinal interpretation.

In our main empirical result, we find that this parking violation corruption measure is strongly positively correlated with other country corruption measures, and this relationship is robust to conditioning on country income, region fixed effects, and a wide range of other country controls (including government employee salary measures). This finding validates the usefulness of the new measure. It also goes against the predictions of simple economic models of crime in situations of zero legal enforcement (e.g., Becker 1968), which would predict that parking violations would be high for all diplomats. Instead we find that diplomats from low corruption countries (e.g., Norway) behave remarkably well even in situations where they can get away with violations, suggesting that they bring the social norms or corruption “culture” of their home country with them to New York City.

An alternative explanation for this pattern warrants mentioning upfront. It is possible there are stronger social sanctions – for example, public embarrassment upon returning home – in low corruption countries against diplomats who commit many parking violations while in New York, relative to

³ In this sense, our corruption measure is conceptually similar to the *Economist* magazine's “Big Mac Index” as a measure of country purchasing power parity.

diplomats from high corruption countries. If the potential response of the home country, either informally or formally, is responsible for limiting parking violations, then diplomats' behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country's culture rather than their own personal values. However, this is still consistent with our basic interpretation of the level of parking violations as a revealed preference measure of country corruption norms.

The parking violations data are at the individual diplomat level for over 1700 U.N. mission diplomats, allowing us to study how individual behavior changes over time and hence the evolution of corruption norms. For diplomats from high corruption countries of origin, a model of convergence to United States norms of compliance would (presumably) predict a decline in the rate of parking violations over time, as tenure in the U.S. increases. By contrast, a model of convergence to the "zero enforcement norm" would imply an increase in violations over time, particularly for officials from low corruption countries. We do find some evidence for the latter: the frequency of violations increases with tenure in New York City. However, in contrast to models of norm convergence, we do not find a statistically significant interaction effect of home-country corruption levels and tenure in New York, implying there is a similar (proportional) increase in rule-breaking for diplomats across the board from both high and low corruption countries.

The parking violation dataset also provides a novel window into issues of sentiment and affinity in individual decision-making. It is often claimed that sentiment has a major impact on important economic decisions as suggested by, for example, the frequent use of consumer boycotts to pressure corporate policies and the 'capitalization of patriotism' in low yield war bonds. However, the empirical evidence on this score remains contested.⁴ We find that diplomats from countries where popular attitudes towards the United States tend to be unfavorable (based on comparable cross-country survey data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project⁵) have significantly more parking violations⁵ than those from countries

⁴ There is a small but growing literature on consumer sentiment and purchasing behavior. Chavis and Leslie (2006) examine the effect of the Iraq War on French wine sales and find mixed results. In the domain of corporate social responsibility, Hiscox and Smyth (2006) find that 'good labor' labels have a strong impact on consumer demand.

⁵ These data are publicly available online at <http://pewglobal.org/> (accessed March 9, 2006).

where attitudes towards the United States are positive. This setting is one in which diplomats can indulge their personal tastes for rule-breaking without punishment, and it appears that diplomats from countries where the U.S. is unpopular derive positive utility from breaking U.S. rules (or suffer less disutility than other diplomats from doing so).

A final empirical finding is worth highlighting. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, there is a sharp – though temporary – drop in diplomatic parking violations, by roughly 80%. We find that countries with greater Muslim populations experience particularly sharp declines. We can only speculate about the exact causes of this change in behavior, but the fear of police harassment or negative media attention for the home country during that politically charged period is a possibility. There were hundreds of attacks on Muslims in the United States in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2002).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the diplomatic parking situation in New York City and the violations data, section 3 discusses the rest of the dataset, section 4 contains the empirical results and the final section concludes.

2. Diplomatic Parking Violations in New York City

Diplomatic immunity provides consular officials and their families with protection from prosecution or lawsuits in their host country. The original intent of these laws was to protect diplomats from mistreatment in other countries, especially those not on friendly terms with the home country.⁶ However, these days diplomatic immunity is more commonly viewed as the “best free parking pass in town” (BBC 1998). Diplomatic vehicles possess license plates tagged with the letter “D” that signals diplomatic status.⁷ While these vehicles may be ticketed, the car’s registrant was shielded from any punishment of non-payment of the ticket. Thus, one immediate implication of diplomatic immunity – not just in New

⁶ While the origin of diplomatic protection dates back many centuries, the current incarnation of the international agreement on diplomatic immunity is found in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. See http://www.un.int/usa/host_dip.htm for the full text of the document.

⁷ Note that while the vehicle’s diplomatic status is revealed by the license plate, there is nothing that identifies the country of origin of the vehicle’s registrant.

York, but also in most other capitals (e.g., London (BBC 1998), Paris (Agence Presse-France 2005), Seoul (Korea Times 1999)) – has been that it allows diplomats to park illegally but never suffer any threat of legal punishment, leaving a ‘paper trail’ of illegal acts with no consequences.⁸ To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, between November 1997 and the end of 2002 in New York City, diplomats accumulated over 150,000 unpaid parking tickets, resulting in outstanding fines of more than \$18 million.

