Inequality and Redistribution Behavior in a Give-or-Take Game

Michael M. Bechtel*[1,2] Roman Liesch[2] Kenneth F. Scheve*[3]

Economic inequality within countries has risen dramatically even in democracies where individuals could vote for more redistribution. We explore this paradox by studying how inequality affects redistributive behavior. We devise a "give-or-take" experiment that randomly varies the level of inequality between two individuals before offering one of them to either take from or give to the other individual. We embed the experiment in surveys conducted among representative samples of citizens in Germany and the United States (N=5,000) to estimate the effect of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality on redistribution behavior. Poorer individuals take on average 13% of the richer persons' wealth while richer individuals give about 12% of their wealth to the poorer subjects. We propose a method for classifying individuals based on their responsiveness to inequality and find that populations feature roughly equal numbers of "equalizers" and "non-equalizers". These redistributive types are concentrated in specific subgroups of the population and help explain individual support for policy interventions such as taxing the rich and welfare transfers to the poor. The polarization over appropriate responses to inequality may account for the absence of policy responses to rising inequality across many countries over the past decades.

Societies have always engaged in some degree of wealth redistribution to realize more equitable outcomes (*1-2*). Yet, the massive rise of within-country inequality over the past decades has by far surpassed increases in redistribution efforts (*3-4*). This seems paradoxical since democracies allow citizens to vote for more redistribution (*5*). We propose an explanation that can reconcile these two facts asserting that people vary in both their general tolerance to inequality and the extent to which they are averse to favorable or unfavorable distributions of wealth (*6*). We conjecture that the precise composition of societies in terms of these redistribution types will affect the degree of government intervention to counter rising inequality.

We propose an experimental approach to the study of redistribution that measures responses to inequality as revealed by re-allocation behavior in representative samples of the adult population. We devised a randomized "give-or-take" experiment that varied the level of inequality between two individuals by raffling two Amazon gift cards among all respondents. The two gift cards could take on three values, each corresponding to a different treatment condition. In the "own poorer" condition the values were \$/€25 (own) and \$/€75 (other). In the "own richer" condition the value of the gift cards was reversed (\$/€75, \$/€25). In the "equality" condition the gift cards were worth \$/€50 each. Respondents were then given the option to either give or take an amount to the other winner. Depending on their choice, they saw a slider that allowed them to give any amount up to all of the initial endowment to the other winner (if they chose give) or take any amount from the initial endowment of the other winner (if they chose take). We embedded this

[1]Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Political Science, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, United States.

[2]Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economic Research, Bodanstrasse 8, University of St.Gallen, Switzerland.

[3]Stanford University, Department of Political Science, Stanford, CA 94305-6044, United States.

*Correspondence to: Email: mbechtel@wustl.edu (M.M.B.), scheve@stanford.edu (K.F.S.)

experiment in surveys conducted of representative samples of the adult population in the United States (N=2,749) and Germany (N=2,217).

This design offers several advantages. First, the randomization of inequality ensures that any differences in individual's allocation choices can be causally attributed to exogenous differences in the initial values of their gift cards. Second, observing actual redistribution behavior that has, in expectations, monetary consequences for a respondent, we improve over measures that rely on stated preferences for redistribution. Third, the design allows us to distinguish between responses to advantageous (own richer) and disadvantageous (own poorer) inequality, a distinction that is important to explain both attitudes toward redistribution among the rich and the poor. Finally, by studying representative samples of the American and German adult population we can characterize the composition of these societies in terms of responses to inequality.

Figure 1 displays the effects of inequality on redistribution behavior as observed in the give-or-take experiment. By comparing the average amount of money redistributed in each condition, we can measure the effect of advantageous inequality ("own richer") and disadvantageous inequality ("own poorer") on redistribution behavior. We find that a-inequality ("own richer") generates a significant level of giving among respondents: On average, richer individuals give $/€9 (12% of their own endowment) to the poorer respondent. Under conditions of equality, the amount re-allocated is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, d-inequality causes significant taking-behavior as individuals who are poorer take $/€10 (13% of the other's endowment) from the other respondent.

When comparing Fig. 1, B and C, we find little differences in how Germans and Americans re-allocate wealth in response to unequal initial distributions. These results suggest that inequality creates demand for the re-allocation of wealth, but the extent of redistribution does not fully remove inequality. We believe that the imperfect equalization of wealth reflects that some people engage in re-allocation behavior that equalizes payoffs whereas others fall short of equalizing.

Fig. 1. Average amount taken/given in $/€ in response to advantageous (a-)inequality ("own richer"), equality, and disadvantageous (d-)inequality ("own poorer") in the (**A**) pooled data, the (**B**) United States and (**C**) Germany. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals calculated from robust standard errors. All differences are significant (P<.001). N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

To explore behavioral differences in responding to inequality we asked respondents how much they would give or take conditional on different values of the other winner's initial gift card value ($/€5, $/€15, $/€25, $/€50, $/€75, $/€85, $/€95) while keeping the initial value of the respondent's gift card, which was randomly assigned to be either ($/€25, $/€50, or $/€75), constant (*7*). This provides us with 4,966 individual redistribution schedules that say how much and in which direction each individual would redistribute given a specific distribution of wealth, which here is understood as differences in the value of the two Amazon gift cards.

To classify individuals based on their redistribution behavior we regress the redistributed amount on the difference in the Amazon gift cards separately for scenarios in which an individual was richer than the other (advantageous or a-inequality) and scenarios in which an individual was poorer than the other (disadvantageous or d-inequality). The estimated coefficient provides us with a measure of the extent to which an individual gives or takes as a function of differences in wealth. We code respondents based on how their give-or-take responses change if they are richer than the other (a-inequality) and if they are poorer (d-inequality) and distinguish between three types: *Equalizers* tend to re-allocate an amount that roughly leads to an equal distribution of wealth as measured by the final values of the two Amazon gift cards, i.e., on average, individuals classified as equalizers have an elasticity of 0.5. *Non-Equalizers* do not or only very mildly redistribute wealth. On average, their sensitivity to inequality is estimated at 0. These two groups comprise the vast majority of individuals (over 70%). We also form a residual category of *Other* that includes individuals that employ other allocation rules. We use this classification to code individuals along the two dimensions of inequality: The d-inequality dimension captures how individuals respond to disadvantageous inequality and the a-inequality dimension measures how respondents react to advantageous inequality.

