When Order Affects Performance:

Behavioral Spillovers and Institutional Path Dependence

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Abstract

To understand how culture might affect institutional performance, we introduce a modeling framework that allows for *behavioral spillovers* across institutions. We use this model to explain how, and under what behavioral conditions, institutional performance is dependent on the sequencing of institutions. That is, we argue that institutional performance is path dependent, and that patterns of behavior—culture—drive this path dependence. We derive criteria for optimal sequences of new institutions.

We show how increases in culture's influence increases path dependence only to a point; thereafter, culture creates dependence on initial conditions and the subsequent path loses its influence. We also derive optimal sequences of institutions within a family of games. The optimal sequences induce behavioral diversity and build on existing productive behaviors to avoid inefficient spillovers. Counterintuitively, these sequences maximize the *potential* for path dependence in order to avoid its *realization*. We also derive a general result showing how institutions with weak punishment regimes reduce the likelihood of behavioral spillovers.

Keywords: *Institutional performance, gradualism, transitions, learning, institutional sequencing, equilibrium selection, quasi-parameters*

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Societies adopt the mechanisms of formal institutions—rules and laws—to shape behavior in order to produce desirable political, economic, or social outcomes. Institutions are the means to an end; they are the mechanisms that channel independent human energy toward goals desired by those who possess the power to design them. Although informed by theory, data, and natural experiments, institutional designers often find that outcomes don't align with the designers' intent. Sometimes resource management programs fail to promote sustainable use, or anti-corruption measures are futile, or democracies fail to prevent the rise of authoritarian leaders. Decades of efforts to improve the economy through development projects have failed to meet aspirations, sometimes wildly so (Easterly 2006). Part of these institutional failures can be attributed to the fact that context affects performance. Nearly identical institutions succeed in one location and fail in another. Empiricists have observed context dependence countless times and at all scales, from community-based cooperative lending institutions (Guinnane 1994) to country-level political and economic institutions (Roland 2004).

In the literature one finds two renderings of context: as culture and as the institutional environment. Culture—the shared history, expectations, beliefs, meanings, and artifacts that characterize a community—is often empirically linked to institutional performance; Alesina and Giuliano's (2015) review is replete with examples. Separately, the broader set of institutions that exist in a society are compellingly argued to influence a society's ability to respond to a new institution efficiently; the work of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2005, 2012) to explain the divergent developmental paths of national economies or regime types is exemplary. In both scholarly streams, the empirical evidence that context affects performance is rich but the theoretical development—an explanation for how—remains scant.

One of the most influential arguments that connects context and institutional performance is offered by North (1995, 2005). North offers a set of propositions about institutional change. An "institutional matrix" describes the incentive environment for agents;

they respond to this environment by acquiring skills that they perceive to be useful given their understanding of the environment. Culture, treated exogenously, helps the agents' diverse mental models to converge, facilitating coordinated behavior. North posits that "the economies of scope, complementarities, and network externalities of an institutional matrix make institutional change overwhelmingly incremental and path dependent" (1995:59). North makes a strong assertion that gradual change is natural, that is, it would have the best hope of success.

North's conception is intuition-generating and raises significant questions. If change is "overwhelmingly incremental," is it necessarily incremental? If not, what about extraordinary cases—the interesting ones? Is it necessarily path dependent, and does it depend only on history, or also on the sequence? And does that mean that transitions must be gradual, or are there ways to overcome the incrementalism? Formal models are useful analytical tools to help answer questions like these.

In this paper we argue that culture and institutional environment are interlinked and jointly affect institutional performance. We develop a model that provides a causal mechanism for how culture might affect institutional performance: culture, as patterns of behavior and expectations of how others will behave, is generated in response to existing institutions, and in turn affects response to new institutions. The interaction creates institutional path dependence where culture is the path's conduit. By constructing a formal model we can derive conditions when one would expect culture and institutional environment to affect institutional performance.

We base our theory on an attribute considered in every empirical account: *human behavior.* Institutions fail because people do not act as anticipated. Institutions produce different outcomes because people in one place behave differently than in another place. These behaviors don't just affect future iterations of the institutions that generated them; they may spill over to other institutions, affecting the way agents respond to otherwise unrelated rules or

laws.[1] We model two behavioral phenomena: *behavioral repertoires* and *behavioral spillovers*. Behavioral repertoires refer to the accumulated set of behaviors used in preexisting institutions. A behavioral spillover is the influence of a person's past behavior—be it trusting, cooperative, risk taking, or altruistic—on future behavior. The causal logic requires two steps. Diverse paths or sets of institutional choices produce distinct behavioral repertoires. The repertoires, in turn, produce distinct spillovers. A society that supports multiple forms of altruistic or trusting behavior will be more likely to see that behavior spill over into a new context than a society that lacks those behaviors.

We derive eight main results, five concerning institutional performance and three addressing sequencing. First, as a baseline, we establish that cultural sway can result in suboptimal outcomes. Second, we demonstrate that any set of institutions will be subject to behavioral path dependence unless all institutions have unique equilibria. Third, we show how early institutions that create clear incentives increase potential future path dependence. Fourth, we show contrary to what might be expected that as cultural sway increases, path dependence decreases. This occurs because the effect of the behavior produced by the initial institution predominates, an insight that aligns with the literature on founder effects in organizational strategy (Boeker 1989). Fifth, in a general class of games we show how optimal institutional design requires more carrot than stick. In other words, the best institutions create strong incentives to choose the efficient equilibrium and impose only weak punishments for deviating from it.

The first of our three results on optimal sequencing states that the most efficient paths—when agents maximize their payoffs—include games that induce different behaviors early in the sequence and then rely on incrementalism. The second, as mentioned above, states

[1]Behavioral consistency is an often-mentioned component of culture. Culture consists of a much larger bundle of socially-transmitted elements, including values, beliefs, traits, narratives, and the meaning of symbols and artifacts. See for example Swidler 1986, Axelrod 1997, Boyd and Richerson 2005 and Bednar and Page (2007). See Bednar et al 2012 for evidence of the existence of behavioral spillovers between institutions.

that these optimal sequences paradoxically avoid path dependence by enabling its possibility. Early diversity builds the dimensionality of behavioral repertoires, resulting in greater capacity to respond optimally to incentive structures. That initial diversity also maximizes the potential for future path dependence. The third result states that negatively reinforced institutional drift leads to institutional change at the most inefficient moment. This is the moment at which institutional change occurs in the quasi-parameter model of Greif and Laitin (2004).

We have organized the article into five parts. We first situate our project within the literature on how context influences institutional design and performance. In Section 2, we present our modeling framework and apply it to two families of games that can be parameterized by a single variable. We also include a sketch of how one might apply the model to sequencing in democratic transitions. We present our main results in Section 3, parsing path dependence from initial game dependence, conditions for optimal sequencing, and modeling endogenous institutional change. In the fourth part, we extend the model to cover a broad array of cooperation problems: in formal modeling terms, we present a model of a general class of all two by two symmetric games as well as arbitrary game forms. We conclude by discussing possible extensions.

1 Institutional Performance Within Context

Evidence of the importance of context on institutional performance spans centuries and continents. Putnam's (1993) analysis of divergence in the economic performance of North and Southern Italy provides a well-known example. In 1970, Italians decentralized their government, implementing identical institutions at the regional level. In subsequent decades the northern regional governments outperformed those in the South. Putnam and his colleagues traced the cause of the divergence to culture: the North and South had differing

patterns of behavior that Putnam labelled "trust". In the North, trust was fostered through cooperative, mutually-rewarding social relations and economic transactions. In the South, patterns of social and economic interaction where characterized more by mutual suspicion and exploitation. In Putnam's analysis, these differing habits of behavior—dating back a thousand years—created distinct reactions to identical governmental reforms.

The failed Irish loan cooperatives provide a second brief illustration. In 1894, Horace Plunkett encourage the Irish to copy the rural Germany's Raiffeisen credit cooperatives. Among the reasons these cooperative failed were that the Irish, unlike the Germans, refused to force their neighbors to repay loans. Guinnane (1994) cites a 1902 report by the Irish Agricultural Organization Society: "It is difficult in a country with no business traditions, and where the natural kindliness of the people renders them easy-going with regard to mutual obligations, to make them realize the necessity of adhering resolutely to the rules." The Irish culture lacked the behaviors that would cause them to be willing to punish deviations, leading to an inefficient outcome.

These examples illustrate our framework of behavioral repertoires and behavioral spillovers. In Italy, the same institution produced different results because behavior varied by place; spillovers from southern Italian Mafia organizations dampened the trust that could have made regional governance more effective. In Ireland, the institution allowed for multiple outcomes, or equilibria. People adopted a familiar behavior resulting in a suboptimal outcome. In each case, existing behaviors influenced how institutions performed.

Given these cases, it should come as no surprise that scholars concerned with institutional performance have paid attention to institutional context. In Long's (1958) conception of an "ecology of games" or North's "institutional matrix" institutions create a behavioral or belief environment, and through that, affect the performance of other institutions. Similarly, Aoki's (1994, 2001) theory of complementary institutions assumes that the presence of one institution in an environment makes another more effective, and his approach to institutional

change also allows for interdependence between institutions (Aoki 2007). Relatedly, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) show how individual agency produces incremental institutional change.