The parking violations data are at the level of the individual unpaid violation.⁹ Drivers have 30 days to pay a ticket before it goes into default, at which point an additional penalty is levied (generally 110 percent of the initial fine). Diplomats then receive an additional 70 days to pay the ticket plus this penalty before it is recorded as an unpaid violation in default and thus appears in our dataset. The information on each violation includes the license plate number, the name and country of origin of the car’s registrant, the date, time and location of the violation, the fine and penalty levied, and amount paid (if any). Note that the registrant is often the mission itself, signifying an official rather than personal vehicle; these account for 20 percent of total violations. We return to this below in describing our individual-level results. The period of coverage is November 24, 1997 to November 21, 2005. (Refer to the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the New York City parking violations dataset.)

A crucial change in enforcement took place in October 2002, with the implementation of the Clinton-Schumer Amendment (named after the two senators from New York State), which gave the City permission to tow diplomatic vehicles, revoke their official parking permits, and have 110 percent of the total amount due paid from U.S. government aid to the offending diplomats’ countries of origin (Singleton 2004). We mainly focus on the pre-reform period, November 1997 through October 2002. Parking violations actually fell substantially after the reform, suggesting that increased enforcement can sharply reduce corruption, but the basic cross-country patterns remain unchanged as we discuss below.

For most of the analysis we focus on the total amount of unpaid parking violations for a particular country’s diplomats during the period 1997-2002, conditional on the total number of U.N. permanent

⁸ See <http://www.state.gov/m/ds/immunities/c9127.htm>.

⁹ We gratefully acknowledge the New York City Department of Finance, in particular Sam Miller and Gerald Koszner, for compiling these data.

mission staff with diplomatic privileges. We obtain this information from the U.N. Bluebook for May 1998. Published twice annually, the Bluebook lists all U.N. mission staff, as well as their official titles. We additionally use U.N. Bluebooks for 1996 – 2002 to track the U.N. tenure of individual level violators. Fortunately, the Bluebooks use consistent spellings across editions, facilitating automated matching across time. In a majority of cases, the spelling and format were also consistent with the names in the parking violations data; the algorithm matched 70.9 percent of the diplomats in our parking violations database (please see Data Appendix for further details on the matching algorithm). The first Bluebook we use is from February 1996, and we use this as our start date for calculating tenure at the United Nations. – that is, we cannot distinguish among arrival times pre-1996, and all individuals included in the February 1996 Bluebook are coded as being present starting at that date. As a robustness check, we limit the sample only to diplomats who were not present in the first Blue Book (16.4 percent of matched individuals), which allows us to more accurately capture arrival dates, and find similar results.

We also obtained data on the number of diplomatic license plates registered to each mission from the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Foreign Missions. Unfortunately, these data are only available for 2006, though we were assured that these numbers are stable over time.¹⁰

Table 1 presents the annual number of violations per diplomat during November 1997 – October 2002 for each country, along with the total number of diplomats from the May 1998 U.N. Bluebook. Overall, the basic pattern accords reasonably well with common perceptions of corruption across countries. The worst parking violators all rank poorly in cross-country corruption rankings. While many of the countries with zero violations accord well with intuition (e.g., Scandinavian countries, Canada), there are a number of surprises. Some of these are countries with very small missions (e.g., Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic), and a few others have high rates of parking violations but do pay the fines (these are Bahrain, Malaysia, Oman, and Turkey; we return to this point below). The smallest

¹⁰ We thank Murray Smith of the U.S. Office of Foreign Services for providing us with these data and for many useful conversations.

missions may plausibly have fewer violations since each mission is given two legal parking spaces at the United Nations and this may suffice if the country has very few diplomats.

Figure 1 shows the total violations per month during November 1997 – November 2005. There are two clear declines in the number of violations – the first comes in September 2001, corresponding to the period following the World Trade Center attack. The second and more pronounced decline coincides with the implementation of the Clinton-Schumer amendment that allowed the City to take punitive actions against diplomats with unpaid violations.

3. Cross-country data

We also employ country-level data on economic, political, and social characteristics, and in particular consider data on country corruption levels, using the corruption measure in Kaufmann et al (2005) from 1998, the earliest year with wide coverage. This is a composite corruption index that is essentially the first principal component of a number of commonly used corruption indices. By definition, therefore, it is quite highly correlated with the commonly used indices and is extremely highly correlated ($\rho=0.97$) with the Transparency International (TI) ratings from the same year. For ease of interpretation, we reverse the sign of the original measure so that higher values indicate higher levels of corruption. The mean value of this measure is zero, and it ranges from -1.6 to 2.6. The main advantages of this country measure are that its method of aggregation is clearly defined relative to the TI measure, and relative to other indices it has very broad country coverage.

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey from 2002 (the earliest year that the survey was performed) provides a measure of anti-American sentiment based on responses to the question: “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.” This is coded to take on values between one (most favorable) to four (least favorable). To control for general aversion to foreigners, we similarly code responses to a follow-up question from the Pew survey that asks respondents their attitudes towards a dominant regional country (for example, Argentines were asked to give their opinion of Brazil). The five countries in the Pew dataset whose

citizens viewed the U.S. most favorably in 2002 are Honduras, Venezuela, Ghana, Philippines, and Nigeria, while the five that viewed the U.S. least favorably are Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. The preponderance of Middle Eastern countries may in part be due to popular opposition there to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which was imminent by late 2002. Unfortunately, the Pew data are not available prior to 2002 and thus we are unable to explore how changes in popular attitudes over time affect New York City parking violations.

