Market Structure and Innovation:  
A Dynamic Analysis of the Global Automobile Industry*

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Abstract

The question how market structure and innovation are related has been extensively studied in the literature. However, no studies exist for the automobile industry, which spends more on R&D than any other industry. We fill this gap by studying the relationship between market structure and innovation in the global automobile industry for the 1980-2005 period. We use the dynamic industry framework of Ericson and Pakes [1995] and estimate the parameters of the model using a two-step procedure proposed by Bajari et al. [2007]. Since the industry has seen a lot of consolidation since 1980, mergers are an important ingredient of our model.

After estimating the parameters of the model, we simulate the industry forward and study how changing market structure (mainly due to mergers) affects innovative activity at the firm as well as at the industry level. Our findings are the following: (1) The effect of market structure on innovation in the global auto industry depends on the initial state. If the industry is not very concentrated, as it was in 1980, some consolidation may increase the innovative activity. However, if the industry is already concentrated, as in 2005, further consolidation may reduce the incentives to innovate. (2) Mergers reduce the value of merging firms though they may increase the aggregate value of the industry. (3) Mergers between big firms eventually reduce consumers’ utility.

Key words: Competition and Innovation; Automobile Industry; Dynamic Games

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1 Introduction

In this paper, we investigate how changes in industry structure interact with the innovative activity of the incumbent firms in the global automobile industry. The question of interaction between market structure and innovation has been the subject of intense research since Schumpeter [1950]. However, there is hardly any study on the global automobile industry. This is surprising given the fact that the global automobile industry has not only undergone interesting changes in its market structure in recent years, but is also one of the most innovative industries in the global economy.

The global automobile industry has seen significant consolidation over the last few decades. Many of the industry giants have found it beneficial to join hands with some of their former rivals. The mergers between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler and between Hyundai and Kia, the association between Renault and Nissan and the takeover of Mazda, Jaguar and Volvo by Ford are but a few examples of this consolidation. On the one hand, this consolidation is the result of increased competition, which has made it harder for smaller firms to survive on their own. On the other hand, consolidation intensifies competition as the emerging groups are highly research intensive. The top 13 firms in the auto industry spent more than 55 billion dollars on R&D in 2005 and have obtained more than 50,000 patents from the US patent office between 1980 and 2004.

Increasingly, producing cars is a highly research intensive activity: in 2003, more than 13% of all R&D in the OECD was spent in ISIC industry 34 ‘Motor Vehicles’, more than in any other industry. Statistics in Table 1 illustrate the comparative importance of R&D in the automotive industry for the OECD and the three largest economic blocs. The industry is concentrated worldwide, guaranteeing that the main firms will take actions of competitors into account when deciding on their own innovative activities. In 2005, more than 85% of all vehicles were produced by the 13 largest firms, which are active in all major regions of the world.

At the most fundamental level, two features are necessary for innovation to take place. First, firms need to be able to finance innovation, i.e. there needs to be a margin between price and marginal cost. Second, firms need to have an incentive to innovate, i.e. innovation has to increase expected profits. Both conditions are clearly satisfied in the automobile industry. Demand estimates for this industry—see for example Berry et al. [1995] or Goldberg [1995]—reveal that markups over marginal costs tend to be large, consistent with the view that fixed costs are important in this

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1 Kamien and Schwartz [1982], Cohen and Levin [1989], Ahn [2002] and Gilbert [2006] are surveys of the relevant literature.

2 Throughout, we do not distinguish between minority share holdings and outright control. E.g. Mazda is counted as part of the Ford group, even though Ford Motor Co. never held more than 33.4% of Mazda’s shares (achieved by 1996).
industry. Innovation is also likely to advance a firm’s competitive position through higher product quality and reliability, the introduction of desirable features in its products, or lower production cost. A large number of analysts makes a living measuring these benefits for consumers and investors alike.\(^3\)

Unlike most of the studies that use reduced form regressions to study the relationship between market structure and innovation, we do so in a strategic and dynamic environment. There are at least two reasons for this. First, innovation is inherently a dynamic activity. Firms make R&D investments today expecting uncertain future rewards through better products or more efficient production. The magnitude of these benefits are intricately linked to the future market structure and the level of innovation of competitors.\(^4\) Merging or forming strategic alliances with rivals is also best analyzed in a dynamic framework. Mergers interact with innovation through their influence on market structure as well as through the consolidation of the knowledge stock in the industry. The global automobile industry seems an ideal place to study these two forces and their interaction.

Second, we now have computationally tractable methods to estimate models of dynamic competition. In this study, we employ a recently developed technique in the estimation of dynamic games that does not require one to solve for the equilibrium of the game, see Bajari et al. [2007]. Our study is one of the first to put these new techniques to a practical test, demonstrate their usefulness and highlight some practical difficulties associated with their application.\(^5\)

The principal objective of our paper is to study the response of firms in terms of their innovative activity to changes in the level of competition — a combination of market structure and the level of innovation of all market participants. We do so in a dynamic environment in which firms produce differentiated products that differ in quality. Firms invest in R&D to improve the quality of their products and to lower the cost of production. The market share of a firm depends on the relative quality of its product and the price, which is set strategically in each period. Investments in R&D increase the technological knowledge of the firm but the exact outcome of R&D is uncertain. On average, higher knowledge translates into a higher quality product and lower marginal cost. The investment in R&D is modeled as a strategic decision: a firm takes the actions of its rivals and their possible future states into account before making its R&D decision. In addition, firms incorporate potential future mergers into their expectations.

\(^3\)To name but a few, *J.D. Power* and *Consumer Reports* measure defect rates in vehicles; numerous consumer magazines and internet sites compare the performance and discuss the features of vehicles; and *Harbour Consulting* and *KPMG* continuously compare productivity in the industry.

\(^4\)Aghion and Griffith [2005] provide an overview of the issues involved and review some popular modeling approaches.

\(^5\)Among a growing list of (working) papers using various approaches, we can point the interested reader to the following applications: Ryan [2006], studying the effect of environmental regulation on the cement industry; Collard-Wexler [2005], studying the effect of demand fluctuation in the ready-mix concrete industry; Aguirregabiria and Ho [2006], studying the airline industry; and Sweeting [2006] estimating switching costs for radio station formats.
First, we obtain an estimate of our only dynamic parameter—the cost of innovation—which can only be pinned down in a dynamic game-theoretic model. Preliminary estimates put the R&D cost to obtain one new patent (in expectation) at $17.2m if marginal costs decline linearly with knowledge or at $14.8m if we limit the model to product innovations, i.e. marginal costs are constant. These numbers seem reasonable, given that the observed median for the R&D to patent ratio in our sample is $14.9m and the mean is $15.6m.

Second, with parameter estimates in hand, we study how changes in market structure affect the intensity of innovation. Our main finding is that if the industry is fragmented, some consolidation may improve the innovation intensity. However, once the industry is concentrated enough, any further consolidation will only reduce innovation incentives.

Third, we study the effects of mergers on firm values and on consumers’ utility. We find that mergers destroy some value of the merging firms. However, they help rivals by reducing the extent of competition in the market. The overall effect of mergers on aggregate industry value is positive if merging firms are large in size. These large mergers, however, have negative effects on consumers’ utility. On the other hand, consumers seem to benefit when relatively smaller firms merge.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The supply and demand side of the model as well as the Markov perfect equilibrium concept we rely upon are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the data. The two-step estimation methodology and the coefficient estimates are discussed in Section 4. In the first step, we estimate all the static parameters and generate the value functions using forward simulation. In the second step, we estimate the only dynamic parameter of the model. The impact of changes in market structure on incentives for innovation, firm value and consumer utility is in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.

2 The Model

Our modeling strategy follows Ericson and Pakes [1995]. There are \( n \) firms, each producing a differentiated vehicle. Firms differ in their technological knowledge, which is observable by all market participants as well as by the econometrician, and in a firm-specific quality index, known to the market participants but not observed by the econometrician. We denote the technological knowledge of firm \( j \) (\( j = 1, 2, \ldots, n \)) by \( \omega_j \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) and the quality index by \( \xi_j \in \mathbb{R} \). For the industry as a whole, the vectors containing \( \omega \) and \( \xi \) are denoted by \( s_\omega \) and \( s_\xi \). For later use, we define the vectors of \( \omega \) and \( \xi \) excluding the firm \( j \) as \( s_\omega^{-j} \) and \( s_\xi^{-j} \). We also define \( s = \{ s_\omega, s_\xi \} \) and \( s^{-j} = \{ s_\omega^{-j}, s_\xi^{-j} \} \).

Time is discrete. At the beginning of each period, firms observe \( s \) and make their pricing and investment decisions (see below). Although the pricing decisions are static, the investment decisions are dynamic and depend on the current as well as expected future states of the industry.
Firms invest to increase their technological knowledge. A higher level of knowledge may boost demand, for example, by improving vehicle quality or by introducing more innovative product features. It may also reduce marginal cost by improving the efficiency of production. Hence, the model features both product and process innovation. The effect of R&D investment on knowledge is the sum of a deterministic and a random component, capturing that innovation is a stochastic process. The technological knowledge depreciates at an exogenous rate.

There is no entry or exit in our model, reflective of the evolution of the industry over the last 25 years. However, a firm may ‘exit’ by merging with another firm. Mergers are an important component of our model as they lead to discrete changes in the market structure and force the firms to readjust their prices and investments to take new industry structure into account. In our model, mergers take place for exogenous reasons, but firms take them into account when forming expectations over future valuations. In the remainder of this section we describe the demand and supply sides in some detail and then define the Markov perfect equilibrium of the model.

2.1 The Demand Side

Following Berry et al. [1995] and several others studying the automobile industry, we use a discrete choice model of individual consumer behavior to model the demand side. There are \( n \) firms in the industry producing differentiated vehicles. Vehicles differ in quality, which has two components. The first component, observable to the market participants as well as the econometrician, is positively related to the firm’s technological knowledge, \( g(\omega) \), with \( \partial g(\omega)/\partial \omega \geq 0 \). The second component (\( \xi \)) is unobservable to the econometrician, but firms and consumers know it and use it in their pricing and purchase decisions.