Figure 2 shows the share of redistribution types in our representative samples distinguishing between d-inequality and a-inequality. Overall, about 45% of the population are Equalizers, 30% are Non-Equalizers and 25% are classified as Others based on their re-allocation behavior in response to d-inequality. When coding responses to advantageous inequality, we find 45% Equalizers, 40% Non-Equalizers, and 15% Other. Consistent with common wisdom, the share of equalizers on both dimensions is significantly greater in Germany (d-inequality: 55%, a-inequality: 50%) than in the United States (d-inequality: 40%, a-inequality: 42%). Additional analyses (Figure 3) suggest that d-Equalizers – individuals that tend to take an amount that equalizes payoffs when they are poorer – are more likely to be female, older, and either ideologically left or right (as opposed to center). A-Equalizers – individuals that tend to give an amount to the other that equalizes payoffs if they are richer – are more likely female, younger and ideologically left. This suggests that redistribution types are concentrated in specific socio-demographic environments.

Fig. 2. Classification of redistribution types based on (**A**) d-inequality (disadvantageous inequality) and (**B**) a-inequality (advantageous inequality) for the pooled dataset, the United States, and Germany with survey weights. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from separate auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give or take game and the strategy method on Δpoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for a-inequality and Δricher (initial own gift card value – initial gift card value of other) for d-inequality where negative amounts for Δpoorer and Δricher are replaced with 0. We multiply the corresponding coefficient for Δpoorer by -1 for classification purposes. Types are classified as follows (d-inequality and a-inequality types): -.25 ≤ coefficient < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 ≤ coefficient < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

**Fig. 3**. Socio-demographic correlates of redistribution types for (**A**) d-inequality and (**B**) a-inequality in the United States and Germany (pooled data). The figure shows how the probability of a specific inequality aversion type responds to a change in socio-demographic variables together with 95% confidence intervals computed from heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The simulations are based on results from a multinomial logistic regression and were implemented using Clarify (*8*). For male the simulated change is from female to male respondent. For all age variables the reference group is age < 30. For all education variables the reference group is Education: Low. For all income variables the reference group is Income: Low. For all Ideology variables the reference group is Ideology: Center. N=4,925.

The classification we propose relies on individual behavior as displayed in a highly simplified, two-member society. To evaluate whether this typology has the potential to explain real-world differences in individuals' policy opinions, we explore the correlation between redistribution type and attitudes toward two important types of government redistribution: Imposing heavy taxes on the rich and avoiding welfare spending cuts. Figure 4 A shows results from a linear regression of individuals' policy views as measured on a five-point agree-disagree scale on

Equalizer type using Non-Equalizers as the reference group. We observe that d-Equalizers are on average significantly more likely to support heavy taxes on the rich than Non-Equalizers. In contrast, there exists no statistically discernible difference between those two groups when investigating support for upholding current levels of welfare spending. This correlational pattern adds to the validity of our distinction between d-inequality and a-inequality: Since the behavior we observe under conditions of disadvantageous inequality captures aversion to others being richer, d-Equalizers should support policies that aim to reduce the wealth concentration among the rich, but not necessarily advocate the provision of benefits meant to make the poorest better off. Consistent with this reasoning, Figure 4 B reveals that our classification of redistribution behavior in response to a-inequality predicts support for avoiding welfare spending cuts. Again, as one would expect, a-Equalizers and a-Non-Equalizers do not differ significantly on their support for high taxes on the rich. This pattern suggests that distinguishing between a-inequality and d-inequality improves our ability to explain differences in support for government redistribution.

Fig. 4. Marginal effect of (**A**) d-equalizer and (**B**) a-equalizer on policy views compared to non-equalizers in the pooled data, the United States, and Germany. Policy Views are measured using a five-point scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree). Dots with vertical lines indicate point estimates with robust 95 % confidence intervals from ordinary (weighted) least squares regressions of policy views on d-redistribution and a-redistribution types, own initial

endowment, socio-demographics, ideology, and a dummy indicator for Germany (pooled specification only). N(total) = 4,921, N(United States) = 2,733, N(Germany) = 2,188.

Clearly, the give-or-take experiment and the setting in which it was embedded strongly simplifies the decision-making process that leads to government redistribution in democracies. First, our setting created "mini"-societies in which re-allocation was costless. In the real world, redistribution requires bureaucratic effort and these costs reduce the resources available for re-allocation. Second, we did not specify the process that generated the initial distribution of wealth. Arguably, the extent to which individuals believe that the unequal distribution of wealth reflects differences in effort as opposed to luck will have an impact on their willingness to redistribute (*9*). Third, we did not specify the social identity of the other winner to whom the individual could give to or take from. To the extent that individuals are characterized by differential altruism and treat in-group and out-group members differently, we might expect variation in redistributive behavior conditioned on social heterogeneity *(10)*. Fourth, we deliberately removed strategic considerations by allowing only one individual to change the distribution of wealth. However, beliefs about how others will respond to having to pay higher taxes or receiving larger social benefits will likely affect the willingness to support government intervention meant to reduce economic inequality. We anticipate that our design will be useful to integrate these factors to improve knowledge about the origins of redistribution.