We include a number of variables that capture incentives to comply with local laws. From the data of Kuziemko and Werker (2006), we generate an indicator variable denoting whether the country received foreign aid from the United States in 1998. We similarly generate a pair of indicator variables for military and economic aid, respectively, since these two types of aid may reflect different geopolitical interests – while economic aid recipients may feel beholden to the United States, those receiving military aid are typically countries that the United States requires as allies.

Finally, we consider whether unpaid violations appear to be driven primarily by an income effect. We include the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1998 in U.S. dollars taken from the World Development Indicators. Country-level income per capita is strongly correlated with corruption and with the rule of law, but, as we discuss below, despite this correlation the main results are robust to including income controls. Second, we include the ratio of government bureaucrat's salaries to GDP per capita (using data from Schiavo-Campo et al 1999) for the early 1990s (exact year differs by country) to account for the fact that bureaucrats occupy different positions in the national income distributions.

Our sample constitutes all countries that had 1998 population greater than one million according to the World Development Indicators, and for which basic country-level data were available. Table 2 presents summary statistics for both the country-level and diplomat-level variables.

4. Empirical Results

The main econometric specification in the cross-country analysis is presented in equation 1:

$$\log(1 + \text{Average Annual Unpaid Parking Violations})_i$$

$$= \alpha + \beta_1 \log(\text{Diplomats})_i + \beta_2 \text{Corruption}_i + X_i' \gamma + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where i denotes the country, *Corruption* is the 1998 country corruption index, and X is a vector of other country controls, including the log of GDP per capita in 1998, region fixed effects, among others depending on the specification, and ε is a standard white noise disturbance term.

The New York City unpaid parking violations measure of corruption is robustly positively correlated with the existing country corruption index conditional on the number of U.N. Mission diplomats for that country in New York City (Table 3, regression 1). The relationship is roughly linear (Figure 2). The coefficient estimate on the country corruption index is robust to the inclusion of log per capita income (regression 2) and also to the log of the number of vehicles registered to each mission as a control (regression 3),¹¹ though the point estimate drops by nearly half in the case of the income control. The result is also robust to controlling for the average government wage relative to per capita income (regression 4) and to region fixed effects (regression 5). The regions with the greatest number of unpaid parking violations relative to the reference region (North America and the Caribbean) are Africa and the Middle East. Note that while the coefficient on corruption is robustly significantly significant across this range of specifications, the coefficient on country per capita income is unstable and sensitive to the sample used and choice of covariates.

The strong relationship between the parking violation corruption measure and the country corruption index also holds if the dependent variable is $\log(1 + \text{Average Annual Unpaid Parking Violations} / \text{Diplomats})$ across all specifications (Table 4), and similarly holds if a tobit specification is used rather than OLS (Appendix Table A1).

Since we can follow individual diplomats during their tenure at the U.N., we examine the related question of whether there is gradual evolution of diplomat norms once they move to New York City. Conceptually, the relative plausibility of socialization to U.S. norms versus convergence to a uniform

¹¹ Specifications that allow for more flexible relationships between number of vehicles and violations generate similar results, and imply a monotonic relationship consistent with the functional form we report in the table (results not shown).

high corruption norm is unclear. If convergence is to U.S. norms of corruption, individuals from high corruption countries should have declining parking violations over time, but there should be no change in behavior diplomats from low corruption societies. Alternatively, individuals may begin their stay in NYC unsure as to the extent they can get away with parking violations. Once they successfully “get away with it” a few times and learn about the reality of zero enforcement, diplomats may become bolder in their violations. Convergence to a ‘zero enforcement’ norm predicts increasing parking violations over time, particularly among diplomats from low corruption countries. In practice to estimate these effects we use a regression equation of the form:

$$\begin{aligned} & \log(1 + \text{Monthly Unpaid Parking Violations})_{ijt} \\ & = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{Months in NYC})_{ijt} + \beta_2\{(\text{Months in NYC})_{ijt} * \text{Corruption}_i\} + X_{ijt}'\gamma + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (2) \end{aligned}$$

where i again denotes a country and j denotes an individual diplomat from that country in period t , X_{ijt} is a vector of individual diplomat characteristics, and the final term is the error, which is allowed to be correlated across monthly observations for the same individual. The two key terms in this analysis are β_1 , the effect of increased time spent working as a consular official in New York City on parking violations for diplomats from countries with a corruption index of zero (corresponding to average corruption in the sample), and β_2 , the differential time effect for diplomats from countries with higher corruption.

The frequency of unpaid violations during the pre-enforcement period increases significantly with tenure in New York City (Table 5, regression 1). This result is robust to the inclusion of diplomat fixed effects (regression 2), and to the use of a discrete measure of violations (regressions 4 and 5). In contrast to models of convergence to U.S. norms, we do not find a negative interaction effect of home-country corruption levels and tenure in New York. Rather coefficient estimates on the interaction term are positive and statistically significant, implying that there is, if anything, a divergence in the rate of violations over time, with diplomats from high corruption countries showing increasingly more violations relative to diplomats from low corruption countries over time. However, the point estimates indicate that even

diplomats from low corruption countries (those with corruption index scores between -1 and -2) show some increase in violations over time. Finally, we note that the results are virtually identical if we repeat the analyses dropping individuals that arrived only after our earliest Bluebook was published (results not shown), which allows us to more accurately capture date of arrival. An additional robustness check based on a split of the sample by country parking violations also generated similar results (results not shown).