There are \( m \) consumers in the market in each period and each of them buys one vehicle. \( m \) grows at a constant rate that is exogenously given. The utility of a consumer depends on the quality of a vehicle, its price and the consumer’s idiosyncratic preferences. The utility consumer \( i \) gets from buying vehicle \( j \) is

\[
    u_{ij} = \theta_\omega g(\omega_j) + \theta_p \log(p_j) + \xi_j + \nu_{ij}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, m, \quad j = 1, \ldots, n.
\]

For simplicity, we will assume that the observable vehicle quality equals \( \log(\omega_j + 1) \) and \( \xi_j \) is the unobservable quality (to the econometrician). \( p_j \) is the price of the vehicle produced by firm \( j \) and is adjusted for vehicle characteristics such as size and performance characteristics. \( \theta_\omega \) and \( \theta_p \) are preference parameters. \( \theta_\omega \) shows how quality conscious the consumers are and \( \theta_p \) is a measure of their price elasticity. \( \nu_{ij} \) is the idiosyncratic utility that consumer \( i \) gets from good \( j \). Assuming it
is i.i.d. extreme value distributed, gives the following expected market share for firm \( j \):

\[
\sigma_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, p_j, s^{-j}, p^{-j}) = \exp\left(\frac{\theta_\omega \log(\omega_j + 1) + \theta_p \log(p_j) + \xi_j}{n} \right) \sum_{k=1}^{n} \exp\left(\frac{\theta_\omega \log(\omega_k + 1) + \theta_p \log(p_k) + \xi_k}{n} \right),
\]

(2)

where \( p_j \) is the price charged by firm \( j \) and \( p^{-j} \) is the price vector of all the other firms (excluding firm \( j \)) in the industry. The expected demand for vehicle \( j \) is simply \( m\sigma_j(\cdot) \). Each firm’s demand depends on the full price vector in the industry, directly through the denominator of (2) and indirectly through its own price because its equilibrium price is a function of its rivals’ prices.

### 2.2 The Supply Side

We begin our explanation of the supply side with the period profit function. We assume that R&D investments only generate useful knowledge with a one period lag and that prices can be adjusted flexibly period by period. Hence, at the beginning of each period, after observing their individual and industry states, the firms engage in a differentiated products Bertrand-Nash game. Each firm chooses its own price to maximize profits, taking the prices of its rivals \( (p^{-j}) \) and industry state \( (s) \) as given.

The profit maximization problem of an individual firm \( j \) is

\[
\pi_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}, p^{-j}) = \max_{p_j} \left\{ (p_j - mc_j(\omega_j))m\sigma_j(\cdot) - fc_j \right\},
\]

(3)

where \( mc_j \) is the marginal cost incurred by firm \( j \) to produce a vehicle. The marginal cost is a function of the firm’s knowledge, capturing cost reducing process innovations. \( fc_j \) is the fixed cost of operations faced by firm \( j \). For now, the fixed cost does not play any role.

The first order condition for firm \( j \), after some simplification, is

\[
(p_j - mc_j(\omega_j))[1 - \sigma_j(\cdot)]\theta_p + p_j = 0.
\]

(4)

Since there are \( n \) firms, we have to solve \( n \) such first order conditions simultaneously to obtain the equilibrium price vector \( p^* \).\(^6\) Equilibrium profits are given by

\[
\pi_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) = (p_j^* - mc_j(\omega_j))m\sigma_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, p_j^*, s^{-j}, p^{*-j}).
\]

(5)

Once we know the functional form and parameter values of the demand and cost functions, we can evaluate (5) for any industry state \( s \).

The investment in R&D is a strategic and dynamic decision. Each period, firms choose their R&D investment based on the expected value of future profit streams. The problem is recursive

\(^6\)The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this context has been proved by Caplin and Nalebuff [1991].
and can be described by the following Bellman equation

\[ V_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) = \max_{x_j \in \mathbb{R}^+} \{ \pi_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) - cx_j + \beta EV_j(\omega_j', \xi_j', s'^{-j}) \}, \]  

(6)

where \( \beta \) is the discount factor, \( c \) is the R&D cost per unit of new technological knowledge and \( x_j \) is the addition to new knowledge. A prime on a variable denotes its next period value. \( c \) is the only dynamic parameter in our model that we estimate. The solution to (6) is a policy function \( x_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) \).

The knowledge stock of the firm evolves as follows:

\[ \omega_j' = (1 - \delta) \omega_j + x(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) + \epsilon_\omega \]  

(7)

where \( \delta \) is the depreciation rate of technological knowledge and is exogenously given. \( \epsilon_\omega \) is a random shock that represents the uncertainty involved in doing R&D. A firm that spends \( cx \) on R&D will, on the average, increase its knowledge stock by \( x \). We assume that \( \epsilon_\omega \) follows a well defined and known distribution.\(^7\)

We assume an exogenous AR(1) process for the evolution of the unobserved component of quality (\( \xi \)).

\[ \xi_j' = \rho \xi_j + \epsilon_\xi \]  

(8)

2.3 Mergers

Given the recent evolution of the global automotive industry, there is no need to consider entry or exit, but we do need to deal with mergers. During the 26 year period we study (1980–2005), a total of 9 mergers, acquisitions and associations took place among the 22 initial firms in our sample. These were: Ford-Jaguar (1989); GM-Saab (1990); Ford-Volvo (1998); Daimler-Benz-Chrysler (1998); Hyundai-Kia (1998); Toyota-Daihatsu (1999); Renault-Nissan (1999); and Ford-Rover (2000). Table 2 indicates how these events have reshaped the structure of the industry.\(^8\)

There is no clear pattern in the merger activity, making it nearly impossible to predict. Sometimes a merger is forced on a firm, as happened to Hyundai when the Korean government wanted it to bail out Kia after the Asian economic crisis in 1998. In several instances, a larger firm has taken over a smaller one, not unexpected in an industry with large scale economies. Such attempts are not always successful. Several alliances were tried out before a complete merger was attempted, but fell apart, e.g. DaimlerChrysler with Mitsubishi and GM with Isuzu and Suzuki. At the same time,\(^7\)

\(^7\)This law of motion for the state variable is less general than the one in the main analysis in Ericson and Pakes [1995], as depreciation is deterministic, but more general than the example they analyze in detail, as we allow \( x \) to take on a continuum of values.

\(^8\)Prior to our sample, in 1979, Ford and Mazda entered into an ‘international partnership’, with Ford taking a 25% stake (increased to 33.4% in 1996).
several smaller companies are thriving in spite of incessant merger predictions. Honda, BMW, and Porsche are consistently among the most profitable firms in the industry. There have also been instances of two large firms merging or joining forces in one form or another. The merger between Chrysler and Daimler-Benz is the most recent such example and the association between Nissan and Renault is another. Even among larger firms, attempts to cooperate sometimes fail as with Renault and AMC (1979–1987) and with DaimlerChrysler and Hyundai (2000–2004).  

It is especially difficult to introduce mergers in our simple model with only two state variables. The benefits of a higher level of knowledge—product and process innovations that boost demand and reduce costs—can be captured instantaneously. This precludes as a motive for merging the combination of a large firm that has many models and dealerships with a smaller firm that has a higher level of technological knowledge. Given that the policy function is estimated concave in a firm’s own knowledge (see below), gaining scale economies in R&D or product development can also not explain mergers in our model.

In the absence of any clear pattern, it seems reasonable to assume that mergers are random and occur with an exogenously given probability. We pick this probability to match the average observed merger rate. To avoid reaching a monopoly state, we model the expected number of mergers as a declining function of $n$ (see the calibration of the merger probability in the Appendix) and we impose a lower threshold on the number of active firms on competition policy grounds. This is consistent with Klepper [2002a] and Klepper [2002b], which argue that the U.S. automobile industry has settled into a stable oligopoly. An alternative solution would be to introduce entry, but it would require more radical changes in the empirical strategy. In practice, entry has not played an important role in the evolution of the global market structure, although this could change with the development of the Chinese and Indian automotive industries.

Even with this simple merger technology we need to specify the state variables for the newly created firm and how each firm incorporates possible mergers in the evaluation of its future value. First, we assume that when two firms merge, the knowledge of the new firm is the sum of the individual knowledge stocks. Another possibility would be to allow for complementarities in the knowledge stock or, at the other extreme, assume some overlap in knowledge and discount the sum. All three assumptions are equally arbitrary, but we feel that simply adding the two knowledge stocks is closest in spirit to the state transition function for knowledge used throughout. We further assume that the unobserved quality of the vehicle produced by the merged firm is the average of the unobserved qualities of the vehicles produced by the original firms. This assumption finds some support in the data when we estimate $\xi$’s as the residuals from our demand equation.

Second, consider the situation where $A$ and $B$ are the only firms in the industry and their respective states are $(\omega_A, \xi_A)$ and $(\omega_B, \xi_B)$. There is an exogenous probability $p_m$ each period that

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9Past our sample period, even the full-blown merger between Chrysler and Daimler-Benz become undone.
they will merge. Firm A will incorporate this information in the calculation of its value functions as follow:

\[
V_A(\omega_A, \xi_A, \omega_B, \xi_B) = \max_{x_A \in \mathbb{R}^+} \left\{ \pi_A(\omega_A, \xi_A, \omega_B, \xi_B) - cx_A(\omega_A, \xi_A, \omega_B, \xi_B) + \beta \left[ p_m \zeta_A(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B) EV_A(\omega'_A + \omega'_B, (\xi_A + \xi_B)/2) + (1 - p_m) EV_A(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B) \right] \right\},
\]

(9)

where \(\zeta_A(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B)\) is the share of firm A in the total value of the merged firm. We assume that it is simply the ratio of the stand alone value of A in the sum of the values of both firms in absence of the merger:

\[
\zeta_A(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B) = \frac{EV(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B)}{EV(\omega'_A, \xi'_A, \omega'_B, \xi'_B) + EV(\omega'_B, \xi'_B, \omega'_A, \xi'_A)}. 
\]

The same idea extends to an industry with more firms, but the computations become more involved—see the Appendix for details.