Formal analysis of the effect of institutional sequencing requires situating an institution within an institutional and behavioral context. Scholars of historical institutionalism accomplish this by considering how accumulated experience shapes responses at particular moments (Thelen 1999, Mahoney 2001, 2010, Brady & Collier 2004, Falleti & Lynch 2009). Using the methodology of process tracing, scholars attempt to identify explanatory variables and the corresponding causal mechanisms in historical cases. As Falleti and Lynch, quoting Goertz (1994), put it: "Context plays a radically different role than that played by cause and effect; context does not cause X or Y but affects how they interact" (Falleti & Lynch 2009:1151; Goertz 1994:28). The question of how institutions establish a context that affects their own performance as well as the performance and choice of future institutions has been examined by scholars interested in transitions to democracy and market based economies (e.g. Roland 2000, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) and in studies of endogenous institutional change (Greif and Laitin 2004, Greif 2006, Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

Each of the various theories of democratization and economic development includes recommendations for the sequencing of institutional reform. Those sequencing prescriptions often conflict. Consider the competing approaches to timing, characterized as *gradualism* (eg. Dewatripont and Roland 1992, Carothers 2007, Roland 2000, 2002) vs. *big bang* (Lipton and Sachs 1990). Big bang, or shock therapy, advocates radical and comprehensive (multi-institutional) departures from existing institutions for quick improvement, while with gradualism, steps are taken toward the social goal that begin from the baseline of existing conditions, working with the positive aspects of a political economy, rather than strictly against the undesirable aspects. New institutions are introduced slowly and start with reforms considered most likely to be popular or successful (Roland 2000), as public acceptance for reform builds.

Other theories suggest that the first step should be to establish democratic institutions (Sen 1999, Carothers 2007, Berman 2007, Knight and Johnson 2011), to foster economic growth and its enabling institutions (Lipset 1959, North and Thomas 1973), to establish civil society with high levels of trust (Huntington 1968, Putnam 1993), to reduce of economic inequality (Boix 2003), or to create a strong, independent government (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Still others recommend establishing security and order prior to all other objectives (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Lake 2010). All of these works share two features: they are empirically grounded, and they claim that institutional order affects outcomes. They also largely agree on an ideal end state: a democratic country with strong economic and political institutions, high levels of trust and security, and relative equality, yet they disagree about the appropriate first step on the path to that common end.

Historical narratives situate institutions' contextual effects in beliefs, behaviors, norms, rituals, habits, and organizations (Greif 2006), but any formal model must reduce the dimensionality of causes. Greif, for example, relies on *beliefs* as the cultural attribute that transmits the weight of past institutions and constrains the set of equilibria as well as determining public acceptance of institutions (Roland 2000). Although behavior depends on beliefs, no one-to-one mapping exists between the two. Common beliefs need not induce identical behaviors and behavioral heterogeneity can have implications for outcomes (Bednar et al 2015). Alternatively, identical behaviors can emerge despite disparate beliefs. While both beliefs and behavior can be used to identify conditions for institutional path dependence, they rely on different assumptions. Belief-based models require constraints on priors, while our model requires minimal bounds on the extent of the cultural sway. A behavioral approach complements belief-based models by providing an opportunity to explore a different set of causal forces and to draw distinct insights.

For example, Greif (2006) highlights a fundamental asymmetry between institutions that build from existing structures and those that are created de novo. He derives a strong pref-

erence for the former because the latter lack sufficient context for similarities in beliefs. As a result, learning will be a "lengthy, costly, uncertain endeavor" (2006:191). Greif concludes that human nature advantages traveling familiar paths. A society's historical experience with an institution, or components of it, should cause that society to implement familiar institutional components rather than ones that might appear to be more efficient, from a mechanism design perspective. There exists efficiency in familiarity.

Our approach complements that of historical institutionalism, but builds a model based upon individual decision-making. It shares the intuitions of North (1995): North suggests that culture helps the diverse mental models held by agents to converge, and together with the 's (1993) "institutional matrix" interacts with beliefs to restrict institutional change to incremental advances.

Within our framework we can evaluate gradualism theoretically. We can derive conditions when gradualism would and would not lead to optimal outcomes.[2] We find that generically, gradualism generically leads to inefficient outcomes by locking in on a particular behavior.

2 The Model

In this section we describe our theoretical framework, detailing our working assumptions, definitions, and the general structure of our model. We then build intuition, first with illustrations of sequences of two foundational families of games—coordination and a risk-dominant refinement—and then we suggest an application drawn from electoral sequencing.

[2]As should be clear from our framing, the point of our model is not to derive testable predictions or to fit history exactly, but, following Johnson (2014), to uncover the core logic.

The Formal Framework

Our framework relies on three assumptions: (1) institutions arrive sequentially, (2) individuals' initial behaviors differ: some draw on past behaviors and others play the payoff maximizing strategy; and (3) in subsequent periods, individuals learn to play equilibrium in the new institution. Each assumption requires some elaboration.

First, to model institutions, we adopt the convention of representing an institution as a game form, capturing the incentives and information available to agents as they interact with one another. We divide time into two components: *epochs* and *periods*, where each epoch is divided into a large number of periods. In each epoch, we introduce a new game. That game is played some large finite number of periods within the epoch. We remain agnostic as to whether that same game is played in subsequent epochs. If so, we assume that individuals continue playing the same strategies. We assume an infinite population of individuals who play a sequence of games. As agents play more games, they develop *repertoires* of behaviors that they acquire in response to institutions.

Behavioral spillovers are the core assumption of our model.[3] Individuals interact across multiple institutional settings, and the behaviors that emerge in any one context—be they cooperative, trusting, altruistic, or competitive—might bleed into other institutional settings, creating a consistency of behavior across contexts as well as path dependence.[4] Behavioral

[3]Support for the existence of behavioral spillovers is found in multiple disciplines using diverse methodologies. Fieldwork by social psychologists shows that routine actions can shape cognitive outlook (Talhelm et al 2014). In cognitive psychology, there exists a substantial literature on *cased based* reasoning (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) for a summary) as well as an extensive literature on cultural priming by cultural psychologists. For example, experiments demonstrate the ability to prime individualist and collectivist behavior, showing that behaviors respond to cultural cues and are not static (see Oyserman and Lee (2008) for a meta analysis). Anthropologists and economists have run common experiments in distinct cultural groups and found that responses align with cultural practices (Henrich et al 2001, 2004). And finally, work by experimental economists on multiple game experiments find support for cross-game spillovers (Bednar et al 2012, Cason et al 2012). Within political science, reliance on past experiences and habits can be found in Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) explanation of internalization. At a more macro level, the assumption of spillovers producing consistency also aligns with cross-national survey research on cultural diversity (Inglehart 1990, 1997).

[4]Cross-institutional behavioral consistency is not a given. Agents observe what others have done and

spillovers form patterns of behavior, our method of modeling culture.

Rather than assume that culture automatically alters behavior in any single game, we introduce it as a parameter, so it can be varied, and its effects analyzed. We define the *cultural sway* to be the probability that an individual's initial response draws on a preexisting behavior. This group considers a new game within the context of existing institutions and chooses a familiar behavior: the equilibrium strategy employed in the closest game, perhaps because it reduces cognitive costs or because people reason by analogy.[5] Formally, we denote cultural sway as the proportion γ of the individuals compare the new institution with all existing institutions (games), identify the game in the sequence that most closely resembles game g_t, and initially play that strategy in the new game.[6] The remaining fraction $(1-\gamma)$ of the individuals approach the game with a blank slate. They interpret the game devoid of any context, in the same way that someone trained in game theory might look at a payoff matrix in an experimental setting. Their initial action in the game is that which produces the highest payoff if all individuals take that action. Note that the context-free response is an implicit assumption in many, if not most, formal models of institutions. Following convention, we assume that the context-free choice is the payoff maximizing equilibrium strategy, s_t^*.[7]

These initial actions need not be the long run equilibria. They provide the starting point, the initial conditions, from which people learn. Our last assumption therefore addresses how agents learn. For analytic convenience, we assume that they best respond to the behaviors of others.[8]

will copy a higher-earning behavior if one exists. Thus, our assumption of initial actions based on the past creates the possibility of consistency but in no way guarantees it.

[5]See Samuleson (2001), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), Jehiel (2005), and Bednar and Page (2007).

[6]Identifying the nearest prior institution requires a distance function between games, which we define below.

[7]In experimental settings, initial game play is heterogenous (Camerer 2003).

[8]Other assumptions such as cultural learning or more sophisticated individual learning algorithms would not qualitatively change our findings. In fact, in the case of two strategies that we consider for much of the paper, all improving learning strategies are identical.

Each game is chosen from a family of symmetric games, G. We denote the game selected in epoch t by g_t and the payoff maximizing repeated game equilibrium strategy by s_t^*.[9] In the first epoch, we assume that all individuals choose s_1^*, the payoff maximizing equilibrium strategy. In all subsequent epochs, we assume that individuals choose initial strategies according to their types as described above. After the initial period, the population learns an equilibrium behavior using best response learning (Nash 1951).

A central part of our analysis will be the extent to which a sequence of games together with a spillover parameter (to capture the effect of culture) enable path dependence. To simplify the presentation, we define an *historical context* to be an initial history of games together with a spillover parameter: $\Omega = \{\gamma, (g_1, g_2, ..g_k)\}$. Without loss of generality, assume a game g that when played given a historical context produces an efficient outcome. Next, imagine inserting a sequence of games between the history of games and game g. The outcome in g exhibits path dependence (relative to the context) if there exist sequence insertions that can change the outcome in game g. In this case, that would mean making the outcome in g inefficient.

We can compare relative degrees of path dependence in the following way. Historical context Ω is more path dependent than $\hat{\Omega}$ if (1) both produce the same outcome in game g, and (2) the set of sequence insertions that change the outcome in context Ω strictly contains the set of sequence insertions that change the outcome in context $\hat{\Omega}$. Put another way, outcomes in the context Ω are less robust to the insertion of sequences than in context $\hat{\Omega}$.[10] That is, more inserted sequences would switch the outcome in g given Ω than given $\hat{\Omega}$.