Various measures of proximity to the U.S. are correlated with fewer unpaid parking violations. First, the log of the weighted average distance between a country's population and the U.S. population is strongly positively correlated with parking violations, even conditional on world region fixed effects (Table 6, regression 1), indicating that countries physically closer to the U.S. have many fewer violations. The exact reasons for this pattern are elusive, but greater trade, migration, and tourism between the countries are possible explanations.¹²

The Pew dataset provides a measure of popular attitudes towards the U.S. in a subset of 42 countries, and here we find that diplomats from countries in which popular attitudes are unfavorable are significantly more likely to have unpaid parking violations (Table 6, regression 2). One possible explanation for this result, which would lead to a spurious correlation, is that individuals in countries that hold negative views about other countries in general also tend to be corrupt. However, the result remains robust when we include an additional attitudes control that reflects responses in the Pew survey to a parallel question on respondents' dislike of a neighboring country (regression 3). The coefficient estimate on this additional control is near zero and not statistically significant while the coefficient estimate on views towards the U.S. remains nearly unchanged and statistically significant at over 90% confidence. The main limitation of this analysis in regressions 2 and 3 is the small sample size of only 42 countries¹³, the countries for which there is micro-survey data from Pew. In contrast, the association between the proportion of Muslim population in a country, which is widely thought to be related to anti-American

¹² For example, trade with the United States is indeed negatively correlated with diplomats' parking violations, but this effect loses statistical significance when we control for geographic distance to the U.S. (results not shown).

¹³ This decline in sample size is responsible for the loss of statistical significance for the coefficient estimate on *Corruption*, which nonetheless remains similar in magnitude to the other specifications.

popular attitudes, is not significantly related to unpaid parking violations whether or not region fixed effects are included as controls (regression 5 – the results without fixed effects are not shown).

The relationship between unpaid New York City parking violations and the country corruption index remains qualitatively similar, but becomes somewhat weaker, during the post-enforcement period after November 2002 (Table 7, regressions 1 and 2). This is in part because overall levels of parking violations fell dramatically (Figure 1). The same is true for the Pew measure of unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S. (regression 3), which remains positively and statistically significantly correlated with parking violations, but with a smaller estimated coefficient. Finally, we note that countries that had higher levels of U.S. economic aid show sharp drops in parking violations after November 2002 (regression 4), although the point estimate on the aid coefficient was similarly negative even in the pre-enforcement period. Thus it does not appear that the new policy of linking U.S. foreign aid to unpaid parking tickets appears was an important component of the decline in violations.

Figure 1 indicates that there was a sharp drop in violations in the months following the September 11 attacks in New York City. We find that countries with larger proportions of Muslim population experience particularly pronounced declines during this period. This finding holds in a specification containing country and month fixed effects (regression 1), when country-specific time trends are included (regression 2), and with an additional income control (regression 3). One potential explanation for this result is that governments in predominantly Muslim countries exerted greater pressure on their diplomats to limit violation in order to avoid arousing local ire in New York City. Alternatively, Muslim diplomats may themselves have wished to be unobtrusive given the surge of anti-Muslim violence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. One further explanation – that missions from Muslim countries might be withdrawing diplomats for safety reasons – can be ruled out: the U.N. Bluebook shows no post-9/11 decline in the number of diplomats from predominantly Muslim countries posted in New York (results not shown).

Further Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations

As noted in the introduction, informal or formal social sanction against diplomats in the home country may be responsible for restraining parking violations in some cases. In such cases, diplomats' behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country's norms or culture rather than their own personal values. We acknowledge that individual values may partially explain our results, but note that this account remains consistent with our interpretation of the level of New York City parking violations as a revealed preference measure of corruption for government officials from a certain country, in the absence of formal legal enforcement.

Nonetheless, two findings argue against this alternative interpretation as the driver of our main finding. First, a Lexis-Nexis search of 504 European news outlets (English language or in translation) using the terms DIPLOMATS and PARKING and NEW YORK yielded only 25 stories during the period under study, and these stories were concentrated in just four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia). This suggests that sanctions for returning diplomats who accumulated parking tickets while abroad is almost universally a non-issue in Europe. Second, we considered whether unpaid parking violations early in an official's tenure at the United Nations in New York City is correlated with the length of his employment there, and further whether these early violations interact in any way with corruption in the country of origin (i.e., perhaps violators from low corruption countries could be punished by their government and sent home early, but that this would not be the case in high corruption countries). We find no evidence for such effects in our data (regressions not shown).

Obviously, neither of these two findings is conclusive. In equilibrium the number of violations committed will reflect choices made to avoid home country sanctions. But they are certainly consistent with the view that home country enforcement was typically weak or nonexistent.

An additional concern is that our country corruption measure may be picking up an income effect. Wealthier diplomats could potentially have greater means to use parking garages or simply pay for any tickets, for example. However, this also seems unlikely. First, as noted above, we find that the index of country corruption robustly explains unpaid parking violations even conditional on national per capita income (and also controlling for the ratio of bureaucratic wages to per capita income). Further, the

inclusion of paid violations in our parking measure has no effect on our main results (Appendix Table A2). Once again, we acknowledge that our tests cannot conclusively rule out that income is playing some role, but the weight of the evidence argues heavily against this explanation.

A final consideration is whether there is a differential selection mechanism for U.N. diplomats across countries that might account for the pattern we observe. In particular, it would be problematic if the relatively more corrupt government officials (within the distribution of officials in a country) were selected for New York postings from high corruption countries. We have no statistical test to explore this possibility, but we feel it is unlikely to be of first-order importance. In fact, to the extent that a selection effect is at work, we expect it to operate in the opposite direction: anecdotal evidence suggests that if anything U.N. postings offer fewer opportunities for graft than other government positions and thus would likely attract relatively less corrupt bureaucrats, possibly dampening the correlation between parking violations and home-country corruption.