To summarize, in each period, the sequence of events is the following:

1. Firms observe individual and industry states.
2. Pricing and investment decisions are made.
3. Profits and investment outcomes are realized.
4. Individual and industry states are updated before the mergers.
5. Mergers are drawn randomly (see Appendix for details).
6. The state variables of merged firms are adjusted and the industry states are updated accordingly.

### 2.4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium

The Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the model consists of \(V(\omega, \xi, s), \pi(\omega, \xi, s), x(\omega, \xi, s)\) and \(Q(s', s)\) such that:

1. \(V(\omega, \xi, s)\) satisfies (16) and \(x(\omega, \xi, s)\) is the optimal policy function;
2. \(\pi(\omega, \xi, s)\) maximizes profits conditional on the state of the industry;
3. \(Q(s', s)\) is the transition matrix that gives the probability of state \(s'\) given the current state \(s\).
Estimating the parameters in the period profit function—demand and supply parameters—is fairly standard. The one dynamic parameter in the model that we estimate, $c$, the cost of R&D, poses a greater challenge. There are at least two ways to proceed. The first is to compute the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), as defined above, from a starting value of $c$ and use maximum likelihood estimation, as in Rust [1987] or Holmes and Schmitz [1995], to fit the observed investment decisions to the predictions from the model’s Euler equations. Having solved for the equilibrium one can simulate the model and study the dynamics of interest. Benkard [2004] uses a similar approach in his study of the market for wide-bodied commercial aircraft. The main disadvantage of this approach is that the numerical solution for the MPE is computationally very intensive, despite some recent innovations by Pakes and McGuire [2001], Doraszelski and Judd [2004] and Weintraub et al. [2005].

The second is a two-step approach proposed by Bajari et al. [2007]. Their method allows for the estimation of the policy and value functions and for the recovery of structural parameters of the model without having to compute the MPE. They get around the problem of computing the equilibrium by assuming that the data we observe represent an MPE. This assumption is not completely innocuous. For example, in the auto industry firms often undergo structural changes with adjustments spread over many years. During this transition period, firms do not behave as they would in equilibrium. A prime example would be the three-year recovery plan Renault initiated at Nissan, when it took control of the troubled Japanese automaker. Similarly GM and Ford, having lost a big chunk of their market share in recent years, are undergoing massive restructuring. Their decisions during this restructuring phase are likely to be different from their decisions in a stable equilibrium. Nevertheless, the assumption that firms always play their equilibrium strategy sounds reasonable and, more importantly, does away with the need to compute the MPE.

Given this assumption, the first step proposed by Bajari et al. [2007] is to estimate the state transition probabilities and the equilibrium policy functions directly from the observed information on investments and the evolution of the two state variables. Together with estimates of the period profit function, these can be used to obtain the value functions by forward-simulation. In the second step, the value function estimates from the first step are combined with equilibrium conditions of the model to estimate the structural parameter(s). In Section 4 we elaborate on these steps in some detail and explain how we apply them to our model. First, we describe the data set.

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10 Alternative approaches that avoid computing the MPE at each iteration include Aguirregabiria and Mira [2007] and Pakes et al. [2005].

11 Another implication of this assumption is that one has to rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria or simply assume that multiple equilibria may exist but the firms only play one and the same equilibrium in all periods. For a review of the problem of multiple equilibria in these models and its possible solutions see Section 6 in Doraszelski and Pakes [2006].
3 Data

We choose our sample period to be 1980–2005. This period covers most of the consolidation that has taken place in the industry over the last few decades. We limit the sample to the largest 13 firms (in terms of unit sales) that are active in 2005. The industry has seen significant consolidation over the last 25 years and working back to 1980, these 13 groups emerged from 22 initially independent firms. Throughout, we do not distinguish between full and partial ownership ties, e.g. Nissan and Renault are treated as a single firm after they initiated an alliance in 1998, even though Renault never obtained majority control. Table 2 lists all firms in the initial and final year of the sample. In 2005, our sample accounted for slightly more than 85% of global automobile production. The remaining 15% was produced by a large number of small firms. Since patenting activity of these small firms is negligible and other information on them is spotty, we ignore these fringe firms.\(^{12}\)

In order to estimate the parameters we need data on the following four variables: gross additions to a firm’s knowledge \((x)\); knowledge stock \((\omega)\); market share; and prices. Our measure of gross addition to a firm’s knowledge is the number of U.S. patents issued to a firm in a calendar year.\(^{13}\) Patent information is taken from the database of the National University of Singapore (NUS), which covers the period 1975–2004. Its main advantage over the more widely used NBER’s patent database is that coverage is extended beyond 1999. Since different subsidiaries of the same firm might file for patents, we searched the database using several variations of the names of each firm and manually scrolled through the results to make sure that all appropriate patents were included.

Our measure of the knowledge stock of a firm is its ‘patent stock’. Using the number of patents issued to each firm for the period 1975–2004, we construct the patent stock using the perpetual inventory method: \(\omega_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)\omega_t + \tilde{x}_t\).\(^{14}\) The sum of patents awarded to each firm from 1975 to 1979 gives the initial patent stock at the beginning of the year 1980. We then depreciate this patent stock at a constant rate \(\delta\) and add the patents issued in 1980 to obtain the patent stock at the beginning of 1981. Continuing this forward, we can construct the patent stock for each firm up

\(^{12}\)The only sizeable firm in 1980 not included in our sample is Lada in the USSR. British Leyland in the U.K. was part of the Rover Group and AMC in the U.S became 46% owned by Renault shortly after 1979.

\(^{13}\)Patents are a widely used as a measure of innovation output. In his survey on use of patents as a measure of technological progress, Griliches [1990] concludes: “In spite of all the difficulties, patents statistics remain a unique resource for the analysis of the process of technical change.” [p. 1701] Because of the nature of the industry, all firms patent in the U.S. It is reasonable, though, to assume that the decision to patent an invention in the U.S. or not is different for firms not active in the U.S. vehicle market. We control for this in the estimation of the policy function.

\(^{14}\)The difference between this equation and the law of motion for the knowledge stock, equation (7), is that the firm plans to obtain \(x_t\) patents, but the randomness in the innovation process yields the observed \(\tilde{x}_t = x_t + \epsilon\) new patents, with \(E(\tilde{x}_t) = x_t\).
Our measure of innovation (i.e. the number of patents issued) is only available at the firm level and is assumed to be useful for the firm’s worldwide activities. Our empirical counterpart to output is the number of vehicles produced worldwide by each firm and its affiliates. This information is obtained from Ward’s Info Bank, the Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks, and is supplemented by information from the online data center of Automotive News for the most recent years. Market share of a firm is computed as the ratio of the number of vehicles produced by a firm to the total number of vehicles produced in the global market.

To construct prices for these ‘composite’ models, we estimate a hedonic price regression for all available models in the market. The log of the list price is the dependent variable and a host of vehicle characteristics as explanatory variables—see Goldberg and Verboven [2001] for an example.\footnote{Bajari and Benkard [2005] discuss the performance of hedonic pricing models when some product characteristics are unobservable.} We include a full set of firm-year interaction dummies and these coefficients capture the relative price for each firm in each year. The log price is relative to the base firm—GM—exactly as needed to estimate the demand equation in (10) below. For now, we estimate the hedonic regression only for the U.S. passenger vehicle market, updating the data set in Petrin [2002] to 2004. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of these prices for a number of firms. We are in the process of compiling similar information for the European and Japanese markets to estimate prices representative of the firms’ worldwide sales.\footnote{The relevant price will then be the weighted average of the firm-year dummies from separate hedonic regressions in the three regions, using for each firm its sales in the region as weight.}

\[\text{Figure 1 approximately here}\]

## 4 Estimation Methodology and Results

### 4.1 Step 1

We now describe the estimation methodology, which closely follows Bajari et al. [2007]. In the first step, we estimate the demand and cost of production parameters, the transition probabilities and policy functions and use them to evaluate the value functions using forward simulations. The results will be presented immediately following the relevant piece of the model.
4.1.1 Estimation of Demand Parameters

The demand side in our model is static and we do not need the full model to estimate the demand parameters. Following Berry [1994] we can write the log of the market share of firm \( j \) relative to a base firm \( 0 \) as

\[
\log[\sigma_j(\cdot)/\sigma_0(\cdot)] = \theta_\omega \log[(\omega_j + 1)/(\omega_0 + 1)] + \theta_p \log[p_j/p_0] + [\xi_j - \xi_0].
\] (10)

Using the observed market shares and with data on \( \omega \)'s and prices, we can estimate the above equation by OLS to get the estimates for \( \theta_\omega \) and \( \theta_p \). However, as producers use information about the unobserved vehicle quality (\( \xi \)) in their pricing decisions, prices will be correlated with the error term and OLS estimates will be inconsistent. In particular, we expect the price coefficient to be upwardly biased. We use an IV estimator and follow the instrumenting strategy of Berry et al. [1995]: the sum of observable characteristics of rival products is an appropriate instrument for own price. In our case, this boils down to just the sum of rivals’ knowledge. The residuals from (10) are our empirical estimates of \( \xi \) relative to GM.

The demand parameters using three different estimation methods—least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (IV) without and with time fixed-effects—are in Table 3. The impact of knowledge, \( \theta_\omega \), is estimated similarly under all three specifications: it has a positive impact on sales, as expected, and is estimated very precisely.