References
1.   R. M. Adams, *The Evolution of Urban Society: Early Mesopotamia and Prehispanic Mexico* (Transaction Publishers, US, 1966).
2.   K. G. Hirth, *American Antiquity* **41**, 35 (1978).
3.   T. Piketty, E. Saez, *Science* **344**, 6186 (2014).
4.   K. Scheve, D. Stasavage, *Taxing the Rich: A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe* (Princeton University Press, US, 2016.
5.   A. H. Meltzer, S. F. Richard *J Pol Econ* **89**, 914 (1981).
6.   E. Fehr, K. M. Schmidt, *Q J Econ* **114**, 3 (1999).
7.   H. Rauhut, F. Winter, *Soc Sci Res* **31**, 6 (2010).
8.   G. King, M. Tomz, J. Wittenberg, *Am J Polit Sci* **44**, 4 (2000).
9.   A. Alesina, E. La Ferrara, *J Pub Econ* **89** (2005).
10. A. Alesina, E. Glaeser, and B. Sacerdote, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* **2** (2001).

Supplementary Information

Inequality and Redistribution Behavior in a Give-or-Take Game

Michael M. Bechtel   Kenneth F. Scheve   Roman Liesch

Materials and Methods

Survey Programming and Sample

We programmed and hosted the survey in Qualtrics. The online sample was provided by Respondi. Respondi maintains own, actively managed online-panels that employ a combination of online and offline recruitment methods to ensure that the panels can be used for conducting representative surveys (*1*). We provided Respondi with margins for socio-demographics (age, gender, education) derived from population censuses to ensure that our samples match the population margins in the United States and Germany. To remove any remaining imbalances we weighted the data using the ebalance-algorithm (*2*). Supplementary Table S1 provides information about the distribution of socio-demographic characteristics in the raw sample, the weighted sample, and the voter population. Unless indicated otherwise, all analyses use weighted data.

Give-or-Take Game and Redistribution Behavior in the Strategy Method

The survey contained two parts to elicit individuals' aversion to advantageous (a) and disadvantageous (d) inequality. The first part was the payoff-relevant "give or take" game which was explicitly payoff-relevant. We provided respondents with the game instructions (see Supplementary Figure 1 for an example). The game was based on the option of winning one of two Amazon gift cards. The initial values of these gift cards could vary. We informed respondents about the initial value of their gift card that he/she could win and the other winner's gift card. We randomized these initial values ($ in the United States and € in Germany) to be (respondent/other winner): (25/75), (50/50), or (75/25) and informed respondents that they could increase or decrease these values by choosing to give to or take from the other winner. If a respondent chose to give, the amount would be deducted from his/her initial gift card value and added to the other winner's gift card. If a respondent decided to take, the amount would be deducted from the other winner's gift card and added to his/her own gift card. We illustrated these two options with an example. The experiment randomized the order in which the two options were displayed.

On the screen that followed, respondents were again shown the initial gift card values and asked whether they wanted to give, take or do nothing (see Supplementary Figure 2). We randomized the order of the answer options "give" and "take". Respondents could use a slider to give any amount up to all of their entire initial endowment to the other winner (if they decided to give) or take any amount up to the entire initial endowment of the other winner (if they decided to take). Respondents were shown in real time the final values of both gift cards depending on the current slider position (see Supplementary Figure 3). Individuals could redistribute any amount as long as the resulting value of the two vouchers was zero or positive.

The second part relied on the strategy method to elicit respondents' redistribution schedules. We did not inform respondents that this part of the survey was no longer payoff-relevant. The exact question wording for the first question was:

"Now, suppose that the initial value of your gift card was the same but the initial value of the other winner's gift card was different. Please indicate how much you would like to either take from or give to the other winner if the initial value of the gift cards is as follows:

    You: $75
    Other: $5"

We repeated this question (using a slightly shorter version) with the initial value of the respondent's gift card remaining constant while the other winner's initial gift card took on each of the following initial values: 15, 25, 50, 75, 85, and 95 \$/€. Respondents were not asked again how much they would redistribute if the other winner's initial gift card value was equal to the initial value in the first part of the give-or-take game. Below each question was a slider that ranged from the maximum amount a respondent could take to the maximum amount a person could give. The resulting final values of the gift cards were shown in real time depending on the slider position. This provides us with a redistribution schedule for each respondent that says how much a person redistributes conditional on the direction and level of inequality.

Coding of Types

We estimate each respondent's sensitivity to a- and d-inequality using their conditional redistribution behavior in combination with individual-level auxiliary regressions. The dependent variable is *Given* which measures the amount given (positive values) or taken in each of the proposed scenarios. Our independent variables are: ΔPoorer, which is the difference between the other respondent's initial gift card value and the respondent's own initial gift card value. The second independent variable is ΔRicher. This variable equals the difference between one's own initial gift card value and the gift card value of other respondent.

To derive individual-level sensitivities to a- and d-inequality, we estimate two auxiliary regressions for each respondent. To estimate d-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to disadvantageous inequality) we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔPoorer using all observations for which ΔPoorer ≥ 0 and multiply the estimated coefficient by -1. To estimate a-sensitivity (the elasticity of redistribution behavior to advantageous inequality), we regress for each respondent the amount given on ΔRicher using all observations for which ΔRicher ≥ 0.

We use the estimated coefficients (d-sensitivity and a-sensitivity) to classify individuals' redistribution types. We use the following coding rule where "sensitivity" refers to the estimated coefficient:

  - Equalizer: 25 $\leq$ sensitivity < .75
  - Non-Equalizer: -.25 $\leq$ sensitivity < .25
  - Other: All remaining cases.

To assess the sensitivity of our results to these coding rules, we develop an alternative coding scheme that changes the intervals that identify Equalizers and Non-Equalizers:

  - Equalizer$_{Alt:}$.25 $\leq$ sensitivity < .6
  - Non-Equalizer$_{Alt}$: -.1 $\leq$ sensitivity < .25
  - Other$_{Alt}$: All remaining cases.

Fig. S1.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Instructions. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw as introduction text to the give-or-take game. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is $75 and that of the other person $25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Take" and "Give" were displayed and the amount given/taken in the examples was always $15.

We will raffle two Amazon gift cards among all respondents that have completed the survey. Just like people's wealth in the real world, the values of these gift cards may vary.