5. Conclusion

We exploit a unique natural experiment – the stationing in New York City of thousands of government officials from 146 countries from around the world – in a setting of zero legal enforcement of parking violations to construct a revealed preference measure of official corruption. We find that this measure is strongly correlated with existing measures of home country corruption. This finding suggests that cultural or social norms related to corruption are quite persistent: even when stationed thousands of miles away, diplomats behave in a manner highly reminiscent of officials in the home country. Norms related to corruption are apparently very deeply engrained.

The second main empirical finding is the strong correlation between affinity for the United States in the diplomat's home country and parking violations in New York. This provides real-world empirical evidence that sentiments matter in economic decision-making. Of course, in the case we study the punishment for parking violations was essentially zero (at least in the pre-November 2002 period), allowing individuals to indulge their tastes without penalty.

The most important message of our main result is that corruption norms are sticky. This result raises the critical question of whether there are policy interventions that can modify norms over time. For example, the Bloomberg administration's enforcement efforts in New York City were extremely successful in changing diplomats' behaviors, and it would be extremely useful to know whether these changes might additionally have long-lasting effects on norms once individuals become habituated to rule compliant behavior. Such long-run effects of temporary interventions necessarily rely on a shift in norms, and would be consistent with the findings of Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) on the persistent effects of auditing on corruption in Argentina. Unfortunately, our context does not accommodate this analysis.

More broadly, our methodology of inexpensively generating cross-country data could potentially be applied to other settings where many individuals from many countries are present in the same place for a period of concentrated activity (the Olympics Games, for example). We leave this and other extensions for future work.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Average Unpaid Annual New York City Parking Violations per Diplomat, 11/1997 to 11/2002

Corruption rank	Country name	Violations per diplomat	U.N. Mission diplomats in 1998	Country code
1	KUWAIT	246.2	9	KWT
2	EGYPT	139.6	24	EGY
3	CHAD	124.3	2	TCD
4	SUDAN	119.1	7	SDN
5	BULGARIA	117.5	6	BGR
6	MOZAMBIQUE	110.7	5	MOZ
7	ALBANIA	84.5	3	ALB
8	ANGOLA	81.7	9	AGO
9	SENEGAL	79.2	11	SEN
10	PAKISTAN	69.4	13	PAK
11	IVORY COAST	67.1	10	CIV
12	ZAMBIA	60.4	9	ZMB
13	MOROCCO	60.0	17	MAR
14	ETHIOPIA	59.7	10	ETH
15	NIGERIA	58.6	25	NGA
16	SYRIA	52.7	12	SYR
17	BENIN	49.8	8	BEN
18	ZIMBABWE	45.6	14	ZWE
19	CAMEROON	43.6	8	CMR
20	MONTENEGRO & SERBIA	38.0	6	YUG
21	BAHRAIN	37.7	7	BHR
22	BURUNDI	37.7	3	BDI
23	MALI	37.4	5	MLI
24	INDONESIA	36.1	25	IDN
25	GUINEA	34.8	5	GNB
26	SOUTH AFRICA	34.0	19	ZAF
27	SAUDI ARABIA	33.8	12	SAU
28	BANGLADESH	33.0	8	BGD
29	BRAZIL	29.9	33	BRA
30	SIERRA LEONE	25.6	4	SLE
31	ALGERIA	25.2	13	DZA
32	THAILAND	24.5	13	THA
33	KAZAKHSTAN	21.1	9	KAZ
34	MAURITIUS	20.5	4	MUS
35	NIGER	19.9	3	NER
36	CZECH REPUBLIC	18.9	7	CZE
37	LESOTHO	18.8	6	LSO
38	BOTSWANA	18.5	8	BWA
39	BHUTAN	18.4	5	BTN
40	SRI LANKA	17.2	5	LKA
41	CHILE	16.5	14	CHL
42	TUNISIA	16.5	11	TUN
43	NEPAL	16.5	6	NPL

44	IRAN	15.7	20	IRN
45	FIJI	15.5	3	FJI
46	ITALY	14.6	16	ITA
47	LIBERIA	13.5	6	LBR
48	MALAWI	13.0	6	MWI
49	PARAGUAY	13.0	6	PRY
50	RWANDA	12.9	3	RWA
51	UKRAINE	12.9	14	UKR
52	SPAIN	12.7	15	ESP
53	PHILIPPINES	11.5	20	PHL
54	GHANA	11.3	10	GHA
55	MAURITANIA	11.2	5	MRT
56	GUINEA BISSAU	10.8	10	GIN
57	ESTONIA	10.5	3	EST
58	MONGOLIA	10.2	5	MNG
59	ARMENIA	10.1	4	ARM
60	COSTA RICA	10.1	19	CRI
61	COMOROS	9.9	3	COM
62	TOGO	9.9	5	TGO
63	VIETNAM	9.8	15	VNM
64	GEORGIA	9.7	8	GEO
65	CHINA (PRC)	9.5	69	CHN
66	YEMEN	9.1	8	YEM
67	VENEZUELA	9.1	16	VEN
68	PORTUGAL	8.8	16	PRT
69	UZBEKISTAN	8.8	5	UZB
70	MADAGASCAR	8.7	8	MDG
71	TANZANIA	8.3	8	TZA
72	LIBYA	8.2	9	LBY
73	KENYA	7.7	17	KEN
74	CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)	7.7	6	COG
75	CROATIA	6.5	9	HRV
76	DJIBOUTI	6.5	3	DJI
77	SLOVAK REPUBLIC	6.4	12	SVK
78	FRANCE	6.1	29	FRA
79	INDIA	6.1	18	IND
80	LAOS	6.1	9	LAO
81	TURKMENISTAN	5.8	4	TKM
82	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5.5	3	PNG
83	HONDURAS	5.4	6	HND
84	SLOVENIA	5.2	8	SVN
85	KYRGYZSTAN	5.2	5	KGZ
86	NICARAGUA	4.9	9	NIC
87	URUGUAY	4.4	11	URY
88	SWAZILAND	4.3	7	SWZ
89	TAJIKISTAN	4.3	4	TJK
90	NAMIBIA	4.2	11	NAM
91	MEXICO	4.0	19	MEX
92	ARGENTINA	3.9	19	ARG
93	SINGAPORE	3.5	6	SGP