The price coefficient is estimated negatively, even with OLS, which ignores the correlation between price and unobserved product characteristics. Often, OLS estimates of product level discrete choice demand systems produce a price coefficient that is positive or close to zero. A firm’s patent stock seems to control for a lot of the usually unobserved quality variation that can lead to an upward bias in the price coefficient. Note that we do not observe any other characteristic; the price variable controls for any observable differences in the products offered by each firm.

Instrumenting for price with the knowledge stock of competitors leads to an estimated demand curve that is more elastic; again in line with expectations (see for example Berry et al. [1995], Table III). Including time dummies increases the elasticity further. Using the estimates in the third column, the price elasticity varies between -7.2 and -1.96. Without enforcing the first order conditions for optimal price setting, all firms are estimated to price on the elastic portion of demand, consistent with oligopoly theory. The price-marginal cost markups implied by these estimates are below those obtained in other studies that estimate demand systems for car models (see, for example, Berry et al. [1995]). This is reasonable because we work at a much higher level of aggregation. At the firm level, a much larger fraction of costs will be variable than at the model

\[^{17}\text{We estimate the demand, cost, and policy functions pooling data across all years; time subscripts are omitted. Throughout, we use GM as the base firm.}\]
level. At the same time, the residual demand for a firm will be less elastic than for an individual model.

[Table 3 approximately here]

For the results in the third column, a 1% price increase has the same effect on demand as a 13% increase in the knowledge stock. A value of 0.20 for $\theta_\omega$ means that a firm with a patent stock that is half of GM’s patent stock, will on average have a market share that is 13% lower than GM’s, holding price constant.

The average $\xi$ for each firm is reported in Table 4. These $\xi$’s are residuals from the demand equation, averaged for each firm over the period of our sample. Some of these are intuitive. For example, Chrysler has a lower value than Daimler-Benz and the cheapest brand, Hyundai, also seems to have the lowest unobserved quality. Other values, especially for some of the European firms, look surprisingly large. The reason is that for these firms we are likely to underestimate the knowledge stock as they are less prone to register their patents at the US Patent Office (USPO). At the other extreme, some firms that patent a lot, such as Honda and Chrysler, are estimated to have lower $\xi$. Precisely the opposite effect.

4.1.2 Estimation of Production Cost Parameters

We do not observe marginal cost, but once we have the estimates for $\theta_\omega$, $\theta_p$, and the vector $\xi$ from the demand system, we use the system of first order conditions (4) to recover marginal costs. Assuming firms are setting prices optimally, we solve for the marginal costs that rationalize the observed prices and market shares. While it is possible to impose optimal price setting in the demand estimation to increase precision, we chose not to as it would force the price elasticity to exceed unity. We denote this new variable by $mc$ and plot it against the patent stock in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 approximately here]

For low values of the patent stock there is no clear relationship between the two. Once the stock exceeds a thousand patents, there is a clear negative relationship: a higher patent stock is associated with lower marginal cost. It seems that in this industry, patenting is associated with product innovations, boosting demand, as well as process innovations, lowering production cost.

While the marginal costs we recover vary by firm and year, we need to be able to predict marginal costs at any possible state in order to calculate the value function. Assuming that $mc$ is a linear function of $\omega$, we can run a simple OLS regression of the form

$$mc_j = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \omega_j + \epsilon_j^c.$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)
In addition, we use two alternative specifications: (i) we impose that \( \gamma_1 = 0 \), to study the case in which marginal cost is constant and does not vary with the technological knowledge of the firm; (ii) we use \( \log(\omega_j + 1) \) instead of \( \omega_j \), to impose diminishing returns to knowledge in terms of cost savings. The parameter estimates are in Table 5.

4.1.3 Estimation of the Policy Function

The next task is to characterize the policy function from the observed investment decisions. Ideally, the control variable \( x \) should be modeled as a completely flexible function of a firm’s own state and the full vector of its rivals’ states that are contained in the vector \( s \). Bajari and Hong [2005] discuss the resulting distribution of the estimator if this step is carried out nonparametrically. In our application, we observe at most 22 firms over 25 years, which forces us to estimate this relationship parametrically.

We postulate the following parsimonious policy function:

\[
x_j = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \omega_j + \alpha_2 \omega_j^2 + \alpha_3 \sum_{k \neq j} \omega_k + \alpha_4 \text{rank}_j + \epsilon_j.
\] (12)

Optimal innovation depends nonlinearly on the firm’s own knowledge stock, the combined knowledge accumulated by its rivals, and the firm’s knowledge rank in the industry. We expect innovation to be concave in own knowledge, declining if the accumulated stock becomes too large. Eventually, depreciation could even lead to declining knowledge stocks.

Under our assumption that firms always play their equilibrium strategy, the OLS estimate of the above equation will in effect give us the equilibrium policy of the firm as a function of its own and the industry state. The error term in equation (12) captures the approximation error between the true policy function \( x(\omega_j, \xi_j, s) \) and the one we estimate.

The policy function estimates are in Table 6. Results in the first column are OLS estimates for the entire sample. The coefficients on ‘own stock’ and ‘own stock squared’ have the expected positive and negative signs respectively. However, the coefficient on the squared variable is statistically

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18 Clearly, many alternative characterizations are possible. We plan to investigate the robustness of our estimates to more flexible specifications. We do not include \( \xi \) in this policy function because of data constraints. We currently have on average seven observations per firm in the demand estimation, which is not enough to estimate an AR(1) process for \( \xi \) for each firm separately. As described below, in the forward simulations we use the average \( \xi \) for each firm. We tried adding our empirical \( \xi \)’s directly to the policy function, but the coefficient was statistically insignificant and we lost 70% of the data. We have 491 observations to estimate the policy function, but just 155 observations on empirical \( \xi \)’s. For now, we dropped \( \xi \) from the policy function estimation. We hope to overcome this problem when we have more data in future.
insignificant. It turns out that this result is driven by a small number of outliers; illustrated in Figure 3 which plots the number of new patents granted against the depreciated patent stock. For patent stocks below 1200, there is a clear positive relationship between the flow of new innovations and the existing stock. Above 1200, there is no clear pattern, but the relationship is certainly not as steep as for the bottom-left observations. However, due to six outliers for which a firm is awarded more than 600 new patents in a single year, the relationship appears to be positive.

[Figure 3 approximately here]

Running the same OLS regression excluding these outliers, the estimates of both the linear and squared coefficients on a firm’s own patent stock are higher (in absolute value), and estimated much more accurately. The $R^2$ also jumps from the first to the second column. The results now clearly suggest an increasing but concave relationship between innovation and patent stock.

[Table 6 approximately here]

In contrast, the combined patent stock of a firm’s rivals is a negative predictor for innovation. The effect is estimated relatively precisely and large in absolute value. At the margin, a firm with a stock of one thousand patents, is estimated to increase its new patent target by 0.17 for each additional patent it holds. If all its 21 rivals held one additional patent, the firm is estimated to lower its target for new patents by 0.055. In fact, raising the patent stock for all firms in the industry by one is estimated to lower innovation for all firms with a stock of more than 1320 patents, which is not an uncommonly large stock as can be seen from Figure 3.

This result plays an important role when we forward simulate the value function. It limits the number of patents a firm wants to accumulate over time, reinforcing the effect of the negative coefficient on the square of own patents. Without these effects the total patent stock in the industry would grow implausibly large, especially if we allow for process innovations that lower marginal costs.

Finally, the coefficient on own rank—a variable indicating how many other firms hold a larger patent stock—is not estimated significantly different from zero whether the regression is run on the full sample or omitting the outliers. Conditional on the own patents and the cumulative total of the rivals, the rank does not seem to play a role. Excluding the rank variable, results in column (3) of Table 3, the estimated values for the other three coefficients hardly change, but their standard errors decline. These are the estimates we will use in the simulation of the value function.
4.1.4 Estimation of the State Transition Function

The state transition function for the knowledge stock $\omega$ is given by (7). It is measured as the accumulated stock of past patents, which decreases exogenously in value because of economic obsolescence of knowledge and expiration of patent rights and increases with newly awarded patents $(x)$.\footnote{This idea of patent stock is similar to the one used by Cockburn and Griliches [1988].}

The only parameters in the state transition function are the depreciation rate ($\delta$) and the parameters of the distribution of $\epsilon^\omega$. We do not estimate these parameters from the data, but assign them values that we believe are reasonable.

We assume a depreciation rate of 15\% ($\delta = 0.15$).\footnote{Of course, we use the same value of $\delta$ to construct the patent stock from patent data.} This is the same depreciation rate used in Cockburn and Griliches [1988] to construct R&D stock. It captures both patent expirations and the economic obsolescence of older knowledge. The standard deviation of $\epsilon^\omega$ is set to 10\% of $x$. Given the assumption of a normal distribution with mean zero for $\epsilon^\omega$, a firm that chooses to have 100 new patents in a particular year has a 67\% probability of ending up with 90 to 110 patents.\footnote{Although we choose the standard deviation of $\epsilon^\omega$ arbitrarily, our estimate of the structural parameter $c$ is hardly affected by this choice.}

An alternative approach would be to let the control $x$ be the value of R&D and estimate a patent production function $\Delta \omega_t = f(\omega_{t-1}, x, \epsilon)$ from the data. The stock of knowledge would then evolve according to $\omega_t = (1 - \delta) \omega_{t-1} + \Delta \omega_t$. In our model, the cost of innovation is estimated at $cx$ and we will compare this with observed R&D expenditures as a reality check.

The law of motion for $\xi$ that we specified in (8) poses further challenges. Ideally we would like to use the time-varying $\xi$’s as estimated in Section 4.1.1 above and estimate the law of motion as an AR(1) process for each firm separately. However, we do not have long enough firm-level time series data to estimate reliable AR(1) processes. For now, we compute the average $\xi$ for each firm and hold it constant over time. When two firms merge, we simply assign the average of individual firm $\xi$’s to the merged firm.