In the next section, we show that the performance of some institutions, represented as conventional game forms, depends on the institutions that were introduced prior to its appearance. We refer to these institutions as *susceptible*: behavioral outcomes depend upon

[9] In the event that there exist multiple payoff maximizing strategies, we assume that one is focal.
[10] For formal definition see appendix.

the particular sequence of games that precede it. If a game's outcome is not a function of the historical context, we refer to it as *immune*. As we will see, immunity is harder to achieve in contexts with substantial cultural sway. In addition, the initial game in the sequence can have a large effect on future outcomes. We define the *extent of initial game dependence* for a context Ω to be the probability that the outcome of a game in the susceptible region is the same as that of the initial game in the context.

Two Foundational Families of Games: Coordination and Efficiency

In our model, we consider families of games indexed by a parameter or set of parameters. Any two by two game—the prisoners' dilemma, chicken, stag hunt, pure coordination, or the battle of the sexes—can be embedded within the family of games we consider. We focus here on games with multiple one-shot equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is necessary for behavioral spillovers to matter. Otherwise, the players would choose the unique equilibrium.

To build intuition before our main analysis, we first derive results for two familiar classes of games. We first analyze *coordination games*. In these games, highest payoffs are achieved when players manage to play the same action as their opponent. These games can capture technological choice as well as coordination on social norms or language (Cooper 1988), or situations in which societies fail to adopt an innovation for cultural reasons, such as the United States' continued use of the English system of weights and measures. We use these games to show how behavioral spillovers can produce inefficient outcomes as games are introduced sequentially.

We then consider a second class of games with the property that the inefficient equilibrium is *risk dominant*. Achieving the efficient outcome requires a level of trust. These games can provide insight into how a market institution might fail from lack of trust. In these games, learning often produces the inefficient equilibrium (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993, Ellison

1993). We show how some sequences of early games can produce behavioral patterns that spill over into subsequent games and enable the efficient equilibrium to emerge.

Coordination Games: Tradition or Innovate

In the first class of games, individuals choose one of two actions: to *follow tradition* or to *innovate*. The payoffs to each action are determined by a parameter $\theta \in [0, 16]$. If both players stick to tradition, each gets a payoff of $(16-\theta)$. If both play an innovative new action, each gets a payoff of θ. If the two players choose opposite actions then each receives a payoff of four. For θ less than four or greater than twelve, the game has a unique equilibrium. For $\theta \in [4, 12]$, both sticking to tradition (T) and innovating (I) are pure strategy equilibria. Note that sticking to tradition is efficient if $\theta \leq 8$ and innovating is efficient if $\theta \geq 8$. To facilitate the comparison of games, we refer to games by their θ value.

Figure 1: Payoffs for the Tradition/Innovation Game

	Tradition (T)	Innovate (I)
Tradition (T)	$16-\theta, 16-\theta$	$4, 4$
Innovate (I)	$4, 4$	θ, θ

To demonstrate the logic of the model, we let the amount of cultural sway, γ, equal $\frac{3}{4}$, so that three-fourths of the population plays the equilibrium action from the closest game. First, assume that the first game in a sequence of games has $\theta_1 = 7$. By assumption, the outcome in the first game will be efficient, so individuals will choose to follow tradition. Assume that in the second game $\theta_2 = 9$. By construction, three-fourths of the population will initially follow tradition and one-fourth will innovate. The payoffs for the two strategies in the population are as follows:

$$\textit{Tradition (T):}\ \tfrac{3}{4}(7) + \tfrac{1}{4}(4) = \tfrac{25}{4} \qquad \textit{Innovate (I):}\ \tfrac{3}{4}(4) + \tfrac{1}{4}(9) = \tfrac{21}{4}$$

Figure 2: Susceptible and Immune Regions in the Tradition/Innovative Game as a Function of θ



For $\theta = 9$, if everyone were to innovate they would earn higher payoffs, but the payoff from sticking to tradition is higher given the amount of culture sway. If in subsequent periods people learn to play the strategy with the higher payoff, then the traditional strategy will come to dominate. Thus, in the learned equilibrium everyone chooses to follow tradition.

Alternatively, if the first game in the sequence had produced innovative strategies, i.e. $\theta_1 > 8$, the outcome in the second game with $\theta_2 = 9$ would also have been to innovate. Given that the outcome in the game $\theta_2 = 9$ depends on the games that precede it, it is *susceptible*, a condition that is required for a game to have a path dependent outcome. In this example, the sequence of games $(\theta_1 = 9, \theta_2 = 7)$ produces innovative outcomes in both games, where as we just showed, the sequence $(\theta_1 = 7, \theta_2 = 9)$ produces traditional outcomes in both games. Hence, outcomes exhibit true path dependence: they depend not just on the set of games, i.e. *set dependence*, but also on the order in which those games are played (Page 2006).

Not all games will be susceptible. If θ is sufficiently high (resp. low) then the outcome will be to innovate (resp. follow tradition) regardless of the previous games, as depicted in Figure 2. To see why, suppose that the first game in a sequence produces an efficient, traditional outcome, e.g. $\theta_1 < 8$. If the second game has $\theta_2 > 10$, then both players choose innovative actions despite cultural sway.[11] A similar calculation shows that for $\theta_t < 6$, the strategy chosen will follow tradition regardless of the previous games played. Therefore, the values $\theta = 6$ and $\theta = 10$ partition the parameters into the *immune* and *susceptible* regions.

[11]The payoff to the traditional action equals $\frac{3}{4}(16-\theta_2)+\frac{1}{4}(4) = 13-\frac{3}{4}\theta_2$. The payoff to innovation equals $\frac{3}{4}(4)+\frac{1}{4}(\theta_2) = 3+\frac{1}{4}\theta_2$. The latter exceeds the former if and only if $\theta_2 \geq 10$.

Games with parameter values in the immune region are not affected by the sequencing of the games' introduction to the society.

Risk Dominant Games: Trust or Safety

We next characterize a class of games with a risk dominant action. Players have a choice between a trusting action or a safe action; to trust implies risk but can lead to a higher payoff. This family generalizes the Stag Hunt game, where hunters could choose to rely on one another in pursuit of a stag or to hunt alone for a rabbit. Given the payoffs, if $\theta \leq 8$ then Safe is the efficient equilibrium, otherwise Trusting is efficient.

Figure 3: Payoffs in the Trust Game

	Safe	Trusting
Safe	$16-\theta, 16-\theta$	$4, 2$
Trusting	$2, 4$	θ, θ

The initial susceptible regions are as shown in Figure 4.[12]

Notice how the the immune regions favors the safe action. This happens because choosing safe is *risk dominant*.[13] Learning advantages risk dominant strategies (Samuelson 1997). Trust, therefore, will be harder to create or maintain. Consider the following set of games $\{7, 9, 10, 11, 14\}$. If game $\theta = 7$ occurs first, then the only sequence that obtains the efficient outcomes in all remaining games is $(7, 14, 11, 10, 9)$. This sequence front-loads games in which trusting is the efficient outcome and then builds trust in the susceptible region.

[12]To solve for the boundary of the immune region for the trusting action, choose θ so that the trusting strategy receives a higher payoff even if three fourths of the individuals play the safe action. Formally, set θ so that $\frac{3}{4}(16-\theta_B)+\frac{1}{4}(4) \leq \frac{3}{4}(2)+\frac{1}{4}(\theta_B)$. Solving gives the threshold at $\theta = 11.5$. A similar calculation gives the threshold for the safe action as $\theta = 6.5$.

[13]The action that receives the highest expected payoff if all actions are chosen with equal probability is called the *risk dominant* action.

Figure 4: Susceptible and Immune Regions in Safe/Trusting Game as a Function of θ



N Player Games: Sequencing Electoral Institutions

Our framework also applies to games with arbitrary numbers of players. Consider an N person coordination model in which voters coordinate on either regional or national parties in a series of two elections: one regional and one national. If regional elections are held first, voters would be more likely to coordinate on regional parties. When national elections are held, voters may continue to support regional parties. In contrast, if the national elections were held first, national parties may be more likely to emerge. Later, when subsequent regional elections are held, those nationalist actions would spill over into the regional election. Relevant behaviors in this game could include gathering information, developing policy platforms, and forming relationships with people outside the region. These behaviors might transfer to the other elections.[14]

Linz and Stepan (1992, 1996) make similar arguments to prescribe that new democracies hold national elections first. This prescription breaks with the Tocquevilian logic that voters get experience with local elections before trying their hand at the more significant national election, as well as with Ordeshook and Shvetsova's (1997) recommendation that the party

[14]A formal version might look as follows: assume N voters within a region who can coordinate on *national* issues (U) or *regional* issues (R). Let N_R denote the number of people who regional issues and $N_U = (N - N_R)$, denote those who choose national issues. Using a crude variant of the cube rule (Taagepera and Shugart 1999), payoffs could be written as follows:

$$\pi_{REG} = \theta \left(\frac{N_R}{N}\right)^3 + (1-\theta)\left(\frac{N_U}{N}\right)^3$$

$$\pi_{NAT} = (1-\theta) \left(\frac{N_R}{N}\right)^3 + \theta\left(\frac{N_U}{N}\right)^3$$

where the parameter θ denotes the relative advantage of regional focus in the regional election and national focused in the national election.

system be driven from below, to help constrain the national government. Spain, where national parties won a majority of the vote in early elections despite strong Basque and Catalan regional identities provides a supporting example. In contrast, Yugoslavia first held regional elections leading to the rise of ethnic parties and the dissolution of the country.