94	ROMANIA	3.5	10	ROM
95	UGANDA	3.5	7	UGA
96	HUNGARY	3.3	8	HUN
97	MACEDONIA	3.3	4	MKD
98	BOLIVIA	3.1	9	BOL
99	PERU	3.1	9	PER
100	HAITI	3.0	9	HTI
101	JORDAN	2.9	9	JOR
102	BELARUS	2.7	8	BLR
103	BELGIUM	2.7	14	BEL
104	CYPRUS	2.5	11	CYP
105	GUYANA	2.3	5	GUY
106	AUSTRIA	2.2	21	AUT
107	GABON	2.2	8	GAB
108	RUSSIA	2.0	86	RUS
109	LITHUANIA	2.0	7	LTU
110	EL SALVADOR	1.7	10	SLV
111	POLAND	1.7	17	POL
112	GAMBIA	1.5	8	GMB
113	MALAYSIA	1.4	13	MYS
114	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	1.4	6	TTO
115	LEBANON	1.3	3	LBN
116	GERMANY	1.0	52	DEU
117	ERITREA	0.8	3	ERI
118	MOLDOVA	0.7	4	MDA
119	KOREA (SOUTH)	0.4	33	KOR
120	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.1	22	DOM
121	FINLAND	0.1	18	FIN
122	GUATEMALA	0.1	9	GTM
123	NEW ZEALAND	0.1	8	NZL
124	SWITZERLAND	0.1	10	CHE
125	UNITED KINGDOM	0.0	31	GBR
126	NETHERLANDS	0.0	17	NLD
127	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.0	3	UAE
128	AUSTALIA	0.0	12	AUS
129	AZERBAIJAN	0.0	5	AZE
130	BURKINA FASO	0.0	5	BFA
131	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	0.0	3	CAF
132	CANADA	0.0	24	CAN
133	COLOMBIA	0.0	16	COL
134	DENMARK	0.0	17	DNK
135	ECUADOR	0.0	9	ECU
136	GREECE	0.0	21	GRC
137	IRELAND	0.0	10	IRL
138	ISRAEL	0.0	15	ISR
139	JAMAICA	0.0	9	JAM
140	JAPAN	0.0	47	JPN
141	LATVIA	0.0	5	LVA
142	NORWAY	0.0	12	NOR
143	OMAN	0.0	5	OMN

144	PANAMA	0.0	8	PAN
145	SWEDEN	0.0	19	SWE
146	TURKEY	0.0	25	TUR

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Observations
Panel A: Country-level data			
Annual unpaid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/1997-11/2002 ^a	2.06	1.41	146
Annual unpaid and paid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/1997-11/2002 ^a	0.28	0.35	146
Annual unpaid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/2002-12/2005 ^a	1.88	1.85	146
log(Diplomats in the country U.N. Mission, 1998) ^b	2.21	0.69	146
Log(1+Number of license plates registered to the country's U.N. Mission, 2006) ^c	1.97	0.90	146
Country corruption index, 1998 ^d	-0.01	1.01	146
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$) ^e	7.39	1.58	146
Average government wage / Country per capita income, early 1990s ^f	2.83	2.38	92
log(Weighted distance between populations) ^g	9.11	0.42	146
Proportion Muslim population, 2004 ^h	0.28	0.37	146
Unfavorable views towards the United States ⁱ	2.23	0.49	42
Unfavorable views towards other countries ⁱ	2.25	0.51	42
Received U.S. economic aid, 1998 ^j	0.69	0.47	144
Received U.S. military aid, 1998 ^j	0.63	0.48	144
Panel B: Diplomat-level data			
Monthly New York City parking violations, 11/1997-11/2002 ^a	0.32	0.65	14408
Length of time at the U.N. Mission in New York City (in months) ^b			

Sources:

^a New York City, Parking Violations Database (provided to the authors by the New York City Department of Finance in December 2005).

^b United Nations Bluebook 1998.

^c U.S. Department of State Office of Foreign Missions (provided to the authors by Deputy Director Murray Smith in April 2006).

^d Composite index from Kaufmann et al. (2005), but here higher values indicate more corruption.

^e World Development Indicators (2005).

^f Schiavo-Campo et al. (1999); exact year differs by country.