Suppose you are one of the winners and the initial value of your gift card is $75 and the initial value of the other winner's gift card is $25. You will have the possibility to increase or decrease the value of both gift cards:

Option "Give": You can give any amount from your gift card to the other winner. Any amount given to the other will be deducted from your gift card and then added to the gift card of the other winner.
  - For example, if you decide to give $15, you will receive $60, and the other person will receive $40.

Option "Take": You can take any amount from the other winner's gift card to increase the value of your gift card. Any amount taken from the other will be deducted from the gift card of the other winner and added to your gift card.
  - For example, if you decide to take $15, you will receive $90, and the other person will receive $10.

Fig. S2.

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Decision Whether to Take or Give. This picture shows the screen that respondents saw when they where asked whether they wanted to take, give, or do nothing. In the example, the initial value of the respondent's gift card is $75 and that of the other person $25. The experiment randomized the order in which the options "Take" and "Give" were displayed but always showed "Do nothing" as last option.

The initial value of your gift card is: $75
The initial value of the other person's gift card is: $25

Do you want to take something from the other person, give something to the other person, or do nothing?

○ Take

○ Give

○ Do nothing

Fig. S3

Screenshot of Give-or-Take Game: Giving in the $75/$25-Condition. The picture shows the screen respondents saw that chose to give in the 75$ own/25$ other condition. Respondents could use the slider to indicate the amount they wanted to give to the other person. The final values of the gift cards were updated in real time as a function of the slider position and were displayed to respondents below the slider. The range of the slider in the experiment varied and was chosen so that each respondent could take or give (depending on the choice made in the question displayed in Figure S2) the maximum amount possible depending on the initial values of the gift cards. The custom start position of the slider was set to 0 and individuals that chose to do nothing in the previous screen skipped this part.

The initial value of your gift card is: $75
The initial value of the other person's gift card is: $25

How much do you want to give?

(Please note that even if you do not want to move the slider, you have to touch it to proceed to the next question.)

| 0 | 15 | 30 | 45 | 60 | 75 |

Give

The final value of your gift card is: $56

The final value of the other person's gift card is: $44

Table S1.

Distributions of Socio-demographics in the Survey Sample and the Population. The table shows the distributions of socio-demographics in the population, the weighted sample, and the raw sample. The population socio-demographics are taken from the following sources: United States: 2016 Current Population Survey. Germany: German Statistical Office, 2011 Population Census and data on education was obtained from the German statistical office for the year 2010.

	Population (%)	Weighted Sample (%)	Raw Sample (%)
United States (N=2,749)			
Age: 18-24	12.30%	12.34%	14.26%
Age: 25-44	32.50%	32.54%	34.99%
Age: 45-64	34.70%	34.67%	33.32%
Age: 65+	20.50%	20.45%	17.43%
Gender: Male	48.20%	48.22%	48.96%
Gender: Female	51.80%	51.78%	51.04%
Education: Less than high school degree	9.50%	9.46%	6.88%
Education: High school degree	29.20%	29.26%	32.96%
Education: Some college	30.00%	30.08%	34.78%
Education: Bachelor's degree	20.00%	19.92%	14.44%
Education: Advanced degree	11.20%	11.28%	10.94%
Germany (N=2,217)			
Age: 18-24	8.60%	8.59%	7.67%
Age: 25-44	27.50%	27.51%	29.27%
Age: 45-64	37.00%	37.00%	36.18%
Age: 65+	26.90%	26.90%	26.88%
Gender: Male	48.40%	48.43%	51.20%
Gender: Female	51.60%	51.57%	48.80%
Education: High school lowest tier	43.80%	43.62%	28.06%
Education: High school medium tier	25.70%	25.98%	44.79%
Education: High school high tier	14.50%	14.45%	12.00%
Education: University/College	16.10%	15.95%	15.15%

Table S2.

The Causal Effect of Inequality: Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) using survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (given: positive, taken: negative). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in $/€ / other's initial gift card value in $/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pooled	United States	Germany
Disadvantageous Inequality	9.80***	9.79***	9.81***
	(0.530)	(0.743)	(0.751)
Equality	0.80*	1.27*	0.22
	(0.430)	(0.682)	(0.471)
Advantageous Inequality	-9.15***	-9.00***	-9.33***
	(0.442)	(0.624)	(0.615)
Observations	4,966	2,749	2,217
R-squared	0.150	0.126	0.198

Table S3.

Amounts Taken in the Give-or-Take Game: Results Without Survey Weights. This table reports linear regressions of amounts taken on the initial type of inequality for the pooled dataset (model 1), the United States (model 2), and Germany (model 3) without survey weights. Amounts taken are measured by individual's amount taken in the give-or-take game (given: positive, taken: negative). The initial type of inequality is coded as follows (respondent's initial gift card value in $/€ / other's initial gift card value in $/€): (25/75): Disadvantageous Inequality, (50/50): Equality, (75/25) Advantageous Inequality. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Pooled	(2) United States	(3) Germany
Disadvantageous Inequality	9.95***	10.00***	9.90***
	(0.515)	(0.748)	(0.687)
Equality	0.87**	1.25*	0.40
	(0.423)	(0.666)	(0.476)
Advantageous Inequality	-9.22***	-9.08***	-9.41***
	(0.427)	(0.617)	(0.571)
Observations	4,966	2,749	2,217
R-squared	0.152	0.128	0.198

Table S4.

Frequency of Redistribution Types. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) separately for the pooled dataset, the United States, and Germany. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔPoorer ≥ 0 (for d-redistribution types) and regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 for classification purposes. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	46,93%	39.79%	55.79%
Non-Equalizer	29.43%	35.04%	22.47%
Other	23.63%	25.16%	21.74%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Types	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.48%	42.60%	53.54%
Non-Equalizer	39.23%	43.06%	34.48%
Other	13.29%	14.34%	11.98%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S5.