Our framework reveals the conditionality of any sequencing claims. If the payoffs from coordinating on regional interests in say Moldavia, Georgia, and Ukraine were sufficiently strong, regionalist behavior could have existed within the *immune region*. If so, even if voters had voted for national parties in the national elections, voters would have coordinated on regional parties later. Linz and Stepan's argument that holding national elections first would have solved the problem assumes a limited attachment to regional identities. Our model implies a testable hypotheses that electoral order matters more for low levels of attachment and would not matter when regional attachment is high.

3 Results: One-Dimensional Family of Games

We now state general results for a family of games that includes coordination games and trust games. We make the following formal assumptions:

Assumption 1 *There exists a family of symmetric two by two games indexed by a one-dimensional real-valued parameter, $G(\theta)$, with $\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_U]$ with two pure strategies denoted by A and B. Payoffs are maximized if both players choose the same strategy for all θ. Payoffs for A are maximized at θ_L and payoffs for B are maximized at θ_U.*

Assumption 2 *The payoff to playing B increases in θ and the payoff to playing A decreases in θ. These marginal effects increase in magnitude when the other individual chooses the same action.*[15]

[15]Formally, this can be written as $\frac{\partial \pi_{BB}(\theta)}{\partial(\theta)} > \frac{\partial \pi_{BA}(\theta)}{\partial(\theta)}$ and $\frac{\pi_{AA}(\theta)}{\partial(\theta)} < \frac{\partial \pi_{AB}(\theta)}{\partial(\theta)}$, where $\pi_{ij}(\theta)$ equals the payoff to an individual playing i whose opponent plays j.

Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that there exists an efficiency cutpoint, $\theta^{=}$, such that for any game $\theta \leq \theta^{=}$, A is payoff maximizing, and for any $\theta > \theta^{=}$, B is payoff maximizing. To simplify the presentation, we define $\theta^A(\gamma)$ and $\theta^B(\gamma)$ to denote the boundaries of the initial susceptible region. Thus, strategy A is immune for any game with $\theta < \theta^A(\gamma)$ and strategy B is immune for any game with $\theta > \theta^B(\gamma)$. If there exists no immune region for strategy A (resp. B) then we set $\theta^A = \theta_L$ (resp. $\theta^B = \theta_U$).

Our first claim states that the size of the initial susceptible region increases in the size of the spillover: the stronger the spillover, the more likely inefficient equilibria emerge in later games. The proofs of all claims are in the appendix.

Claim 1. *Increasing the amount of cultural sway makes more games susceptible to sequencing: $\theta^A(\gamma)$ (resp. $\theta^B(\gamma)$) weakly decreases (increases) in γ.*

Next, we state a lemma that clarifies the logic. The lemma states that at the end of any sequence of games, there exists a threshold T such that in the next game, the strategy A will be played if $\theta < T$ and B if $\theta > T$. Note that the lemma implies that two historical contexts are outcome equivalent if and only if they have the same threshold.

Lemma 1. *The outcome in a game is determined by a threshold in the space of payoffs that depends on the historical context and the amount of cultural sway. [Given a historical context Γ of length $t-1$, in epoch t there exists a threshold $T_t(\Gamma)$ such that if $\theta_t < T_t$, A will be the outcome and if $\theta_t > T_t$, B will be the outcome.]*

The threshold will equal the average of the largest θ that produces an outcome of A and the smallest θ that produces an outcome of B, provided that the average lies in the susceptible region. Therefore, it depends on both the spillover parameter and the payoffs in the first game.

We now state a corollary that makes two points: first, the closer the first game is to the

efficiency cutpoint the more it will affect later paths, and second, the greater the amount of cultural sway, the larger the effect of the initial game.

Corollary 1. *If the initial game produces outcome A, then for any subsequent games, the threshold increases in the amount of cultural sway and in the payoff parameter of the initial game. [Given $\Omega = \{\gamma, (\theta_1)\}$, where $\theta_1 < \theta^=$, for any sequence of future games $(\theta_2, \theta_3, \ldots, \theta_k)$, the threshold at time k, T_k, weakly increases in both γ and θ_1.]*

Path Dependence and Initial Game Dependence

We now demonstrate how the extent of institutional path dependence depends on historical context. We first state a sufficient condition for the existence of institutional path dependence.

Claim 2. (Existence of Path Dependence) *Any set of games that contains at least one susceptible game and two games with distinct efficient equilibrium outcomes exhibits path dependence.*

The claim has a straightforward corollary.

Corollary 2. (Existence of Susceptible Games)*: For any set of games that contains at least one susceptible game and two games with distinct efficient outcomes, there exists one ordering of the games such that all susceptible games produce outcome A and another ordering in which all produce outcome B.*

The existence of a susceptible region enables path dependence. However, a larger susceptible region does not necessarily imply greater path dependence; the size of the susceptible region depends both on the amount of cultural sway and the historical context. One historical context could have a larger susceptible region but include more previous games. These

previous games can restrict path dependence. We make that intuition formal in the next claim.

Claim 3. (Greater Susceptibility Need Not Imply Greater Path Dependence) *There exist contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ with the same threshold such that the susceptible region for Ω contains the susceptible region for $\hat{\Omega}$, but that context Ω does not exhibit greater path dependence.*

It does follow that a larger susceptible region implies greater path dependence if there has existed at least one outcome of each type in both contexts.

Claim 4. (Distinct Outcomes and Path Dependence) *If two historical contexts with the same threshold each include one outcome of each type, then a larger susceptible region implies greater path dependence.*

A straightforward corollary of this claim is that choosing an institution with clearer incentives—i.e a θ further from the threshold—produces greater future path dependence because it makes the susceptible region larger.

Corollary 3. *Given any game in an historical context, clearer incentives, i.e. payoffs further from the threshold, increase subsequent path dependence.*

We have shown how the degree of path dependence is captured by cultural sway provided that both outcomes have occurred. As cultural sway becomes dominant (formally, in the limit as γ approaches one), the susceptible region can converge to the entire space. It follows that the strategy played in the first game will be played in all subsequent games. This implies sensitivity to the initial game, and *not path dependence*.

We can measure initial game dependence as the probability that a given future game has the same outcome as the first game given a random sequence of subsequence games. The



Figure 5: Odds Ratio of Threshold in Direction of Initial Game in Tradition Game after 1000 Epochs.

next claim states that the extent of initial game dependence strictly increases in the amount of cultural sway.

Claim 5. (Large Sway Produces Initial Game Dependence) *The extent of initial game dependence strictly increases in cultural sway (γ) and approaches one as cultural γ approaches one.*

The previous claim describes outcomes for γ near one. The same effect holds for less cultural sway as well. In Figure 5, we show results from 1000 simulations of our Tradition/Innovation Game. We plot the number of times that the final threshold lies on the same side of the efficiency cutpoint as the initial game against the number of times that it was not. This is the odds ratio that the initial game determines all subsequent outcomes. For low amounts of cultural sway, the ratio is around two, which suggests path dependence. For large amounts of cultural sway, the odds ratio approaches seven; the initial game determines a substantial majority of subsequent outcomes. We might more accurately describe those cases as initial game dependent.

These calculations demonstrate that if the outcome depends on the path, then both

outcomes must remain possible. When cultural sway is large, the initial game determines behavior in nearly all future games.

Efficient Paths

We now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient sequence of games to exist and show how to construct such sequences. We restrict attention to sets of games that include at least one game in which outcome A is efficient and one game in which outcome B is efficient. We also require that at least one game lies in the immune region for one outcome (without loss of generality, we use B). Without that assumption, all games would produce the same outcome.

We first show that placing games with stronger incentives earlier in the sequence weakly increases the number of games with efficient outcomes. To state the claim, we introduce some notation. We can relabel the games corresponding to their efficient outcome and then index them based on the strength of the incentives they create. To be precise, given any set of games $\{\theta_1, \theta_2, \ldots, \theta_k\}$ we label and index the θ's as follows: We assign α labels to games where outcome A is efficient ($\theta < \theta^{=}$). We then arrange the α's in increasing order. We assign β labels to games where outcome B is efficient and arrange the β's in decreasing order. We therefore have relabeled and reindexed the games so that $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{k_\alpha}, \beta_{k_\beta}, \ldots, \beta_2, \beta_1\}$ where $\alpha_j < \alpha_{j+1}$, $\beta_i > \beta_{i+1}$.

Two principles underlie the construction of efficient sequences. First, games with lower indices, i.e. those with stronger incentives, should be introduced earlier. Second, outcomes of both types should be alternated to some extent. The benefit of alternation can be seen through an example in which we alter the sequencing of a common set of games. Assume that payoffs and cultural sway are such that the efficiency cut point equals eight ($\theta^{=} = 8$) and the susceptible region is bounded by two and eleven ($\theta^{A} = 2$, and $\theta^{B} = 11$) as shown in



Figure 6: An Efficient Sequence of Games

Figure 6. Finally let the set of games be $\{4, 7, 9, 10, 12\}$.

We first sequence the games according to the strength of their incentives, alternating between games that have A as the efficient outcome and games that have B as the efficient outcome. This produces the sequence $(4, 12, 7, 10, 9)$. Refer again to Figure 6. As each game is introduced, the threshold (denoted by T_t) moves in the direction of the game just introduced. By construction, each subsequent game has sufficiently strong incentives that it lies on the appropriate side of the threshold. For example, game α_2 which has a payoff parameter of seven lies to the left of the threshold T_3 which equals eight.

We next consider an alternative sequence $(4, 12, 10, 9, 7)$ that does arrange the games by strength of incentives but includes all of the games with B as the efficient outcome before the second game that has A as the efficient outcome. This sequence violates the second principle. As can be seen in Figure 7, by the time that the game α_2 is introduced in epoch five, the threshold T_5 has fallen below seven, so the game now produces an inefficient outcome. Had the game been placed earlier in the sequence the outcome would have been efficient.