4.1.5 Computation of the Value Function

We can put the previous four building blocks together to obtain a numerical estimate of the value function starting from any state $(\omega, \xi, s)$, given the structural parameter vector $\theta$. For the simple model described above, $\theta$ consists of a single parameter: $c$ – the R&D cost required to obtain one new patent in expectation. For now, the evaluation of the value function will be conditional on a starting value for this parameter ($c_0$). In step 2 below we use the equilibrium conditions of the model to derive a minimum distance estimator for this parameter.
To evaluate the value function we use forward simulation. We first explain our forward simulation procedure for the case when there are no mergers. For an initial industry state $s_0$, the estimated demand model and cost equation gives us the equilibrium period profit vector over all active firms in the industry according to (5). The initial state directly determines optimal innovation, according to the estimated policy function, giving the net profit vector: $\pi_0(s_0) - c_0 x_0(s_0)$. Next, we use the state transition function to find the next period’s state and denote it by $s_1$. In order to do this, we draw a vector of $\epsilon_\omega$ values, one for each active firm, which enter equation (7). Following the same steps as above we can compute the expected net profit in period 1 as $\pi_1(s_1) - c_0 x_1(s_1)$, which we discount back to period 0 using an appropriate discount factor $\beta$. We continue this process for a sufficiently large number of periods $T$ until the discount factor $\beta^T$ gets arbitrarily close to zero. In other words, we evaluate the following equation:

$$V(s_0|\theta) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta^t [(\pi_t(s_t) - c_0 x_t(s_t))] \right], \quad (13)$$

where the expectation is over future states. We run these forward simulations a large number of times, using different draws on $\epsilon_\omega$, the only source of uncertainty in the model, and take their average as a numerical estimate of $V(s_0|\theta)$.

The forward simulation of the value function becomes somewhat more complicated in the presence of mergers. At the end of each period, all firms receive a draw from the uniform distribution over the unit interval. If in some period two firms receive a draw below $p$ (this value is calculated in the Appendix) they merge. The $\omega$ of the merged firm is the sum of $\omega$’s of individual firms and $\xi$ of the merged firm is the average of individual $\xi$’s. This changes the state of the industry in all calculations from that point onwards.

In order to allocate the future profits of the merged firm to the value functions of each of the formerly independent firms, we calculate the share of each firm in their combined value should they have remained independent—according to equation (17). This still requires the calculation of future patent stocks for all firms and the profits for the two merging firms as if the merger had not

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22 This subsumes the calculation of the equilibrium price vector by solving the system of first order conditions for all firms.

23 The $\xi_i/\xi_0$ term in equation (10) is fixed at the values that correspond to the year of $s_0$. The $\epsilon$ and $e$ errors in, respectively, equations (11) and (12), are fixed at zero throughout the simulations.

24 If only one firm draws a merger, no merger takes place. If two firms draw a merger, they merge. If three firms draw a merger, we merge two of them randomly and the third remains unmerged. If four firms draw a merger, we merge two of them randomly and then merge the remaining two. And a similar procedure is used if more than four firms draw a merger. The probability to draw a merger (i.e. $p$) is different from the probability of actually experiencing a merger (i.e. $p_m$). We further clarify this distinction in the Appendix.

25 The values of $\xi$ (estimated as residuals from equation (10)) for Chrysler and Daimler-Benz a year before their merger were -0.47 and 0.57. Two years after the merger, $\xi$ for the joint firm was estimated at 0.04, consistent with our assumption.
taken place in all future periods. As a result, the computational burden rises substantially. Starting from 22 firms, the first merger at time $\tau$ requires the calculation of additional value functions for 21 firms, although only $400 - \tau$ future periods will be considered, and so forth.

To compute future profits in the industry, we need an assumption on the evolution of the market size. We assume that the number of consumers ($m$) in the industry follows a linear trend over time, with a slope that matches the observed trend (1980–2005) in the data. Specifically, we assume $m_{1980} = 37.4$ million and increase it by 1.1 million every year. The only other parameter we need is the discount rate $\beta$, which is set at 0.92. Given the static parameter estimates, an initial state of the industry, and a starting value for the dynamic parameter $c_0$, we simulate forward the evolution of the industry state and calculate profits for all firms as we go along. We simulate forward for 400 periods—$\beta^{400} = 3.27 \times 10^{-15}$—and construct the value functions as the present discounted value of the profit streams.

The estimated policy function does not feature any intrinsic firm heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{26} Initial differences in knowledge stocks persist for some time but eventually vanish. The concavity of innovation in the own stock and the negative effect of the rivals’ stock leads all firms to converge to one of two absorbing states. High innovation firms that do positive innovation in steady state all converge to the same stable (average) patent stock, with only the randomness in the innovation process (equation (7)) leading to small and temporary differences. A high initial patent stock gives the firms higher profits early on, which does generate large differences in estimated value functions. Eventually, firms with a sufficiently high initial patent stock reach a point at which marginal benefits on the demand and cost side are outweighed by the cost of R&D. Alternatively, firms with such a low initial patent stock that in the policy function the negative effect of rivals’ knowledge dominates eventually cease innovating and their patent stocks depreciates away.

\subsection{4.2 Step 2}

In step 2 we use the results from the first stage together with the equilibrium conditions on the MPE to recover the dynamic parameter(s) of the model ($\theta$). The following steps assume that the model is identified and there is a unique true parameter vector $\theta_0$. Bajari et al. [2007] propose a minimum distance estimator for this true parameter vector. Let $x(s)$ be the equilibrium policy profile. For this to be a MPE policy profile, it must be true that for all firms, all states, and all alternative policy profiles $x'(s)$

$$V_i(s, x(s), \theta) \geq V_i(s, x'(s), \theta),$$

\textsuperscript{14}where $x' \neq x$ only at the $i$th element, as all other firms play their Nash strategy. Equation (14) will hold at the true value of the parameter vector $\theta_0$.

\textsuperscript{26}$\zeta$’s are permanently different among firms but they do not appear in the estimated policy function.
The minimum distance estimator for $\theta_0$ is constructed as follows. For each firm $i$ and each state $s$ we observe in the sample, we use the forward simulation method to calculate $V_i(s, x(s), \theta)$. We do the same calculations using a number of alternative policy profiles $x'(s)$ and compute the difference $V_i(s, x(s), \theta) - V_i(s, x'(s), \theta)$. We denote this difference by $d(i, s, x'|\theta)$. We then find $d$ for all $i$, $s$ and $x'(s)$ for a given value of $\theta$ and compute the sum of the squared $\min\{d(i, s, x'|\theta), 0\}$ terms. This only penalizes the objective function if the alternative policy $x'$ leads to a higher value function, which should not happen if $x$ is the MPE profile. The $\theta$ with the smallest sum is our estimate of $\theta_0$, i.e.

$$\hat{\theta}_0 = \arg \min \sum_{i, s, x'} \left[ \min\{d(i, s, x'|\theta), 0\}\right]^2.$$ (15)

The only dynamic parameter in the model is the (average) R&D cost of a obtaining a new patent ($c$). Each period, a firm chooses the number of patents it would like to add to its knowledge stock, denoted by $x$. The R&D expenditure this requires upfront is $c \cdot x$ and the firm will obtain $x(1 + \epsilon^\omega)$ new patents by the next period.

The minimum distance estimator as defined in (15) gives us an estimate of $c$. To evaluate the objective function we have to specify alternative policies that differ from the equilibrium Nash policy. For each firm $j$ and each industry state $s$ we include 10 observations in the objective function by choosing $x'(s) = (\iota + ae_j)'x(s)$, where $\iota$ is a vector of ones, $e_j$ a vector of zeroes with a single one at position $j$ (both vectors are of length $n$) and $a \in \{-0.10, -0.08, ..., -0.02, 0.02, ..., 0.08, 0.10\}$.

Our results indicate that the estimate of $c$ is sensitive to the specification of the marginal cost function is important for the estimate of $c$. Assuming that the marginal cost is a linear function of the patent stock as in equation (11), leads to an estimate of $c$ that is $17.2$ million dollars. This specification makes patents valuable. To fit the observed rate of patenting, the model estimates a relatively high R&D cost per patent.

In contrast, assuming a constant marginal cost, which shuts down the productivity benefit of knowledge, the estimate falls to $14.8$ million dollars. Including the logarithm of the patent stock instead of the linear term leads to an intermediate estimate of $16.7$ million dollars. As a comparison, the median R&D-per-patent ratio we observe in the sample is $14.9$ million dollars, suggesting the estimate is plausible. R&D expenditures per patent are highly dispersed. Even omitting the European firms that patent infrequently in the U.S. the standard deviation is $12.5$m. The median R&D-per-patent ratio has been increasing over time, reaching $18.1$m in 2004.

\footnote{This number is based on a normalized price of $10,000 for a GM vehicle.}
5 Findings

Thus far, we have estimated the structural parameters of the model which gave us some insights into the importance of innovation in the automotive industry. We found evidence of product and process innovation affecting both the demand and cost sides in plausible ways. Firms’ optimal innovation policy depends on the state of the industry and the model produces a plausible estimate for the R&D cost of new patents. In this section, we use the model to study the interaction between innovation and market structure. First, we compare some predictions of the model with data. Second, we study the key question: how do changes in market structure interact with innovation? However, the primary goal of firms and policy makers is not innovation per se. Instead, the firms are more interested in the value that innovation creates and policy makers are more concerned about the consumer welfare. Third, we study how mergers, a major source of change in market structure in the model and in the data, affects firm value and consumer utility.

5.1 Model Predictions and Data

First, we confront some model predictions with the data. The results in Table 10 compare for a number of important variables the predictions with the observed values for the top three firms in the sample: GM, Ford, and Toyota. The model predicts lower market share for GM in both periods. The market shares for Ford and Toyota are predicted well for 1981 but are over predicted for 2004. Prices are over predicted for both Ford and Toyota. The reason is that prices in our model depend on utility, which in turn depends on knowledge stock and $\xi$. Since Ford and Toyota have knowledge stocks comparable to GM and $\xi$'s that are higher than GM, the model predicts a higher price for their vehicles relative to GM’s.