^g Mayer and Zignago (2005)

^h US Department of State (2004)

ⁱ Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002.

^j Data from Kuziemko and Werker (2006).

Table 3: Country Characteristics and Unpaid New York City Parking Violations (in logs), 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement)

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(Diplomats)	0.86*** (0.24)	1.04*** (0.24)	0.35 (0.24)	1.28*** (0.31)	1.12*** (0.26)
Country corruption index, 1998	1.04*** (0.15)	0.56** (0.24)	1.04*** (0.15)	0.92*** (0.33)	0.72*** (0.25)
Log(1 + Diplomatic Vehicles)			0.59* (0.26)		
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)		-0.42** (0.16)	-0.42** (0.16)	-0.19 (0.25)	-0.23 (0.19)
Average government wage / country per capita income				0.03 (0.11)	
Africa region indicator variable					2.92*** (0.67)
Asia region indicator variable					2.23*** (0.72)
Europe region indicator variable					2.30*** (0.66)
Latin America region indicator variable					1.60** (0.77)
Middle East region indicator variable					2.83*** (0.89)
Oceania region indicator variable					1.99** (0.91)
Observations	146	146	146	92	146
R ²	0.23	0.26	0.26	0.33	0.34
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.2)	3.8 (2.1)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Table 4: Country Characteristics and Unpaid New York City Parking Violations per Diplomat (in logs), 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement) – alternative specification

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations/Diplomat)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Country corruption index, 1998	0.61*** (0.08)	0.27* (0.15)	0.49** (0.21)	0.38** (0.17)
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)		-0.27** (0.11)	-0.08 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.13)
Average government wage / country per capita income			0.05 (0.08)	
Region indicator variables	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	146	146	92	146
R ²	0.19	0.22	0.25	0.32
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	2.1 (1.4)	2.1 (1.4)	2.0 (1.4)	2.1 (1.4)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Table 5: Unpaid Parking Violations over Time for Diplomats, 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement)

	Dependent variable:				
	log(1 + Monthly NYC Parking Violations)			Any Monthly NYC Parking Violation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Length of time in New York City	0.083*** (0.020)	0.185*** (0.024)	0.185*** (0.024)	0.147*** (0.015)	0.146*** (0.015)
Length of time in New York City * Country corruption index, 1998			0.030** (0.014)		0.026*** (0.008)
Diplomat Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14408	14408	14408	14408	14408
R ²	0.03	0.44	0.45	0.32	0.32
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	0.32 (0.65)	0.32 (0.65)	0.32 (0.65)	0.32 (0.65)	0.32 (0.65)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors with clustering by diplomat. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Observations are at the diplomat-month level. The length of time in New York City is in months.

Table 6: Unpaid Parking Violations and Proximity to the U.S., U.S. Aid, and Affinity with the U.S., 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement)

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
log(Diplomats)	1.15*** (0.25)	0.46 (0.51)	0.41 (0.53)	1.11*** (0.27)	1.13*** (0.26)
Country corruption index, 1998	0.72*** (0.24)	0.72 (0.52)	0.83 (0.56)	0.70*** (0.25)	0.71*** (0.25)
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.46 (0.35)	-0.42 (0.36)	-0.32 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.19)
log(Weighted distance of population from U.S.)	1.65*** (0.58)				
Unfavorable views towards the U.S. (Pew)		2.55** (1.14)	2.28* (1.27)		
Unfavorable views towards other countries (Pew)			0.57 (0.66)		
Received U.S. economic aid				-0.70 (0.52)	
Received U.S. military aid				0.56 (0.35)	
Proportion Muslim population					0.20 (0.47)
Region indicator variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	146	42	42	144	146
R ²	0.37	0.47	0.48	0.35	0.34
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	3.8 (2.1)	4.4 (2.1)	4.4 (2.1)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.1)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Table 7: Country Characteristics and Unpaid New York City Parking Violations (in logs), 11/2002 to 12/2005 (post-enforcement)

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Diplomats)	0.42*** (0.11)	0.52*** (0.12)	0.24 (0.29)	0.53*** (0.13)
Country corruption index, 1998	0.30*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.11)	0.41 (0.31)	0.40*** (0.12)
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)		0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.10)
Unfavorable views towards the U.S. (Pew)			1.29*** (0.40)	
Received U.S. economic aid				-0.53** (0.23)
Received U.S. military aid				0.08 (0.17)
Region indicator variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	146	146	42	144
R ²	0.14	0.24	0.34	0.27
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	1.1 (0.9)	1.1 (0.9)	1.3 (0.9)	1.1 (0.9)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Table 8: Unpaid New York City Parking Violations and Muslim Population after September 11, 2001

	Dependent variable: log(1 + Monthly NYC Parking Violations)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Post 9/11 * Proportion Muslim population	-0.32** (0.15)	-0.48** (0.19)	-0.32** (0.16)
Post 9/11 * log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)			-0.007 (0.053)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-specific time trends	No	Yes	No
Observations	7493	7493	7493
R ²	0.78	0.82	0.78
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	2.7 (1.7)	2.7 (1.7)	2.7 (1.7)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors with clustering by country. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. Observations are at the country-month level, for the period December, 1997 – November, 2002.