To make these intuitions more formal, we first state a claim establishing the benefits of

Figure 7: An Inefficient Sequence of Games



Sequence: (α_1, β_1, β_2, β_3, α_2)

ordering games by strength of incentives, a method of sequencing we call *incentive based incrementalism*. The claim states that given any sequence of games that produces efficient outcomes in every game, switching the order of the games so that those with stronger incentives (lower indices) are introduced earlier will maintain efficiency in at least as many future games.

Claim 6. Incentive Based Incrementalism *Given any set of games labeled* $\alpha_1 < \alpha_2 \cdots < \alpha_{k_\alpha} < \theta^{=} < \beta_{k_\beta} < \ldots \beta_2 < \beta_1$*, any game sequence in which there exists integers* j *and* j' *such that* $j > j'$ *and* α_j *(resp.* β_j*) appears prior to* $\alpha_{j'}$ *(resp.* $\beta_{j'}$*) produces inefficient outcomes in at least as many games as an alternative sequence in which game* α_j *appears before* $\alpha_{j'}$ *(resp* β_i *appears before* $\beta_{j'}$*).*

In light of this claim, we hereafter assume games are introduced by increasing indices and that α_1 is the first game introduced so that the sequence produces an outcome A. Assume

next an outcome of A in game α_{j-1}. We can then define the *immunity score* of game α_j to be the number of type β games that can be introduced (starting from the most extreme) yet still obtain an efficient outcome in game α_j game. To state this formally, the immunity score equals the largest number of β games that can be introduced prior to α_j such that those games all produce outcome B, yet game α_j still produces outcome A.

Given a game α_j (resp β_i), and a set of games $\{\alpha_1, ..\alpha_R, \beta_M ...\beta_1\}$, the **immunity score** *for α_j (resp β_j) is defined as follows:*

$$\begin{aligned} I(\alpha_j) &= max\ i\ s.t.\ (\beta_i - \alpha_j) > (\alpha_j - \alpha_{j-1})\ \ if\ \alpha_j > \theta^A \\ &= M \quad otherwise \\ I(\beta_i) &= max\ j\ s.t.\ (\beta_i - \alpha_j) > (\beta_{i-1} - \beta_i)\ \ if\ \beta_i < \theta^B \\ &= R \quad otherwise \end{aligned}$$

From this definition, games with large immunity scores will be less susceptible to the sequence of games. At one extreme, a game in the immunity region of outcome A (resp. B) has an immunity score equal to k_β (resp. k_α). At the other extreme, a game with an immunity score of zero must be introduced prior to any game that produces the other outcome.[16]

Our next claim relates the immunity scores to the possibility of an efficient sequence of games. Assume that $k_\alpha = k_\beta$, that is there are equal numbers of games with A and B as efficient outcomes. The claim gives a sufficient condition for the alternating sequence of games $(\alpha_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \beta_2, ...\alpha_{k_\alpha}, \beta_{k_\beta})$ to be an efficient sequence.

Claim 7. *(***Efficient Alternation***) Given a set of games with an equal number of efficient A outcomes and B outcomes, if $I(\alpha_j) \geq j$ for all j and $I(\beta_i) > i$ for all i, then the alternating sequence of games produces efficient outcomes in every game.*

The proof of the claim is straightforward. If the games are introduced in the order α_1,

[16]The immunity score obviously depends on the size of the behavioral spillover γ.

β_1, α_2, β_2 and so on, then by the construction of the immunity score, each game produces the efficient outcome. The alternating sequence will fail to be efficient if any game has an immunity score less than its index. For example, suppose that game α_5, which has an index equal to five, has an immunity score of three. This low immunity score means that only β_1, β_2, and β_3, can be introduced prior to α_5 yet still have game α_5 produce outcome A.[17] This implies that if the games are introduced using the alternating sequence, the outcome in game α_5 would be B.

Violation of the inequality in the previous claim does not imply that an efficient sequence cannot exist. If game β_4 has an immunity score larger than five, then game α_5 could be introduced prior to game β_4, and each game would still produce an efficient outcome. The following claim which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient sequence. We refer to the procedure of incrementally weakening incentives from each direction as *multi-directional incrementalism.*

Claim 8. (Efficiency and Multi-Directional Incrementalism) *Given a set of games* $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_R, \beta_M, \beta_{M-1}, \ldots, \beta_1\}$*, there exists a sequencing of the games that produces efficient outcomes in every game if and only if the following two conditions hold:*

(i) If $j > I(\alpha_j)$*, then for any* β_i *s.t.* $i > I(\alpha_j)$*,* $I(\beta_i) \geq j$*.*

(ii) If $i > I(\beta_i)$*, then for any* α_j *s..t.* $j > I(\beta_i)$*,* $I(\alpha_j) \geq i$*.*

As stated in the next corollary, if a set of games does *not* permit an efficient sequencing, then an efficient sequence can be created by introducing new, more extreme games early.

Corollary 4. *Given a set of games for which no efficient sequence of games exist. An efficient sequence can be created by adding games to the set that have more extreme payoffs than the games that do not produce efficient outcomes.*

[17] This would mean that game β_4 is closer to game α_5 than is game α_4.

The theoretical results reveal a benefit to placing games with higher immunity earlier in a sequence. Societies that early in their history introduce institutions that produce diverse behaviors better sustain that diversity. They can leverage that diversity to produce efficient outcomes in future games. The corollary suggests a lesson for reform: if you cannot attain an efficient outcome in the game you wish to introduce, construct a new game with stronger incentives first.

Endogenous Institutional Change

We now interpret the *quasi-parameter* framework introduced by Greif and Laitin (2004) within our framework. Grief and Laitin describe a process of endogenous institutional change where game play produces feedbacks that change the payoff structure within an existing game. They refer to the changing payoff values as quasi-parameters.

To translate their quasi-parameter to our model, consider incremental adjustments to the θ's of an existing game as the equivalent of new games being introduced. As the θ of an existing game changes, equilibrium behavior can be reinforced or become more fragile depending on the change in payoffs. A change in payoffs could degrade an equilibrium behavior if it makes that behavior inefficient.

Institutional drift—the method of change in a quasi-parameter framework—implies costly transitions. A reinforcing quasi-parameter has no effect on efficiency. The equilibrium outcome was efficient and remains so. Degrading quasi-parameters are another matter. Initially an institution might have an efficient outcome A; however, as θ increases and crosses the efficiency cutpoint, outcome B becomes efficient.

Our framework provides a method for analyzing the size of the efficiency loss from a degrading quasi-parameter. Behavior would not change—remaining inefficient—until the quasi-paremeter enters the immune region. This implies inefficient outcomes for any games

lying between the efficiency cutpoint and the immune region.

Claim 9. *A degrading quasi-parameter produces behavioral change only when entering the immune region for the alternative strategy.*

The proof of the claim follows directly. Assume that all games produce outcome A. As θ increases, all outcomes will remain A until θ enters B's immune region. In other words, A is played in the entire susceptible region, beyond the efficiency cutpoint of $\theta^{=}$. A degrading quasi-parameter exemplifies *one-directional incrementalism*: a single behavior is reinforced with each change in θ.

The contrast between the two models merits emphasis. Greif and Laitin assume an exogenous rate of change in the quasi-parameter (although they interpret this change as endogenous to the continued reliance on the institution). In Greif and Laitin, behavior changes within the same institution. In our model, behavior is chosen in a new, similar institution. The behavior and outcomes that will result when that institution is introduced depends on the set of existing institutions. Those institutions could either reinforce or degrade the desired behavior.

One might expect that cultural sway, i.e. behavioral stickiness, would be larger for endogenous changes to an existing institution than for a new and similar institution. That may or may not be so. Regardless, our model shows that for any level cultural sway, behavior only changes once the quasi-parameter (or the payoffs in our case) lies in the immune region. Our model also offers a a solution to redress this problem: speed up the degradation through a large change in the quasi-parameter. Accelerating the transition moves the game into the immune region for the efficient behavior, or, if appropriate, introduce a new, more extreme institution to germinate the more efficient behavior.

Figure 8: A General Game Form

	A	B
A	ω, ω	ρ, ν
B	ν, ρ	$0, 0$

4 Results for General Classes of Games

We now extend our framework to cover all two by two symmetric games. Within this more general class of games, we show that when cultural sway is large, institutions that weakly punish for deviation are more likely to produce efficient outcomes. Increasing rewards for choosing the correct strategy also improves the likelihood of efficient outcomes but not as effectively as weakening the punishment for failing to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Our analysis relies on the parameterization of two by two symmetric games in Figure 8, with up to three distinct parameters to define a wide array of payoffs. The parameters ω, ν, and ρ can take any real value. This class of games admits three types of efficient equilibria: A and B as before, and a third in which players alternate between A and B that we denote by S. The efficient regions for each of the three strategies are shown in Figure 9.

To analyze this more general class of games, we must modify our previous construction in two ways. First, we need to define a distance or similarity measure between games. We could use Euclidean distance over payoffs or a lexicographic measure in which a game is closer to games that have the same efficient equilibrium and then base distance on the Euclidean metric. The results that follow do not depend on the distance metric used, only that it is well defined.

Second, we must characterize off-the-equilibrium play, i.e. punishment strategies. Following convention, we assume punishment relies on the minmax strategy. Consider the Prisoner's Dilemma game where A is the analog of cooperation. To support cooperation A,

Figure 9: Efficient Regions For The Three Strategies in 2 x 2 Games



an individual must punish with B in subsequent rounds of the game. To avoid complications, we assume that within an epoch a game is repeatedly infinitely and that discounting is sufficiently low so that we can rely on average payoffs.