[Table 10 approximately here]

More importantly, the number of new patents the firms are predicted to apply for are estimated not too far off. The largest discrepancy is for Ford in 2004, but the actual number of new patents the firm filed that year (134) is an outlier itself (the average for Ford over the sample period is 260). The model also predicts the evolution of industry state reasonably well. In Figure 4 we plot the mean and the standard deviation of $\omega$ by year as in the data and as predicted by the model. The predicted means and standard deviations evolve more smoothly, but track the data fairly well. While the estimated valuations for the three firms seem highly unrealistic, their evolution over time is more reasonable. Incorporating fixed legacy costs for GM and Ford, as indicated in equation (3), would adjust the levels.

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28 By industry state we mean $s_\omega$ because $s_\xi$ does not evolve endogenously.
What the model does capture well is that firms with a patent stock above a threshold have an incentive to innovate a lot and converge to the leading firms. The simulations predict firms to fall into two groups; each of the three firms in Table 10 fall into the high patent stock–high price group. In the data, we do see the leading firms converging to similar knowledge levels, see Figure 5. The coefficient of variation across the five largest firms falls from 0.61 initially to 0.20 in 2004. To achieve this outcome, firms with a lower patent stock initially innovate more rapidly to catch up with the leaders.

5.2 Market Structure and Innovation

The question how market structure affects innovation has been extensively studied in the literature and the evidence is mixed. Examining the evidence, Cohen and Levin [1989] (p.1075) cite several studies that found a negative relationship, but also others that found a positive relationship, and even one that found an inverted-U relationship. They conclude that “the empirical results concerning how firm size and market structure relate to innovation are perhaps most accurately described as fragile.” (p.1078)

More recently, the theoretical model in Aghion et al. [2005] predicts an inverted-U relationship in a general equilibrium setting and they find empirical support for it in the manufacturing sector of the U.K. In their model, competition is exogenous. An increase in competition will lead to more innovation if firms are technologically close to one another and diminish innovation if they are technologically far apart. The net aggregate effect depends on the steady state distribution of the technology gap across industries. In their model, there is no reverse feedback from innovation to competition. This differs from our set-up. Having estimated the parameters of the model, we are now in a position to examine how market structure and innovation interact in our model of the global automobile industry.

The market structure of the global auto industry can most appropriately be classified as an oligopoly and has been so for a long time. However, the extent of competition faced by firms in this industry has changed over time as the industry consolidated. We use two definitions of competition: the inverse of the degree of concentration in the industry and the ratio of marginal cost to price. Innovation is measured by the R&D intensity, the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. In our model, competition and innovation are determined simultaneously and evolve together. Random mergers reduce the extent of competition exogenously and change the incentives to innovate. Innovation, in turn, changes the (knowledge) states of the industry and influences the nature of competition in this way.

To study this relationship we begin with the actual state of the global auto industry in 1980.
We set $\xi_j = 0$.\footnote{Since $\xi$ does not enter the policy function, setting $\xi = 0$ does not affect the results of this subsection.} Given the state of the industry, firms make their pricing and R&D investment decisions. We record these decisions and compute the statistics of interest for individual firms as well as for the industry as a whole. We then draw mergers randomly and update industry state based on firms’ R&D investments and the outcome of merger draws. We continue this process until the number of firms is down to five.\footnote{We set the lower limit at five to allow for the industry to become highly concentrated.} Figure 6 plots the results based on a random merger sequence, which is reported in Table 8.\footnote{We report the results based on a single merger sequence here, but the conclusions are robust when we use another sequence or average over several sequences.}

In Figure 6(a), the X-axis indicates firm level competition as measured by the ratio of marginal cost to price.\footnote{This is just one minus the Lerner’s Index. The Lerner’s Index is defined as $p - mc$.} Innovation intensity, R&D expenditures to sales, is plotted on the Y-axis. The relationship between competition and innovation turns out to be inverted-U shaped. As the degree of competition increases, firms increase their innovative activity, but only up to a point. When competition becomes too intense, the innovative activity declines. In this example, the innovative activity is at its maximum when $mc/p$ ratio is around 0.59. The same holds in Figure 6(c) when competition is measured by the cumulative market share of all a firm’s competitors. Innovation peaks when a firm controls about 10% of the market. In Figure 6(b) we average the $mc/p$ ratios and innovation intensities over all firms and time periods. The inverted-U pattern still holds, although the upward-sloping portion of the inverted-U is much longer than the downward-sloping portion. Figure 6(d) is similar to Figure 6(b), but competition is measured by one minus the Herfindhal’s index.\footnote{Herfindhal’s Index = $\sum_{j=1}^{n} s_j^2$. Where $s_j$ is the market share of firm $j$.}

In Figure 7 (solid lines) we depict various components that generated Figure 6(b). Mergers make the market more concentrated over time and we illustrate how several industry variables evolve. The price-cost margin increases (7(a)); sales continue to grow along a linear trend (7(b)); aggregate R&D in the industry first increases and then flattens out (7(c)); which is mirrored in R&D intensity (7(d)). The first two effects follow directly from our assumptions on competition and the absence of an outside good. The trend in aggregate R&D owes its shape to concave policy function and mergers. As the industry evolves, smaller firms tend to innovate a lot. They do so because, due to the steep value function, marginal addition to knowledge adds a lot to their value. However, in our estimated model there are decreasing returns to knowledge. As firms’ knowledge increases, benefits from further innovation decline and they innovate less. Mergers tend to expedite this process of decreasing returns by causing discrete increases in the knowledge stock of market participants. To see this, we add dotted lines to Figure 7 showing the evolution of the industry in absence of mergers. Figure 7(c) shows that industry R&D was bound to flatten over time even in the absence of mergers. However, mergers hasten this process by discretely increasing the knowledge

23
of merging firms.

The previous analysis started from the initial state of the industry in 1980. At that time, there were 22 firms in the industry sample and almost half of them had a very small knowledge stock. Initially, R&D grew rapidly, faster than sales, and innovation intensity increased in the earlier periods. Once these firms grew bigger and merged, the decreasing returns caused R&D to flatten while the sales continued to grow along their linear trend and R&D intensity fell. Combining both episodes in Figure 6 gave rise to the inverted-U relationship.

We now repeat the same experiment but start from the industry state in 2004. At that time, mergers had reduced the number of firms in the sample to just 13. This is already a concentrated industry state. In many of the panels of Figure 8, we now have only observations on the left-side, suggesting a positive relationship between competition and innovation, i.e. as industry becomes more concentrated, innovation falls.\(^{34}\) We plot the results of this experiment in Figures 8 and 9, which are comparable with Figures 6 and 7. The reason, as Figure 9 shows, is that now the industry is already concentrated at the start and we never observe any ‘high competition’ situations. This makes R&D grow more slowly than sales and R&D intensity declines throughout.

To sum up, forward simulations based on our estimated model of global auto industry show that, in general, competition is good for innovation. If an innovation-intensive industry is too fragmented (as the auto industry was in 1980), some consolidation is likely to increase innovative activity. However, as the industry becomes highly concentrated, further consolidation will negatively affect the intensity of innovation in the industry. Our results suggest that the global auto industry has already consolidated enough and any further big mergers (like the one recently proposed between GM and Nissan and Renault) would reduce innovation. These results depend on the decreasing returns to knowledge stock reflected in the concave policy function that we estimated.

5.3 Market Structure, Value and Utility

Innovation is not an end in itself. From a producer’s point of view, innovation is desirable because it creates value by improving quality, boosting demand, and by lowering cost. From a consumer’s point of view, innovation is desirable because it adds to utility by improving quality and by reducing price. The ultimate question from welfare point of view is that how changes in market structure, and the consequent changes in innovative activity and competition, affect firm value and consumer utility.

In this subsection we look for an answer to this question through the lens of three specific examples. First, we consider the merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler that took place in 1997. This is an example of two medium-sized firms merging. Second, we consider the merger

\(^{34}\)The random merger sequence used in this experiment is reported in Table 9
between Hyundai and Kia in 1998, an example of two relatively small firms merging. Finally we consider a counterfactual merger between two very large firms Renault-Nissan and Ford in 2004. As we shall see below, the effect of a merger on value and utility depends importantly on the size of the firms involved in the merger.

5.3.1 Mergers and Value

First, we consider the merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1997. This experiment begins with the actual state of the industry (s) in 1997. We consider the evolution of the industry under two scenarios, with and without the merger. The values (sum of the expected discounted profits) for all firms in each period are reported as thin lines in Figure 10 in the absence of a merger and as thick lines with a merger taking place in 1997.

In this model, mergers are almost always value destroying for merging firms. The reason is that the value function is very steep at low levels of knowledge but it flattens out for higher knowledge stocks. When two firms merge, their combined knowledge stock tends to be much less valuable than the sum of their individual knowledge stocks. In addition, even a firm with zero knowledge has some value, albeit a low one, as it will capture some market share. A merger destroys this stand-alone value as well. We see this in Figure 10 for the merger in question. It is, however, not obvious what would happen to the value of other firms in the industry after the merger. In this example, the combined value of all firms in the industry (including the merging firms) increases. The reason is that when medium-sized firms merge into one, competition in the industry is reduced and this helps rivals to gain a greater market share and enjoy a higher markup. The addition to the value of rivals more than offsets the loss in the value of merging firms, in this case.

In the second experiment, Hyundai and Kia merge in 1998. The results are reported in Figure 11. Like the previous experiment, the value of the merging firms declines after the merger. Unlike the previous case, the merger leaves the aggregate industry value unchanged. However, over time, the model predicts a slightly lower aggregate value with merger than without it (see Figure 11(b)).