Appendix Table A1: Country Characteristics and Unpaid New York City Parking Violations (in logs), 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement)
 – tobit specifications

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Diplomats)	0.89*** (0.27)	1.11*** (0.28)	1.35*** (0.35)	1.17*** (0.27)
Country corruption index, 1998	1.19*** (0.19)	0.63** (0.29)	1.05** (0.40)	0.83*** (0.30)
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)		-0.48** (0.20)	-0.22 (0.31)	-0.27 (0.22)
Average government wage / country per capita income			0.01 (0.11)	
Region indicator variables	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	146	146	92	146
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.1)	3.8 (2.2)	3.8 (2.1)


Notes: Tobit specifications. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Appendix Table A2: Total New York City Parking Violations, paid and unpaid (in logs), 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement)

	Dependent variable: log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Diplomats)	1.00*** (0.21)	1.12*** (0.21)	1.38*** (0.28)	1.19*** (0.22)
Country corruption index, 1998	0.96*** (0.15)	0.62*** (0.22)	1.14*** (0.31)	0.73*** (0.23)
log(Per capita income, 1998 US\$)		-0.29** (0.15)	0.05 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.17)
Average government wage / country per capita income			0.15** (0.07)	
Region indicator variables	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	146	146	92	146
R ²	0.27	0.29	0.45	0.41
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)	4.1 (1.8)	4.1 (1.8)	4.2 (1.9)	4.1 (1.8)

Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.

Figure 1: Total Monthly New York City Parking Violations by Diplomats, 1997-2005 (log scale)



Data Appendix

(1) New York City Diplomatic Parking Violation Data

The New York City Department of Finance supplied listings of all unpaid parking violations of U.N. Missions. The violations covered the period from November 24, 1997 to November 21, 2005. In order to appear in the database, a violation had to go unpaid for at least 100 days. Data were at the level of the violation, and included the following entries for each violation:

- Summons: Unique identification number for the violation
- License plate number of the violating car
- The person to whom the violating car was registered, often the mission itself
- Time of violation: included both hour and minute as well as calendar date
- Type of violation, e.g. “FIRE HYDRANT” or “EXPIRED METER”
- Street address of violation
- Initial dollar value of fine issued
- Additional dollar penalty for having not paid the fine on time
- Amount paid towards the fine, generally zero
- country: Name of country to which the car is registered

Data on U.N. diplomats’ paid parking violations (violations that did not go into arrears) were made available to us in aggregate form by the New York City Department of Finance. For each country, we were given statistics for the pre-enforcement period of November 24, 1997 – October 31, 2002 and the post-enforcement period of November 1, 2002 – November 21, 2005.

(2) Country Corruption Index

We use the aggregate measure of Kaufmann et al (2005) for the year 1998. Data are available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset>

(3) World Region Classification

United Nations region code data, available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>, was used to classify countries into the following regions: (1) North America (including Carriibbean), (2) South America, (3) Europe, (4) Asia, (5) Oceania, (6) Africa, (7) Middle East

The Middle East was defined as: Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen

(4) International Trade Data

Trade data (utilized only in unreported regressions) are taken from <http://dataweb.usitc.gov/>

(5) Geographic Distance From U.S.

Distance from the United States is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2005). Their measure uses city-level data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside each nation. The idea is to calculate distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. In practice, nearly identical results are obtained using the distance of countries’ capitals from Washington, D.C.

(6) United Nations Bluebooks

The United Nations issues its list of mission personnel, or Bluebook, twice yearly. We utilize edition numbers 280 (May 1998) through 288 (August 2002). Documents were retrieved from the UN Official Document System (ODS), available at <http://documents.un.org/advance.asp>. Searching for the symbol ST/SG/SER.A/### with truncation turned off returns the relevant Blue Book (where ### is the Blue Book edition number).

(7) Mission Staff Counts

Edition 280 (May 1998) was checked by hand to count the mission staff and spouses for each country in the Blue Book, producing the following variables.

- Mission: Indicator variable indicating whether the country had a U.N. mission
- Staff: Simple count of staff; staff members were always listed with their surnames in bold

(8) Longitudinal Staff Data

Bluebook edition numbers 278 through 288 were converted into plain text format. A name-matching program then checked these text files against a list of names extracted from the NYC parking violations data. Names were converted to regular expressions to improve match quality (since names from parking violation data often used forward slashes in place of apostrophes and dashes). A name was considered to have matched (and thus to have been present at the date of the Bluebook's publication) if its first name and last name appeared on the same line in the Bluebook. If a name matched more one time in the same Blue Book, its matches were checked by hand. The matching program also recorded the staff position, which was specified on the line following the match, and the country of the mission in which the match was found. This country was checked against the country as specified by the parking violation data to verify the accuracy of the matches. Finally, in a small number of cases (20 diplomats), we found that there were gaps in the individual's appearance in the Blue Book, even though in some cases parking violations in vehicles registered to these individuals took place during the purported absence. We omit these observations from our analyses, but in practice their inclusion does not affect the point estimates or significance of our results (results not shown).

(9) Diplomatic Vehicles

Data were provided by Murray Smith, Deputy Director at the U.S. State Department's Office of Foreign Missions in April 2006. These data report counts of the number of vehicles with diplomatic license plates registered to each mission in early 2006.

(10) Muslim Population

Data were taken from the religious demography sections of the U.S. State Department's 2004 International Religious Freedom Report, available online at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/>

(11) US Military/Economic Foreign Aid Data

These data were provided to us by Iliana Kuziemko and Eric Werker. We utilize data on aid flows from 1998. See Kuziemko and Werker (2006) for details.