Assumption 4 *Players choose strategies to achieve minmax payoffs when their opponent plays a different strategy.*

To see how path dependence arises in this setting, suppose that B is the efficient outcome in the first game and that the second game has the following payoffs:

	A	B
A	$2, 2$	ρ, ν
B	ν, ρ	$0, 0$

Assume $\rho + \nu < 4$, so that A is the efficient outcome in this second game. Let M denote the minmax payoff. Assuming infinitely repeated play we can approximate the payoffs from playing A, denoted as π_A, and the payoffs from playing strategy B, denoted as π_B, as follows:

$$\pi_A = \gamma M + (1-\gamma)\omega \qquad \pi_B = \gamma 0 + (1-\gamma)M$$

The efficient outcome will be achieved in the second game if and only if $(1-\gamma)\omega > (1-2\gamma)M$. This will be satisfied if M equals zero or if $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$ (given that $M \leq 0$). But suppose that the off-diagonal payoffs sum to a large negative number so that $M < 0$. Now, A may no longer be the equilibrium outcome in the second game. Thus, lowering the minmax payoff decreases the probability of getting the efficient strategy for the new game. To state the result simply: *Stronger punishment is counterproductive.*

This intuition holds more generally. Given an arbitrary family of games $G = \{G_\psi\}_{\psi \in \Psi}$ with a well-defined distance measure, $d : G \times G \to [0, \infty)$, consider the introduction of game G_T in the Tth epoch. We can state the following claim:

Claim 10. *(***Stronger Punishment Impedes Efficiency***) Let G_τ denote the previous game in the sequence of games closest to G_T given d. Denote the payoff in the efficient infinitely repeated game equilibrium in G_T by A_T, A_τ denote the payoff in G_T from playing the equilibrium strategy used in G_τ, and let M denote the minmax payoff in G_T. The efficient equilibrium will be chosen in G_T if and only if the following holds:*

$$A_T > A_\tau + (A_\tau - M)\frac{(2\gamma - 1)}{(1-\gamma)}$$

The claim implies three routes to efficient outcomes: (1) choose a game so that the nearest game has the same efficient equilibrium, (2) increase payoffs to the efficient equilibrium, or (3) increase the minmax payoff. The third route is the most powerful. If a new institution creates large punishments (a small minmax payoff) then the cost of overcoming cultural sway will be high. Punishment works against experimentation; mild punishments enable the efficient behavior to take hold.

5 Discussion

Whether implementing a new law, managing a transition—possible on a grand scale such as in a transition to democracy—or introducing policies to achieve more targeted goals like promoting a new industry, the order that laws and institutions are introduced can matter, as scholars of development have long noted. Conflicting interpretations of the empirical evidence create an opportunity for foundational models of institutional sequencing to unpack the logic of when and how institutional context and, more generally, culture matter.

This need for models is reinforced by North's (1994, 1995) influential intuition of the significance of the "institutional matrix" as well as recent studies that establish a correlation between culture and institutional performance (Greif 1994, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006, Tabellini 2010, Gorodnichenko and Roland 2013, Alesina and Giuliano 2013). In these studies, culturally-circumscribed attitudes are measurable proxies for equilibrium beliefs. Most scholars have zeroed in on the trust/distrust or individualistic/collectivist differences, as measured by the World Values Survey (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). Analytically, culture has been treated as a primitive, at best "slow-moving" (Roland 2004). However, it is also the product of institutions (Putnam 1993, Tabellini 2010). In our framework, we capture culture as a behavioral consistency across institutional domains, and generate results about how culture modeled in this way will affect institutional performance.

A model should explicate conditions for common intuitions to hold and fail, it should produce more subtle, and sometimes unexpected results, and it should enable one to ask new questions. Our model does all three. First, we've shown that if some individuals choose initial strategies based on their past experiences then we should expect to see path dependence in the performance of a sequence of institutions. In our model, path dependence arises even when spillovers are mild, and the level of inefficiency caused by this path dependence correlates with the extent of cultural sway. Neither of these results should be especially

surprising. If the model failed to produce these results, we would have reason to question the core assumptions.

Second, the model reveals less intuitive comparative statics. As cultural sway increases, the susceptible regions increase until path dependence gives way to initial game dependence. If cultural sway is substantial, and if nearly all institutions have plausible behavioral analogues in the cultural repertoire, then the ultimate threshold will favor the behavior produced by the initial institution with high probability. Under these conditions the first institution has an enormous effect on the agents' responses to subsequent institutions.

Finally, we derive rules for the optimal sequencing and design of institutions. We find that the key to efficiency is diversity of institutions and behaviors. Optimal sequences start from diverse extremes, creating incentives to generate distinct behaviors, and eventually introduce institutions where outcomes are more contingent on the past. Thus, the way to reduce *realized* path dependence is to keep its *potential* alive for as long as possible, by creating incentives for diverse behaviors early.

The mechanistic role that diversity plays should not be thought of as a *portfolio effect*. An optimal portfolio includes stocks that produce high payoffs in different states of the world. The holder of that portfolio still earns the average of those payoffs. The diversity spreads risk. In our framework, ideally people choose the *best* behavior from their repertoire. Diversity does not spread risk. It provides better options.

Thus, the implications of gradualism—a common policy recommendation to ease economic or political transitions—are that it reduces the ways in which people can respond. When institutions evolve incrementally, existing behaviors become reinforced, preventing new behaviors from emerging. Gradualism may lock in undesirable behavior.[18]

Our results also suggest that breaking from tradition requires strong carrots and weak

[18]The idea that optimal sequences of choices should maintain options, although new to political science, can be found in a slightly different form in artificial intelligence. The best game-playing algorithms keep strategies open (Gelly et al 2012). The best institutional sequences should do the same.

sticks. The introduction of bureau franchises in China provides a wonderful example of how this can be accomplished. The bureau franchises created strong incentives to create new businesses. Every agency, even the post office, could earn bonuses through entrepreneurship. At the same time, few punishments were put in place for inefficient choices. This combination of big carrots and little sticks allowed individualistic behavior to gain a foothold (Ang 2016).

Regarding optimal design, we find that strong negative consequences are counterproductive: they reduce the likelihood of efficient outcomes by raising the cost of experimenting. This result runs counter to standard mechanism design logic that one should choose institutions with dominant strategies (Page 2012).

To conclude, our framework enables us to explore the implications of cultural sway and behavioral spillovers. We identify the necessity of taking into account behavioral repertoires when constructing or sequentially introducing institutions. Our analysis extends the formal literature on institutions by including the cultural and behavioral effects. We advocate proceeding in this new direction with vigor and caution. Models of microprocesses used to explain macrophenomenon inevitably fail to capture important aspects of the environment. These gaps limit our ability to draw inferences about the real world, to construct accurate hypotheses, and to design effective institutions. By filling those theoretical gaps with micro level data, formal institutional analysis can begin to bridge two literatures that rarely communicate: the stark theoretical models that isolate and identify informational structures and incentive effects, and the rich, comparative case studies that elucidate context.

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Appendix

Proof of Claim 1: Let $\pi_i(\theta)$ denote the payoff if both individuals choose strategy i and π_{iD} denote the payoff to an individual who plays strategy i when the other player chooses the opposite. A game is immune for A if the payoff from A exceeds the payoff from B. If the immune region is empty, the result follows immediately. Assume an immune region for strategy A. The boundary of the immune region $\theta^A(\gamma)$ satisfies the following equation:

$$(1-\gamma)\pi_A(\theta^A(\gamma)) + \gamma\pi_{AD}(\theta^A) = (1-\gamma)\pi_{BD}(\theta^A) + \gamma\pi_B(\theta^A(\gamma))$$

Simplifying gives:

$$\pi_A(\theta^A(\gamma)) - \pi_{BD}(\theta^A) = \frac{\gamma}{(1-\gamma)}\left[\pi_B(\theta^A(\gamma)) - \pi_{AD}(\theta^A)\right]$$

By construction, both individuals choosing strategy A is an equilibrium at $\theta^A(\gamma)$. Therefore, $\pi_A(\theta^A(\gamma) > \pi_{BD}(\theta^A)$ which implies that $\pi_B(\theta^A(\gamma)) > \pi_{AD}(\theta^A)$. Increasing γ to $\gamma + \epsilon$, increases the coefficient on the right hand side of the equation. By A2, decreasing θ^A, increases the left hand side of the equation and decreases the right hand side. Therefore, $\theta^A(\gamma+\epsilon) < \theta^A(\gamma)$. A similar argument holds for $\theta^B(\gamma)$ strictly increasing in γ.

Proof of Lemma 1: It suffices to consider the case where $\theta_1 < \theta^=$. It follows that T_2 will equal θ^B as any susceptible game produces outcome A. Until there exists a k such that $\theta_k \geq \theta^B$, the threshold remains at θ^B. Therefore, assume $\theta_2 < \theta^B$, so that $T_3 = \theta^B$. If $\theta_2 \geq \theta^B$, then $T_3 = \frac{1}{2}(\theta_1 + \theta_2)$, provided that $\frac{1}{2}(\theta_1 + \theta_2)$ lies in the interval (θ^A, θ^B). If $\frac{1}{2}(\theta_1 + \theta_2) \leq \theta^A$, then $T_3 = \theta^A$, and if $\frac{1}{2}(\theta_1 + \theta_2) \geq \theta^B$, then $T_3 = \theta^B$. To determine the threshold for all subsequent periods, let θ^a equal the largest θ_k for $k < t$ that produces outcome A and let θ^b be the smallest θ_k for $k < t$ that produces outcome B. The threshold equals the average of θ^a and θ^b provided it lies in the susceptible region. Otherwise, the threshold equals whichever of θ^A or θ^B is closest to that average.