Frequency of Redistribution Types Without Weights. This table reports the distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) separately for the pooled dataset, the United States, and Germany. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔPoorer (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔPoorer ≥ 0 (for d-redistribution types) and regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. (for a-redistribution types). We multiply the corresponding coefficient for ΔPoorer by -1 for classification purposes. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N(total)=4,966. N(United States)=2,749, N(Germany)=2,217. N(Germany)=2,217.

D-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.08%	39.83%	56.07%
Non-Equalizer	29.42%	34.96%	22.55%
Other	23.50%	25.21%	21.38%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

A-Redistribution Type	Pooled	USA	Germany
Equalizer	47.58%	42.74%	53.59%
Non-Equalizer	39.05%	42.78%	34.42%
Other	13.37%	14.48%	12.00%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table S6.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for the pooled dataset. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: $-.25 <=$ sensitivity $< .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 <=$ sensitivity $< .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

| | | A-Redistribution Type | | | |
		Equalizer	Non-Equalizer	Other	Total
D-Redistribution Type	Equalizer	30.38%	13.50%	3.06%	46.93%
	Non-Equalizer	10.25%	16.93%	2.26%	29.43%
	Other	6.86%	8.81%	7.97%	23.63%
	Total	47.48%	39.23%	13.29%	100.00%

Table S7.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the Pooled Sample Without Weights. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for the pooled dataset. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=4,966.

		A-Redistribution Type			
		Equalizer	*Non-Equalizer*	*Other*	*Total*
D-Redistribution Type	*Equalizer*	30.31%	13.49%	3.28%	47.08%
	Non-Equalizer	10.33%	16.87%	2.22%	29.42%
	Other	6.95%	8.68%	7.87%	23.50%
	Total	47.58%	39.05%	13.37%	100.00%

Table S8.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for US respondents. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		A-Redistribution Type			
		Equalizer	Non-Equalizer	Other	Total
	Equalizer	24.55%	12.58%	2.67%	39.79%
D-Redistribution Type					
	Non-Equalizer	11.40%	21.10%	2.54%	35.04%
	Other	6.64%	9.38%	9.13%	25.16%
	Total	42.60%	43.06%	14.34%	100.00%

Table S9.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in the United States. This table reports the joint distribution of d- and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for US respondents. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,749.

		A-Redistribution Type			
		Equalizer	Non-Equalizer	Other	Total
D-Redistribution Type	Equalizer	24.41%	12.59%	2.84%	39.83%
	Non-Equalizer	11.53%	20.92%	2.51%	34.96%
	Other	6.80%	9.28%	9.13%	25.21%
	Total	42.74%	42.78%	14.48%	100.00%

Table S10.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany. This table reports the joint distribution of d-redistribution and a-redistribution types in the sample (with weights) for German respondents. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: $-.25 \leq$ sensitivity $< .25$: Non-Equalizer, $.25 \leq$ sensitivity $< .75$: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

		A-Redistribution Type			
		Equalizer	*Non-Equalizer*	*Other*	*Total*
	Equalizer	37.60%	14.64%	3.55%	55.79%
D-Redistribution Type	*Non-Equalizer*	8.81%	11.75%	1.91%	22.47%
	Other	7.13%	8.09%	6.52%	21.74%
	Total	53.54%	34.48%	11.98%	100.00%

Table S11.

Joint Distribution of D-Redistribution and A-Redistribution Types in Germany Without Weights. This table reports the joint distribution of d-redistribution and a-redistribution types in the sample (without weights) for German respondents. Coding of types based on individual redistribution behavior in the give-or-take game and the strategy method part where we kept the initial value of the respondent's gift card constant while varying the other winner's initial gift card value. Types are defined using coefficients resulting from auxiliary regressions of the amount given in the give-and-take game and the strategy method on ΔRicher (initial gift card value of other – initial own gift card value) for all observations where ΔRicher ≥ 0. Types are classified as follows: -.25 <= sensitivity < .25: Non-Equalizer, .25 <= sensitivity < .75: Equalizer, all other values: Other. N=2,217.

| | | A-Redistribution Type | | | |
		Equalizer	Non-Equalizer	Other	Total
D-Redistribution Type	Equalizer	37.62%	14.61%	3.83%	56.07%
	Non-Equalizer	8.84%	11.86%	1.85%	22.55%
	Other	7.13%	7.94%	6.31%	21.38%
	Total	53.59%	34.42%	12.00%	100.00%

16

Table S12.

Measurement and Coding of Variables. This table describes the variables and variable codings.

Government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich.	Based on the question "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:" The exact wording of the item was "The government should redistribute wealth by heavy taxes on the rich." We measured respondents' attitude towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the question text accordingly.
Government should not spend less on benefits for the poor.	Based on the question "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:" The exact wording of the item was "The government should spend less on benefits for the poor." We measured respondents' attitude towards this statement on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and recoded the answers to invert the item and the answer scale. We randomized the polarity of the answer scale and adapted the question text accordingly.
Male	Self-reported gender. Coded into binary variable where 1 equals male and 0 female.
Age	Self-reported age. Recoded into the categories 18-29, 30-49, 50-69, and 70+.
Income	Self-reported household income. Recoded into income: low (income in the lowest quartile), income: middle (interquartile range), and income: high (income in the upper quartile) with unweighted data.
Education	Self reported highest level of education achieved. US respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including high school degree or equivalent, middle: Some college (1-4 years, no degree) and associate's degree (including occupational degree), high: Bachelor's degree and advanced degrees. German respondents were coded into the following categories: low: up to and including secondary school leaving certificate (Haupt-(Volks-)schulabschluss), middle: polytechnic secondary school of the former GDR (Abschluss polytechnische Oberschule der DDR), intermediate secondary school or similar degree (Realschul- oder gleichwertiger Abschluss), university of applied sciences entrance qualification (Fachhoschulreife), higher education entrance qualification (Abitur), and vocational education (Berufsausbildung), high: university of applied science degree (Fachhochschulabschluss) and university degree.
Ideology	Self-reported placement on left-right-scale (0-10). The question wording was: "In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?" Recoded into the categories Ideology left (0-2), ideology: center (3-7), and ideology: right (8-10).
Employment status	Self-reported employment status. The question wording was: "Which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?" Answer categories included for the United States: "In paid work or away temporarily (employee, self-employed, working for your family business)", "In education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation", "Unemployed and actively looking for a job", "Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job", "Permanently sick or disabled", "Retired", "In community service", "In military service", "Doing housework, looking after children or other persons", "Don't know", and "None of these". Answer categories for Germany: "Paid Work", "Doing Apprenticeship", "Unemployed and actively looking for job", "Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for job", "Mini- and Midi-Job", "Unemployed at the moment", "Short-time work at the moment", "Retired", "Housework", "Military, community service, voluntary social year", "In school". "Studying", "Not able to work", "Don't know", "No Answer" Recoded into employed, unemployed, retired, in education, and other.