Finally we consider a counterfactual merger between Renault-Nissan and Ford in 2004. This merger is different from the first two because the firms involved in it are quite large. We report the results of this experiment in Figure 12. The effects are similar to the first experiment above: the merging firms lose value, but at the industry level, aggregate value increases. However, a notable difference is in the magnitude of the increase. The aggregate increase is almost twice as large in the latter case. It is the result of a much more pronounced increase in industry concentration. It helps rival firms by reducing the competition they face and increases their market share. The merging firms themselves still lose because the decreasing returns to knowledge effect dominates.

---

35In this and next two experiments, no other mergers are allowed except the ones under review.
In sum, mergers result in lost value for merging firms regardless of the size of the merger due to decreasing returns to knowledge. Rivals benefit, because of reduced competition, and the benefit increases with the size of merging firms.

5.3.2 Mergers and Utility

What about the effects of these changes in market structure and innovative activity on consumers’ utility? We look at the same three experiments, but now calculate average consumer utility in each period. Results are in Figure 13. In Figure 13(a) the merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler does not have a noticeable effect on utility right after the merger. However, after approximately 20 periods, the model predicts that average consumer utility will be lower with merger than without. In Figure 13(b) the merger between Hyundai and Kia increases average utility and this increase persists over time. In Figure 13(c) the merger between Renault-Nissan and Ford results in immediate increase in utility. However, over time the utility drops sharply and eventually the utility with merger is much lower than the utility without it.

To sum up, the bigger the size of the firms involved in a merger, the greater is the negative effect on consumers’ utility. On the other hand, if two small firms merge, average consumer utility may actually increase. These findings further support the findings in Section 5.2. There we found that letting firms merge in an already concentrated industry was harmful for innovation. Here we find that if we let bigger firms merge, it will have negative effects on consumers’ average utility.

Before we close this section two comments are in order. First, the unobserved relative qualities ($\xi$s) of the merging firms also play an important role in determining the effect of a merger on consumers’ utility. Specifically, if two firms with positive $\xi$’s merge, the negative effect on utility is greater than if two firms with negative $\xi$’s merge. Firms with positive $\xi$’s are already doing well on their own. Forcing them to merge imposes decreasing returns on well performing firms. One the other hand, merging two firms with low $\xi$’s only removes two smaller and less desirable options from the market. While we report only three specific mergers, the general conclusions hold in many other experiments that we conducted.

6 Concluding Remarks

We constructed a dynamic game-theoretic industry model of the global automobile industry that allows for random mergers but no entry or exit. We estimate the structural parameters of the model using a new method proposed by Bajari and Benkard [2005]. Our application illustrates the usefulness of their method in terms of saving in computation time and highlight some of the problems faced by us while employing their methodology.
We then use the model to study the interaction between market structure and innovation. Our principal finding is that, in the global auto industry, the effects of market structure on innovation depend on the initial state of the industry. If the industry is very fragmented, an increase in concentration (brought about by random mergers in our model) promotes innovative activity. However, if the industry is already concentrated, a further increase in concentration will discourage innovation. We confirm the existence of the inverted-U relationship between market structure and innovation, in Aghion et al. [2005], at least for some initial states. A general implication of our findings is that observations for an industry may span only a subset of the space, exhibiting a monotone positive or negative relationship.

Our ultimate interest is how these changes in innovation, brought about by changing market structure, affect the net value of firms and utility of consumers. Within our limited model, mergers are always value destroying for the merging parties. The reason is twofold: Decreasing marginal returns to knowledge and the loss of an independent firm. However, depending on the size of merging firms, mergers can have positive or negative effects on aggregate industry value. Specifically, the bigger the size of the merging firms the better it is for rival firms’ values and hence for the aggregate industry value. The effects on the average utility of consumers also depend on the size of merging firms. A merger between big firms will, eventually, lower average utility. However, a merger between smaller firms may increase the average utility over time.

The policy message of this study is clear. The global automobile industry has consolidated sufficiently to provide good incentives for innovation. Any further consolidation is likely to be harmful for innovation and diminish competition. However, mergers between small firms (or between a small and a medium-sized firm) may still be beneficial not only for innovation but also for consumer welfare.

As with any research work, there are many dimensions along which the present study can be improved. First, data set needs to be extended. We would especially like to have data to run hedonic price regressions for European and Japanese firms separately to have better price estimates. We would also like to have more data on patents by European firms. The European patent office would be a natural place to look for such data. These data are not yet publicly available. Second, given the important role played by $\xi$ in our model, the assumption of a constant $\xi$ over time is not satisfactory, but given the data constraints, it is a natural starting point. With an extended data set, the law of motion for $\xi$ can be estimated explicitly. Third, with better data and better $\xi$’s, the policy function needs to be improved by incorporating $\xi$’s into it. Fourth, due to the above three limitations, the model predictions for firm values are far from the observed stock market valuations. We hope that once the above limitations have been overcome, the value estimates will be more in line with the data. At that time, it would make sense to also introduce fixed (legacy) costs as a third state variable.
The above limitations notwithstanding, we believe that dynamic models of competition provide a fruitful modeling environment to study how market structure and innovative activity are related. In line with earlier surveys, we also believe that this relationship is industry specific and generalization are unlikely to be very useful for policy purposes. Nevertheless, the current framework provides a flexible and general approach to study oligopolistic-dynamic interactions and has wide applicability.
References


Appendix: The Merger Technology

When there are more than two firms in the industry and we allow for mergers, the value function of firm $j$ is somewhat more complicated. $p_m(n)$ denotes the probability that a firm experiences a merger at the end of the current period and will be calibrated below. This probability is an increasing function of $n$ and constant across firms. $k$ indexes a firm that $j$ is randomly matched with to merge and $s'^{-jk}$ is the industry state excluding firms $j$ and $k$ after the merger. The value function of firm $j$ can then be written as

$$V_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) = \max_{x_j \in \mathbb{R}^+} \left\{ \pi_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) - cx_j(\omega_j, \xi_j, s^{-j}) + \beta \left[ \frac{p_m}{n-1} \sum_{k \neq j} \zeta_j(\cdot)EV_j(\omega'_j + x'_j, (\xi'_j + \xi'_k)/2, s'^{-jk}) ight] ight\},$$

(16)

where

$$\zeta_j(\omega'_j, \xi'_j, \omega'_k, \xi'_k, s'^{-jk}) = \frac{V_j(\omega'_j, \xi'_j, s'^{-j})}{V_j(\omega'_j, \xi'_j, s'^{-j}) + V_k(\omega'_k, \xi'_k, s'^{-k})}.$$  

(17)

The value is the sum of the period profit, the continuation value should a merger take place (summed over all rival firms $k$, and the continuation value in the case no merger takes place. As discussed earlier, we set a lower bound on the number of firms in the industry, denoted by $n$. When $n = \bar{n}$, $p_m = 0$ and (16) reduces to (6).

We now show how we can impute the probability that a firm will be involved in a merger ($p_m$), from the observed number of mergers in the data. Let there be $n > 1$ firms in the industry and let $p$ be the probability (same for all firms) that a firm will be up for merger this period. This probability $p$ differs from the merger probability $p_m$, because mergers only take place if at least two firms are up for merger.

With only two active firm, $p_m = p^2$. With more active firms, the probability that two firms merge at the end of the period is the sum of the following probabilities (if more than two firms are up for merger, we pick two at random):

$$\Pr(\text{The firm is up for merger and 1 other firm is also up}) = \frac{n-1}{2}p^n$$
$$\Pr(\text{The firm is up for merger and 2 other firms are up}) = \frac{2}{3}p^n$$
$$\Pr(\text{The firm is up for merger and 3 other firms are up}) = \frac{p^n}{4}$$
$$\Pr(\text{The firm is up for merger and 4 other firms are up}) = \frac{4}{5}p^n$$
$$\vdots$$

where $P_k^n$ is the binomial probability that out of $n$ firms exactly $k$ are up for mergers and is given by $\binom{n}{k}p^k(1-p)^{n-k}$. The last term in the above series of probabilities depends on whether $n$ is an
odd or an even number. If \( n \) is odd, the last term would be \( \frac{n-1}{n} P_n^{n-1} \) and if \( n \) is even, the last term would simply be \( P_n^{n-1} \). Adding these terms together, we can write the sum as

\[
p_m(n, p) = \left[ \sum_{i \in O, i < n} P_i^{n-1} + \sum_{i \in E, i < n} \frac{i}{i+1} P_i^{n-1} \right] \cdot p, \tag{18}
\]

where \( O = \{1, 3, 5, \ldots\} \) and \( E = \{2, 4, 6, \ldots\} \). We have derived an expression for \( p_m \) in terms of \( n \) and \( p \). Our next task is to impute \( p \) from the data. In our sample we observe 9 mergers in 26 years. We shall assume for the sake of simplicity that these mergers are evenly spread over the entire sample period. Then the expected number of mergers in any period is \( \frac{9}{26} \). We make this expected number of mergers depend on \( n \) in a simple way. Let \( \pi \) be the average number of firms in the industry per period. Then we may write the expected number of mergers as

\[
E(M) = \frac{9}{26} \cdot \frac{n}{\pi}. \tag{19}
\]

If the actual number of firms in the industry is equal to the average over the sample period, we expect \( \frac{9}{26} \) mergers to take place in that period (or we expect 1 merger in every \( \frac{26}{9} \) such periods). If the actual number of firms is above the average we expect more mergers and vice versa. The simple idea behind (19) is that as \( n \) declines, we reduce the expected number of mergers that we want to match by choosing an appropriate \( p \). In other words, we want to make \( p \) small as \( n \) declines.