Proof of Claim 2: Let θ^S denote a susceptible game. Without loss of generality assume that A is payoff maximizing in the susceptible game. Let θ^o denote a game in which B is payoff maximizing. The sequence θ^o followed by θ^S produces outcome B in both games. The sequence θ^S followed by θ^o produces outcome A in the first game. The outcome in the second game will be A if $\theta^o < \theta^B$ and B otherwise.

Proof of Corollary 1: Assume $\gamma < \hat{\gamma}$. It suffices to show that $T_t(\gamma) \leq T_t(\hat{\gamma})$ for all t. Let $\psi_t^A(\gamma)$ denote the largest θ_i for $i = 1$ to t that produces the outcome A given γ, and $\psi_t^B(\gamma)$ denote the smallest θ_i for $i = 1$ to t that produces the outcome B given γ. If there exists no θ_i that produces outcome B, set $\psi_t^B(\gamma) = \infty$. The proof relies on induction. By assumption $\gamma < \hat{\gamma}$. Therefore by Claim 1, following period 1, three inequalities hold:

(i) $T_1(\gamma) < T_1(\hat{\gamma})$

(ii) $\psi_1^A(\gamma) \leq \psi_1^A(\hat{\gamma})$

(iii) $\psi_1^B(\gamma) \leq \psi_1^B(\hat{\gamma})$.

We assume that all three inequalities hold through time t and show that they then hold for time $t+1$. We consider three cases:

Case 1: $\theta_{t+1} < \psi_t^A(\gamma)$ *or* $\theta_{t+1} > \psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma})$: By construction, $T_{t+1}(\gamma) = T_t(\gamma)$ and $T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma}) = T_t(\hat{\gamma})$, so inequality (i) holds. Inequalities (ii) and (iii) hold because $\psi_{t+1}^j(\gamma) = \psi_t^j(\gamma)$ and $\psi_{t+1}^j(\hat{\gamma}) = \psi_t^j(\hat{\gamma})$ for $j = A, B$.

Case 2: $\psi_t^A(\gamma) < \theta_{t+1} < T_t(\gamma)$: First, consider the case where $\psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma}) = \infty$. In this case, $T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma}) = T_t(\hat{\gamma}) = \theta^B(\hat{\gamma})$ (Recall that $\theta^B(\hat{\gamma})$ denotes the boundary for the immune region for B.) Therefore, by construction, $T_{t+1}(\gamma) \leq \theta^B(\gamma) \leq T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma})$. The other two inequalities hold trivially. We can therefore restrict attention to the case where $\psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma}) < \infty$. By induction, $T_t(\gamma) \leq T_t(\hat{\gamma})$, therefore the outcome in the game θ_t is A for both spillover rates. Furthermore, $\psi_t^B(\gamma) = \psi_{t+1}^B(\gamma)$ and $\psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma}) = \psi_{t+1}^B(\hat{\gamma})$ so (iii) holds. To prove (ii) holds, by assumption $\psi_{t+1}^A(\gamma) = \theta_{t+1}$. There exist two possibilities: First, if $\theta_{t+1} < \psi_t^A\hat{\gamma}$, then (ii) holds strictly. Otherwise, $\theta_{t+1} = \psi_t^A(\hat{\gamma})$ and $\psi_t^A(\gamma) = \psi_t^A(\hat{\gamma})$, so (ii) holds weakly.

To prove (i) holds, we first solve for $T_{t+1}(\gamma)$:

$$T_{t+1}(\gamma) = \frac{\theta_{t+1} + \psi_t^B(\gamma)}{2}$$

To solve for $T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma})$, let $\theta^* = \max\{\theta_{t+1}, \psi_t^A(\hat{\gamma})\}$

$$T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma}) = \frac{\theta^* + \psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma})}{2}$$

By induction, $\psi_t^B\gamma \geq \psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma})$ and by construction, $\theta^* \geq \theta_{t+1}$, which completes this case.

Case 3: $T_t(\gamma) < \theta_{t+1} < \psi_t^B(\hat{\gamma})$: First, consider the case where $\theta_{t+1} < T_t(\hat{\gamma})$. The outcome is B for γ and A for $\hat{\gamma}$. All three inequalities hold trivially. If $\theta_{t+1} \geq T_t(\hat{\gamma})$, then the outcome is B for both γ and $\hat{\gamma}$. By assumption $\psi_{t+1}^B = \theta_{t+1}$ and

$$T_{t+1}(\hat{\gamma}) = \frac{\psi_t^A(\hat{\gamma}) + \theta_{t+1}}{2}$$

To solve for $T_{t+1}(\gamma)$, let $\theta^* = \min\{\theta_{t+1}, \psi_t^B(\gamma)\}$

$$T_{t+1}(\gamma) = \frac{\psi_t^A(\gamma) + \theta^*}{2}$$

By induction, $\psi_t^A\gamma \leq \psi_t^A(\hat{\gamma})$ and by construction, $\theta^* \leq \theta_{t+1}$, which completes the proof.

Path Dependence (Formal Def'n): Define $\Omega = \{\gamma, (g_1, g_2, g_3, ..g_k)\}$ and $\hat{\Omega} = \{\hat{\gamma}, (\hat{g}_1, \hat{g}_2, \hat{g}_3, ..\hat{g}_{k'})\}$ to be **outcome equivalent** if and only if for any game played next, the same outcome is produced in both contexts, $g \in G$, $\Omega(g) = \hat{\Omega}(g)$.

Given Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ that are outcome equivalent. We say that Ω exhibits **greater path dependence** if and only if for any game, the set of sequences of future games that changes

the outcome in game g in context Ω strictly contains the set of sequences of future games that change the outcome in context $\hat{\Omega}$.

$$\left\{C_m \in \Psi_m : \hat{\Omega}(g) \neq (\hat{\Omega}, C_m)(g)\right\} \subset \{C_m \in \Psi_m : \Omega(g) \neq (\Omega, C_m)(g)\} \;\; \forall g \in G \, \forall m \geq 1$$

Proof of Claim 3: The proof uses payoffs from the traditional and innovative strategies game and relies on a counter example. Assume context $\Omega = \{0.8, (1, 15)\}$ and context $\hat{\Omega} = \{0.75, (\emptyset)\}$, where $\emptyset$ denotes the empty set. Initially, $T = \hat{T} = 8$. The susceptible region in context Ω contains the susceptible region for context $\hat{\Omega}$. Now, consider the game $\theta = 1$. In Ω, the threshold does not change. However, in context $\hat{\Omega}$, $\hat{T}$ move to 10. This means that the sequence $(1, 9)$ would produce an inefficient outcome in $\hat{\Omega}$ but not in Ω. Therefore, Ω cannot be more path dependent.

Proof of Claim 4: Let $T = \hat{T}$ equal the common threshold in both contexts. Let θ^a equal the largest θ_k in context Ω that produces outcome A and θ^b equal the smallest θ_k in context Ω that produces outcome B. Define $\hat{\theta}^a$ and $\hat{\theta}^b$ similarly for context $\hat{\Omega}$. The interval $[\theta_L, \theta_U]$ can be partitioned into six intervals:

$[\theta_L, \theta^a)$, $[\theta^a, \hat{\theta}^a)$, $[\hat{\theta}^a, T)$, $[T, \hat{\theta}^b)$, $[\hat{\theta}^b, \theta^b)$, and $[\theta^b), \theta_U]$.

Without loss of generality, assume that for the next game $\theta < T$ so the outcome equals A. We first state a lemma.

Lemma 2. *The introduction of the first new game moves T, the threshold in context Ω, at least as far as it moves $\hat{T}$, the threshold in context $\hat{\Omega}$.*

First, note that if context Ω has produced a B outcome, then so has $\hat{\Omega}$. If $\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta^a)$, then neither threshold moves and the result holds. If $\theta \in [\theta^a, \hat{\theta}^a)$, then only T moves, so the result holds. Finally, if $\theta \in [\hat{\theta}^a, T)$, then the thresholds move to $\frac{\theta+\theta^b}{2}$ and $\frac{\theta+\hat{\theta}^b}{2}$ in contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ respectively. Given that $\theta^b \leq \hat{\theta}^b$, the result follows.

Given the lemma, it follows that after the introduction of the game θ, the set of games that produce different outcomes is larger in context Ω than in context $\hat{\Omega}$. Therefore, after one game has been added, context Ω produces more path dependence than context $\hat{\Omega}$. Note that given any sequence of future games, the susceptible region of Ω is at least as large as the susceptible region of $\hat{\Omega}$. We now state another lemma:

Lemma 3. *If contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ have both produced both types of outcomes and if Ω has a larger susceptible region, then any new game will move T at least as far as it moves $\hat{T}$*

We can assume that the new game produces outcome A, i.e. $\theta < T$. Suppose first that $T \leq \hat{T}$. If $\theta \in [\theta_L,)$, then $\hat{T}$ does not change, so the result holds. If the interval $[\hat{\theta}^a, T)$ is not empty and contains θ, then the thresholds become $\frac{\theta+\theta^b}{2}$ and $\frac{\theta+\hat{\theta}^b}{2}$ in contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ respectively. Given that $\theta^b \leq \hat{\theta}^b$, the result follows.