Table S13.

The Socio-demographic Correlates of D-Redistribution Types. This table reports coefficients from multinomial regression models with non-equalizer as the base outcome without survey weights. The reference categories for the covariates are: age 18-29, income: low, age: 18-29, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Equalizer	(2) Other
Male	-0.165**	0.062
	(0.069)	(0.081)
Age: 30-49	0.098	0.143
	(0.101)	(0.113)
Age: 50-69	0.048	-0.120
	(0.095)	(0.109)
Age: 70+	0.207	-0.071
	(0.143)	(0.170)
Income: Middle	-0.081	-0.131
	(0.079)	(0.091)
Income: High	0.006	0.013
	(0.102)	(0.116)
Education: Middle	-0.077	-0.305***
	(0.081)	(0.092)
Education: High	0.008	-0.354***
	(0.103)	(0.118)
Ideology: Left	-0.120	0.221*
	(0.106)	(0.120)
Ideology: Right	-0.346***	0.167
	(0.096)	(0.104)
Germany	0.765***	0.345***
	(0.073)	(0.086)
Constant	0.292***	-0.185
	(0.100)	(0.114)
Observations	4,925	4,925

Table S17.

The Socio-demographic Correlates of A-Redistribution Types. This table reports coefficients from multinomial regression models with non-equalizer as the base outcome without survey weights. The reference categories for the covariates are: age 18-29, income: low, age: 18-29, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Equalizer	(2) Other
Male	-0.099	0.229**
	(0.063)	(0.093)
Age: 30-49	-0.397***	-0.225*
	(0.092)	(0.127)
Age: 50-69	-0.378***	-0.481***
	(0.088)	(0.124)
Age: 70+	-0.138	-0.524**
	(0.132)	(0.204)
Income: Middle	0.111	0.048
	(0.072)	(0.104)
Income: High	0.110	-0.029
	(0.092)	(0.133)
Education: Middle	-0.047	-0.190*
	(0.073)	(0.105)
Education: High	-0.066	-0.237*
	(0.094)	(0.134)
Ideology: Left	0.147	0.243*
	(0.096)	(0.142)
Ideology: Right	-0.361***	0.442***
	(0.091)	(0.114)
Germany	0.441***	0.137
	(0.066)	(0.097)
Constant	0.342***	-0.955***
	(0.093)	(0.133)
Observations	4,925	4,925

Table S18.

The Socio-demographic Correlates of D-Redistribution Types Without Ideology. This table reports coefficients from multinomial regression models with non-equalizer as the base outcome without survey weights. The reference categories for the covariates are: age 18-29, income: low, age: 18-29. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Equalizer	(2) Other
Male	-0.187***	0.067
	(0.069)	(0.080)
Age: 30-49	0.089	0.125
	(0.100)	(0.112)
Age: 50-69	0.046	-0.143
	(0.095)	(0.108)
Age: 70+	0.189	-0.076
	(0.142)	(0.170)
Income: Middle	-0.070	-0.134
	(0.079)	(0.091)
Income: High	-0.010	0.030
	(0.101)	(0.115)
Education: Middle	-0.078	-0.301***
	(0.081)	(0.092)
Education: High	-0.014	-0.339***
	(0.103)	(0.118)
Germany	0.807***	0.330***
	(0.072)	(0.084)
Constant	0.224**	-0.112
	(0.098)	(0.110)
Observations	4,937	4,937

Table S19.

The Socio-demographic Correlates of A-Redistribution Types Without Ideology. This table reports coefficients from multinomial regression models with non-equalizer as the base outcome without survey weights. The reference categories for the covariates are: age 18-29, income: low, age: 18-29. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Equalizer	(2) Other
Male	-0.118*	-0.118*
	(0.063)	(0.063)
Age: 30-49	-0.405***	-0.405***
	(0.092)	(0.092)
Age: 50-69	-0.376***	-0.376***
	(0.087)	(0.087)
Age: 70+	-0.167	-0.167
	(0.131)	(0.131)
Income: Middle	0.108	0.108
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Income: High	0.085	0.085
	(0.091)	(0.091)
Education: Middle	-0.045	-0.045
	(0.073)	(0.073)
Education: High	-0.068	-0.068
	(0.093)	(0.093)
Germany	0.484***	0.484***
	(0.065)	(0.065)
Constant	0.307***	0.307***
	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	4,937	4,937

Table S20.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics using the pooled dataset. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-redistribution types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.26***	0.02
	(0.044)	(0.039)
D-Other	0.36***	-0.13***
	(0.053)	(0.050)
A-Equalizer	0.02	0.20***
	(0.040)	(0.038)
A-Other	0.10*	-0.09
	(0.061)	(0.060)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01	0.06
	(0.044)	(0.041)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07	0.03
	(0.045)	(0.042)
Male	0.06*	-0.05
	(0.036)	(0.034)
Income: Middle	-0.09**	-0.17***
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Income: High	-0.17***	-0.30***
	(0.055)	(0.050)
Age: 30-49	0.07	0.16***
	(0.053)	(0.054)
Age: 50-69	-0.04	0.22***
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Age: 70+	-0.26***	0.24***
	(0.089)	(0.080)
Education: Middle	-0.09**	-0.03
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Education: High	-0.10**	-0.13***
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Employed	0.02	-0.23***
	(0.053)	(0.051)
Unemployed	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.079)	(0.075)
Retired	0.10	-0.08
	(0.064)	(0.060)
In Education	-0.21**	-0.14