So far we have been trying to get a reasonable number of expected mergers from the data. But if we know \( p \) and \( n \), we can easily derive the expected number of mergers by using the following equation

\[
E(M) = \sum_{M=1}^{\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor} M \cdot P(M), \tag{20}
\]

where \( P(M) \) is the probability that \( M \) mergers take place. If \( M = 1 \) then \( P(M) = (P_2^n + P_3^n) \). In words, the probability that one merger will take place is simply the sum of the probabilities that out of \( n \) firms 2 or 3 are up for merger. If 3 firms are up for merger, we shall pick 2 at random and the third will not merge and remain independent. Equation (20) can explicitly be written as

\[
E(M) = \begin{cases} 
\sum_{i=1}^{\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor-1} i(P_{2i}^n + P_{2i+1}^n) + \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor(P_{2\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor}^n + P_n^n) & \text{if } n \text{ is odd} \\
\sum_{i=1}^{\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor-1} i(P_{2i}^n + P_{2i+1}^n) + \frac{n}{2} P_n^n & \text{if } n \text{ is even} 
\end{cases}
\]

The last equation implicitly defines \( p \) in terms of \( n \) and \( E(M) \). But in (19) we have already defined \( E(M) \) as a function of \( n \). Hence, given \( n \) we can use (19) to solve for \( E(M) \) and then use the last equation above to solve for \( p \). Once we have \( p \), we can use (18) to get \( p_m \).
Table 1: R&D expenditures by industry in selected countries for 2003 (in PPP $m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>ISIC Rev.3</th>
<th>OECD</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76,199</td>
<td>17,034</td>
<td>21,258</td>
<td>12,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(13.2%)</td>
<td>(8.3%)</td>
<td>(16.9%)</td>
<td>(15.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio, television, telecom. equipment</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>71,623</td>
<td>22,399</td>
<td>13,812</td>
<td>11,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total business sector</td>
<td>15-99</td>
<td>577,316</td>
<td>204,004</td>
<td>125,591</td>
<td>84,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>57,541</td>
<td>15,962</td>
<td>16,850</td>
<td>6,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical, precision, optical instruments</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38,440</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>6,782</td>
<td>3,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and related activities</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>38,189</td>
<td>19,854</td>
<td>6,990</td>
<td>1,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and spacecraft</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34,065</td>
<td>15,731</td>
<td>8,518</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale &amp; retail trade; repairs</td>
<td>50-52</td>
<td>30,066</td>
<td>26,580</td>
<td>1,039</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office, accounting, and computing mach.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24,136</td>
<td>7,664</td>
<td>2,568</td>
<td>10,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D²</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22,417</td>
<td>12,460</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The five most R&D intensive sectors in each of the three country are included and sorted by total R&D expenditure.

1 We only observe statistics from the following countries: USA, EU, Japan, Canada, Korea, Norway, Poland, Czech Republic.

2 For the EU, R&D is included in other sectors.

Table 2: Firms in the sample with market share (worldwide unit sales)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980 (n = 22) market share*</th>
<th>2005 (n = 13) market share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>BMW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>Daimler-Chrysler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler-Benz</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>Fiat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volvo</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rover Group</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daewoo</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saab</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>Honda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyundai</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>Hyundai-Kia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kia</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peugeot (PSA)</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>Peugeot (PSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nissan</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>Renault-Nissan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renault</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuki</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>Suzuki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daihatsu</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>Volkswagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *1982;
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (various years) and Ward’s AutoBank
Table 3: Demand Parameter Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge ((\ln(1 + \omega)))</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price ((\ln p))</td>
<td>-1.1 1***</td>
<td>-1.82*</td>
<td>-2.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Fixed-Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The only instrument in columns (2) and (3) is the sum of all rivals’ knowledge. All variables are normalized by GM. Significant at the *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level.

Table 4: Average \(\xi\)’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Average (\xi)</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Average (\xi)</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Average (\xi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>Renault</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>Hyundai</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>Renault-Nissan</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daewoo</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Hyundai-Kia</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Rover Group</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daihatsu</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Saab</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler-Benz</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>Kia</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>Suzuki</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler-Chrysler</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>Nissan</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>Volkswagon</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Peugeot-Citroen</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>Volvo</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All unobserved qualities are normalized annually by GM quality.
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the Marginal Cost Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable is marginal cost (relative to GM)</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant term</td>
<td>0.83***</td>
<td>0.90***</td>
<td>1.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge ($\omega$)</td>
<td>$-7.36 \times 10^{-5}$***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.05 \times 10^{-5})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log knowledge ($\log(1 + \omega)$)</td>
<td>$-0.03$***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of observations</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note: Significant at the *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Policy Function Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Dependent variable is the number of new patents awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS (without outliers) OLS (without outliers) OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Patent Stock</td>
<td>0.19*** 0.28*** 0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Patent Stock Squared</td>
<td>$-9.04 \times 10^{-6}$***  $-5.55 \times 10^{-5}$***  $-5.51 \times 10^{-5}$***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.38 \times 10^{-6}) (7.41 \times 10^{-6}) (6.21 \times 10^{-6})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of Rivals’ Patent Stocks</td>
<td>$-1.64 \times 10^{-3}$*  $-2.48 \times 10^{-3}$***  $-2.46 \times 10^{-3}$***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.39 \times 10^{-4}) (7.54 \times 10^{-4}) (7.33 \times 10^{-4})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Rank</td>
<td>$-1.60^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.97) (0.80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of observations</th>
<th>491 485 485</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note: Significant at the *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7: List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbrvn</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Abbrvn</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Abbrvn</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>BMW</td>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Peugeot-Citron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHR</td>
<td>Chrysler</td>
<td>HND</td>
<td>Honda</td>
<td>REN</td>
<td>Renault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBZ</td>
<td>Daimler-Benz</td>
<td>HYK</td>
<td>Hyundai-Kia</td>
<td>ROV</td>
<td>Rover Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCH</td>
<td>Daimler-Chrysler</td>
<td>HYU</td>
<td>Hyundai</td>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Saab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>Daihatsu</td>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>SZK</td>
<td>Suzuki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWO</td>
<td>Daewoo</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Kia</td>
<td>TYO</td>
<td>Toyota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIA</td>
<td>Fiat</td>
<td>MTB</td>
<td>Mitsubishi</td>
<td>VOL</td>
<td>Volvo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRD</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>NSN</td>
<td>Nissan</td>
<td>VOW</td>
<td>Volkswagon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8: Merger Sequence 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Merging Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHR(139)  NSN(674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>KIA(0)    ROV(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DWO(0)    FRD(443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>REN(12)   DWO FRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>JAG(0)    TYO(781)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>VOL(3)    KIA ROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SAB(43)   JAG TYO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>SZK(6)    VOL KIA ROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FIA(0)    SZK VOL KIA ROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>REN DWO FRD FIA SZK VOL KIA ROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>HYU(0)    REN DWO FRD FIA SZK VOL KIA ROV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>VOW(179)  SAB JAG TYO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>DSU(7)    GMS(1189)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CHR NSN   VOW SAB JAG TYO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>PSA(0)    MTB(199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>HYU REN DWO FRD FIA SZK VOL KIA ROV DSU GMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>BMW(28)   HYU REN DWO FRD FIA SZK VOL KIA ROV DSU GMS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Numbers in parenthesis are the first period (i.e. 1980) knowledge stocks.
(2) Names in boxes are the firms that had merged before the current period.
(3) See Table 7 for the list of abbreviations.
Table 9: Merger Sequence 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Merging Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PSA(9) MTB(516)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BMW(396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SZK(253) HND(3374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>FRD(1654) SZK HND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>VOW(314) FRD SZK HND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>FIA(47) VOW FRD SZK HND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>TYO(2249) DCH(2619)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>HYK(560) BMW PSA MTB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Numbers in parenthesis are the first period (i.e. 2004) knowledge stocks.
(2) Names in boxes are the firms that had merged before the current period.

Table 10: Model predictions for top firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GM</th>
<th>Ford</th>
<th>Toyota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market share (actual)*</td>
<td>0.174 0.121</td>
<td>0.115 0.098</td>
<td>0.090 0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market share (predicted)</td>
<td>0.090 0.083</td>
<td>0.104 0.140</td>
<td>0.111 0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price (actual)</td>
<td>1.000 1.000</td>
<td>0.858 0.970</td>
<td>0.901 0.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price (predicted)</td>
<td>1.000 1.000</td>
<td>1.080 1.074</td>
<td>1.055 1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New patents (actual)</td>
<td>328 381</td>
<td>149 134</td>
<td>241 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New patents (predicted)</td>
<td>267 319</td>
<td>123 298</td>
<td>196 338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patent stock (actual)</td>
<td>1189 1896</td>
<td>443 1654</td>
<td>781 2248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value (predicted)</td>
<td>73 107</td>
<td>184 336</td>
<td>163 304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * 1982 instead of 1981;
Prices are relative to GM; valuations are in billion of dollars, assuming $10,000 per GM vehicle.
Figure 1: Hedonic prices for a number of firms (relative to GM)
Figure 2: Marginal Cost and Patent Stock

Figure 3: Patents and Patent Stock
Figure 4: Evolution of $\omega$'s: Model (average of 30 random sequences of mergers) and Data
Figure 5: Patent stocks for the largest five firms converge
Figure 6: Competition and Innovation at the Firm and Industry Level

(a) Firm-level Competition (mc/p) vs. Innovation Intensity
(b) Industry-level Competition (mc/p) vs. Innovation Intensity
(c) 1−Firm Market Share vs. Innovation Intensity
(d) 1−Herfindhal vs. Innovation Intensity
Figure 7: Competition and Innovation over Time, With and Without Mergers (Industry Level)
Figure 8: Competition and Innovation at the Firm and Industry Level when the Industry is Concentrated in the Initial State.
Figure 9: Competition and Innovation over Time (Industry Level)
(a) Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Values (w/ and w/o mergers)

(b) Industry Values (w/ and w/o mergers)

Figure 10: The Effects Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Merger on Firm and Industry Values
Figure 11: The Effects of Hyundai-Kia Merger on Firm and Industry Values
Figure 12: The Effects of Renault-Nissan and Ford Merger on Firm and Industry Values
Figure 13: Mergers and Average Utility