Next suppose that $T \geq \hat{T}$. As before, if If $\theta \in [\theta_L, \hat{\theta}^a)$, then $\hat{T}$ does not change as before, so the result again holds. If $\theta \in [\hat{\theta}^a, \hat{T})$ then the thresholds move to $\frac{\theta+\theta^b}{2}$ and $\frac{\theta+\hat{\theta}^b}{2}$ in contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ respectively. Given that $\theta^b \leq \hat{\theta}^b$, the result follows. Finally, suppose that $\theta \in [\hat{T}, T)$. Now the outcomes in the two contexts differ. The outcome in context Ω is A but the outcome in context $\hat{\Omega}$ is B. The thresholds therefore move to $\frac{\theta+\theta^b}{2}$ and $\frac{\theta+\hat{\theta}^a}{2}$ in contexts Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$ respectively. In context Ω, the threshold moves a distance $\frac{1}{2}(\theta - \theta^a)$. In context $\hat{\Omega}$, the threshold moves a distance $\frac{1}{2}(\theta - \hat{\theta}^b)$. Given that $\hat{T}$ is the midpoint of $\hat{\theta}^a$ and $\hat{\theta}^b$, the result follows from the fact that $\mid \theta - \hat{\theta}^b \mid < \mid \theta - \hat{\theta}^a \mid$ and that $\theta^a < \hat{\theta}^a$.

Proof of Claim 5: By Claim 1, the size of the initial susceptible region weakly increases in γ. To show that initial path dependence strictly increases, we must show first that for any sequence of future games $(\theta_1, \theta_2, ...\theta_k)$, that if all outcomes are the same given γ, then they must also all be the same for $\hat{\gamma} > \gamma$, and second, that there exists a sequence of future games that produces a different outcome given γ but not given $\hat{\gamma}$. It suffices to consider cases where the first outcome is A. In any sequence of future games all outcomes will be A if and only if $\theta_i < \theta^B(\gamma)$, the boundary of the immune region for B given γ. The result follows from the fact that that $\theta^B(\hat{\gamma}) > \theta^B(\gamma)$. To show that there exists a sequence of future games that produces an outcome of B for some game under γ but not under $\hat{\gamma}$, consider the single game sequence of future games, $\theta_2 \in (\theta^B(\hat{\gamma}), \theta^B(\gamma))$. It has outcome B in the context defined by γ and outcome A in the context defined by $\hat{\gamma}$. The proof that in the limit as γ approaches one, that the extent of initial game dependence converges to one, follows directly from [A1] and [A2].

Proof of Claim 6: Assume that there exists an $i < j$ such game α_i appears before α_i. Let j be the last α_j in the sequence for which this occurs. It follows that the next α game in the sequence, α_i, will satisfy the condition $i < j$. Thus, any games that appear between α_j and α_i will be β games. Let t denote the epoch in which game α_j appears. Note that if game α_j produces outcome A, then so must game α_i. Therefore, there exist three possible pairs of outcomes in the original sequence.

Case 1: Both α_j and α_i produce outcome A: Construct a new sequence by moving game α_i before game α_j leaving all other games unchanged. The threshold in epoch t exceeds α_j in both sequences, therefore in the new sequence, game α_i produces outcome A. The threshold in the new sequence in epoch $t+1$ is weakly larger than the threshold in epoch t, so game α_j produces outcome A. The thresholds for all subsequent games are unchanged from the original sequence.

Case 2: Both α_j and α_i produce outcome B: After epoch t, the threshold is less than α_j in the original sequence, so β games that follow game α_j produce outcome β. Construct a new sequence, by moving game α_j after game α_i and moving all β games that occur after α_j before α_i. All the β games moved still produce outcome B because in the original sequence, the threshold at t had to be less than the efficiency cutpoint, $\theta^=$. It remains to consider the

α games. If game α_i produces outcome B, then game α_j faces a weakly lower threshold than in the original sequence and still produces outcome B. Further, any α games that follow have unchanged thresholds. If in the new sequence game α_i produces outcome A, but game α_j produces outcome B, then once again, the thresholds for all subsequent α games will be unchanged. (Note that the new sequence is more efficient because it produces an efficient outcome in game α_i.) If both games α_i and α_j produce outcome A in the new sequence, then by the proof of lemma 1, the thresholds for all games that occur after α_j are larger than α_j. Previously, those thresholds had been less than α_j, therefore, all subsequent games are more likely to produce efficient outcomes.

Case 3: Game α_j produces outcome B and game α_i produces outcome A: Construct the same sequence as in Case 2: move β games that occur after epoch t ahead of game α_j and then switch the order of games α_i and α_j. In the original sequence, game α_i produces outcome A. If game α_i is immune it produces outcome A. Assume not. The threshold faced by game α_i in the original sequence was the midpoint of the smallest α that produced outcome B (possibly game α_j) and the largest α that produced outcome A. In the new sequence, α_j appears after α_i so the threshold when game α_i appears has a weakly larger value than in the original sequence. Therefore, game α_i produces outcome A. If game α_j produces outcome B, then the thresholds for all subsequent games are unchanged in the two sequences. If game α_j produces outcome A, the thresholds for all subsequent games will be greater than α_j. In the original sequence, the thresholds for those games were less than α_j, so those games are more likely to produce efficient outcomes.

Proof of Claim 8: To simplify notation, we write $\theta^B(\gamma)$ as θ^B and define θ^A similarly. Choose θ_1 in the interval $(\theta^A, \theta^=)$ and θ_2 in the interval $(\theta^=, \theta^B)$. By construction, both are susceptible. In the sequencing (θ_1, θ_2), A will be chosen in both games, resulting in an inefficient outcome in game θ_2. In the sequencing (θ_2, θ_1), B will be chosen in both games, resulting in an inefficient outcome in game θ_1.

Proof of Claim 7: We first prove sufficiency. Suppose no games exceed balanced sequencing. It suffices to consider the case where $R < M$ so that the sequence, $(\alpha_1, \beta_1, \alpha_2, \beta_2, ...\alpha_R, \beta_R, ...\beta_M)$ results in efficient outcomes for each game. In what follows, we refer to this as the *alternating sequence.* When game α_j occurs in the sequence $j-1$ of the β games occur earlier in the sequence. By assumption $j - 1 < I(\alpha_j)$, which implies that the efficient outcome occurs in game α_j. Similarly, when β_i occurs in the sequence i of the α games have been added to the sequence. By assumption $i \leq I(\beta_i)$, which implies that the efficient outcome occurs in game β_i.

Next assume that balanced sequencing is violated. Let $I(\alpha_{j'})$ be the first α's that exceeds balanced sequencing and $I(\beta_{i'})$ be the first β's that does. Note first that $I(\alpha_{j'})$ cannot equal $I(\beta_{i'})$. If it did, given that $i' > I(\beta_{i'}) = I(\alpha_{j'})$, which by condition (1) implies that $I(\beta_{i'}) \geq j'$, but $I(\beta_{i'}) = I(\alpha_{j'})$ which by assumption is strictly less than j', a contradiction.

By symmetry, assume that $I(\alpha_{j'}) < I(\beta_{i'})$. Games can be added by the following algorithm.

Step 1: Up to game $I(\alpha_{j'})$ use the alternating sequence.

Step 2: Add all α games up to $\alpha_{j'}$.

Step 3: If no remaining games exceed balanced sequencing add them according to the alternating sequence. If not, choose the unique game with the smallest index that exceeds balanced sequencing and go to Step 1.

This algorithm produces efficient outcomes in all games. By assumption, efficient outcomes exist for all games with indices less than j' in both sequences and for games α_j through $\alpha_{j'}$. Suppose that in Step 3, no remaining games exceed balanced sequencing. By (1), if $i > I(\alpha_{j'})$, then $I(\beta_i) \geq j'$, so games β_i for $i = I(\alpha_{j'}$ to j' produce efficient outcomes. If later games exceed balanced sequencing, the result follows by an identical logic.

To prove necessity, suppose that the conditions are violated. Let $\hat{j}$ equal the smallest j that exceeds balanced sequencing. Define $\hat{i}$ similarly if it exists. By symmetry, assume $\hat{j} \leq \hat{i}$. Given our assumption that he conditions are violated, there exists a β_i s.t. $i > I(\alpha_j)$ with $I(\beta_i) < j$ Suppose that $\alpha_{\hat{j}}$ comes before β_i. By assumption, $I(\beta_i) < \hat{j}$, which implies that β_i produces an inefficient outcome. Alternatively, suppose that β_i occurs before α_j. By assumption $i > I(\alpha_j)$, then α_j produces an inefficient outcome.

Proof of Corollary 4: Assume game β_2 is the first game that produces an inefficient outcome. That is, it is closer to game α_2 than it is to game β_1. Suppose that game β_2 is closer to α_1 than to β_2. Let $\beta_2^1 = \frac{1}{2}(\beta_1 + \alpha_2) + \epsilon_1$ for some small $\epsilon_1 > 0$. If β_2 is closer to β_2^1, the proof is complete. If not construct β_2^2 that is closer to β_2^1 than it is to α_2 by setting $\beta_2^2 = \frac{1}{2}(\beta_2^1 + \alpha_2) + \epsilon_2$ for some small $\epsilon_2 > 0$. By construction, the outcome in game β_2^2 is B. One can construct a sequence of β_2^n similarly such that outcome in each game is B. If the ϵ_n converge to zero then the β_2^n converge to α_2 so for some m, β_2 is closer to β_2^m than it is to α_2 completing the proof.

Proof of Claim 10: The payoff from playing the efficient strategy in G_T equals $\gamma M + (1-\gamma)A_T$. The payoff from playing the equilibrium strategy used in the G_τ equals $\gamma A_\tau + (1-\gamma)M$. The first expression is larger than the second if and only if $(2\gamma - 1)M + (1-\gamma)A_T > \gamma A_\tau$. This can be rewritten as $(2\gamma - 1)(A_\tau + M - A_\tau) + (1-\gamma)A_T > \gamma A_\tau$. Rearranging terms gives the result.