	(0.100)	(0.091)
Ideology: Left	0.50***	0.41***
	(0.047)	(0.052)
Idology: Right	-0.31***	-0.58***
	(0.058)	(0.053)
Germany	0.58***	0.43***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Constant	3.28***	3.66***
	(0.076)	(0.073)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.164

Table 21.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results, Without Weights. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics using the pooled dataset without weights. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer	0.25***	0.05
	(0.041)	(0.038)
D-Other	0.34***	-0.11**
	(0.050)	(0.048)
A-Equalizer	0.03	0.19***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
A-Other	0.07	-0.10*
	(0.057)	(0.057)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00	0.06
	(0.042)	(0.039)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.07	0.04
	(0.042)	(0.040)
Male	0.04	-0.06*
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Income: Middle	-0.10**	-0.17***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Income: High	-0.19***	-0.31***
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Age: 30-49	0.08	0.14***
	(0.051)	(0.051)
Age: 50-69	-0.02	0.23***
	(0.055)	(0.052)
Age: 70+	-0.23***	0.25***
	(0.086)	(0.076)
Education: Middle	-0.08**	-0.04
	(0.039)	(0.037)
Education: High	-0.09*	-0.14***
	(0.051)	(0.048)
Employed	0.02	-0.24***
	(0.051)	(0.048)
Unemployed	0.04	-0.07
	(0.074)	(0.071)
Retired	0.10	-0.11*
	(0.061)	(0.057)
In Education	-0.23**	-0.13
	(0.095)	(0.083)
Ideology: Left	0.47***	0.41***
	(0.046)	(0.048)
Idology: Right	-0.27***	-0.58***

	(0.055)	(0.051)
Germany	0.59***	0.43***
	(0.036)	(0.034)
Constant	3.29***	3.65***
	(0.073)	(0.068)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.163

Table S22.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Country Results. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics in the United States and Germany. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	USA	GE	USA	GE
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
D-Equalizer	0.31***	0.11*	0.05	-0.04
	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.058)
D-Other	0.46***	0.12	-0.10	-0.18**
	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.066)	(0.076)
A-Equalizer	0.04	0.01	0.19***	0.23***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.056)
A-Other	0.08	0.07	-0.15*	0.01
	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.076)	(0.096)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.00	0.04	0.02	0.14**
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.061)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09	-0.03	-0.01	0.08
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.061)
Male	0.01	0.12**	-0.10**	-0.00
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Income: Middle	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.28***	-0.05
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Income: High	-0.09	-0.31***	-0.39***	-0.17**
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Age: 30-49	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.29***
	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.085)
Age: 50-69	-0.14*	0.16*	0.16**	0.33***
	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.092)
Age: 70+	-0.46***	0.16	0.15	0.41***
	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.108)	(0.118)
Education: Middle	-0.17***	0.02	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Education: High	-0.12*	-0.12	-0.13**	-0.04
	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.066)	(0.071)
Employed	0.06	0.01	-0.27***	-0.10
	(0.064)	(0.099)	(0.061)	(0.101)
Unemployed	0.01	0.00	-0.12	0.08
	(0.094)	(0.144)	(0.086)	(0.152)
Retired	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.01
	(0.089)	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.108)

26

In Education	-0.06	-0.20	-0.29**	0.17
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Ideology: Left	0.46***	0.51***	0.54***	0.27***
	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Ideology: Right	-0.43***	0.04	-0.70***	-0.12
	(0.068)	(0.097)	(0.061)	(0.105)
Constant	3.35***	3.77***	3.85***	3.72***
	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.092)	(0.133)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.086	0.064	0.168	0.050

Table S23.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Country Results, Without Weights. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics in the United States and Germany without weights. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	USA	GE	USA	GE
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
D-Equalizer	0.32***	0.08	0.07	-0.01
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.053)
D-Other	0.46***	0.08	-0.09	-0.16**
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.070)
A-Equalizer	0.04	0.01	0.21***	0.19***
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
A-Other	0.05	0.03	-0.13*	-0.03
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.086)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.02	0.03	-0.00	0.15***
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.10*	-0.00	-0.02	0.12**
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Male	-0.01	0.10**	-0.10**	-0.02
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Income: Middle	-0.10*	-0.07	-0.28***	-0.04
	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Income: High	-0.11	-0.32***	-0.41***	-0.16**
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Age: 30-49	0.12*	0.08	0.09	0.27***
	(0.067)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Age: 50-69	-0.13*	0.21**	0.17**	0.37***
	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.083)
Age: 70+	-0.45***	0.20*	0.16	0.44***
	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.105)	(0.110)
Education: Middle	-0.16***	0.02	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Education: High	-0.10	-0.12	-0.13**	-0.06
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Employed	0.07	-0.01	-0.26***	-0.12
	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.059)	(0.087)
Unemployed	0.06	0.01	-0.12	0.11
	(0.089)	(0.129)	(0.083)	(0.134)
Retired	0.06	0.07	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.094)
In Education	-0.14	-0.21	-0.29**	0.22*
	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Ideology: Left	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***	0.31***

	(0.073)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.065)
Idology: Right	-0.35***	0.01	-0.71***	-0.09
	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.091)
Constant	3.34***	3.82***	3.85***	3.70***
	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.088)	(0.121)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.077	0.061	0.168	0.053

Table S24.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results, Alternative Coding.
This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics using the pooled dataset. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.26***	0.03
	(0.046)	(0.041)
D-Other$_{Alt}$	0.33***	-0.16***
	(0.050)	(0.046)
A-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.05	0.20***
	(0.041)	(0.039)
A-Other$_{Alt}$	0.13**	-0.07
	(0.053)	(0.052)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.01	0.07*
	(0.044)	(0.041)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06	0.03
	(0.045)	(0.041)
Male	0.06*	-0.05
	(0.036)	(0.034)
Income: Middle	-0.09**	-0.18***
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Income: High	-0.16***	-0.30***
	(0.055)	(0.050)
Age: 30-49	0.07	0.15***
	(0.053)	(0.053)
Age: 50-69	-0.03	0.21***
	(0.057)	(0.056)
Age: 70+	-0.26***	0.23***
	(0.089)	(0.079)
Education: Middle	-0.09**	-0.04
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Education: High	-0.10**	-0.14***
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Employed	0.02	-0.23***
	(0.053)	(0.051)
Unemployed	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.079)	(0.075)
Retired	0.10	-0.07
	(0.064)	(0.060)
In Education	-0.20**	-0.15
	(0.100)	(0.091)
Ideology: Left	0.50***	0.41***
	(0.047)	(0.052)
Idology: Right	-0.32***	-0.58***
	(0.057)	(0.053)

Germany	0.57***	0.43***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Constant	3.25***	3.69***
	(0.077)	(0.073)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.131	0.166

Table S25.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Pooled Results, Alternative Coding, Without Weights. This table reports coefficients from liner regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics using the pooled dataset without weights. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1) Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich	(2) Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor
D-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.24***	0.06
	(0.043)	(0.039)
D-Other$_{Alt}$	0.32***	-0.12***
	(0.048)	(0.045)
A-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.06	0.19***
	(0.039)	(0.037)
A-Other$_{Alt}$	0.11**	-0.09*
	(0.050)	(0.049)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	0.00	0.07*
	(0.042)	(0.039)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.06	0.05
	(0.042)	(0.039)
Male	0.04	-0.05
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Income: Middle	-0.10**	-0.18***
	(0.038)	(0.036)
Income: High	-0.19***	-0.31***
	(0.052)	(0.048)
Age: 30-49	0.09*	0.13***
	(0.051)	(0.051)
Age: 50-69	-0.01	0.22***
	(0.055)	(0.052)
Age: 70+	-0.23***	0.24***
	(0.086)	(0.076)
Education: Middle	-0.08**	-0.04
	(0.039)	(0.037)
Education: High	-0.08*	-0.15***
	(0.051)	(0.048)
Employed	0.02	-0.24***
	(0.050)	(0.048)
Unemployed	0.04	-0.07
	(0.074)	(0.070)
Retired	0.10	-0.11*
	(0.061)	(0.057)
In Education	-0.23**	-0.13
	(0.094)	(0.083)
Ideology: Left	0.47***	0.41***
	(0.046)	(0.048)
Ideology: Right	-0.27***	-0.57***

	(0.055)	(0.051)
Germany	0.59***	0.43***
	(0.036)	(0.034)
Constant	3.26***	3.68***
	(0.073)	(0.069)
Observations	4,921	4,921
R-squared	0.123	0.165

Table S26.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Country Results, Alternative Coding.
This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own
initial gift card value, and socio-demographics in the United States and Germany. Dependent
variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference
category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other
covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation:
other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05,
***p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	USA	GE	USA	GE
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
D-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.29***	0.11*	0.06	-0.03
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.059)
D-Other$_{Alt}$	0.45***	0.07	-0.08	-0.28***
	(0.067)	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.070)
A-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.07	0.02	0.20***	0.21***
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.053)	(0.057)
A-Other$_{Alt}$	0.14*	0.04	-0.16**	0.05
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.082)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.16***
	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.060)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.09	-0.02	-0.01	0.10*
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Male	0.01	0.13**	-0.10**	-0.00
	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Income: Middle	-0.11*	-0.05	-0.28***	-0.05
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Income: High	-0.09	-0.31***	-0.39***	-0.17**
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.071)
Age: 30-49	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.28***
	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.071)	(0.084)
Age: 50-69	-0.13*	0.16*	0.15**	0.33***
	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.091)
Age: 70+	-0.45***	0.16	0.14	0.41***
	(0.125)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.117)
Education: Middle	-0.16***	0.02	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Education: High	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.13*	-0.06
	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.071)
Employed	0.06	0.01	-0.27***	-0.10
	(0.064)	(0.099)	(0.061)	(0.100)
Unemployed	0.01	0.01	-0.12	0.08
	(0.094)	(0.144)	(0.085)	(0.151)
Retired	0.08	0.11	-0.05	0.02
	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.077)	(0.108)
In Education	-0.05	-0.21	-0.29**	0.16
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.137)	(0.138)
Ideology: Left	0.46***	0.51***	0.54***	0.27***
	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.070)	(0.074)
Ideology: Right	-0.44***	0.05	-0.69***	-0.11

	(0.068)	(0.097)	(0.061)	(0.104)
Constant	3.31***	3.77***	3.87***	3.75***
	(0.098)	(0.134)	(0.093)	(0.132)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.088	0.063	0.170	0.057

Table S27.

Correlations Between Redistribution Types and Policy Views: Country Results, Alternative Coding, Without Weights. This table reports coefficients from linear regressions of policy views on redistribution types, own initial gift card value, and socio-demographics in the United States and Germany without weights. Dependent variables are measured on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The reference category for d- and a-inequality types is "non-equalizer". The reference categories for the other covariates are: own initial gift card value: 25, income: low, age: 18-29, education: low, occupation: other, ideology: center. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (*** p<.01, ** p<.05, ***p<.10).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	USA	GE	USA	GE
	Gov't Should Redistr. Wealth by Heavy Taxes on Rich		Gov't Should not Spend Less on Benefits for Poor	
D-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.29***	0.08	0.08	-0.00
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.054)
D-Other$_{Alt}$	0.45***	0.05	-0.06	-0.24***
	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.066)
A-Equalizer$_{Alt}$	0.08	0.02	0.21***	0.17***
	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
A-Other$_{Alt}$	0.13*	0.01	-0.15**	0.00
	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.073)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 50	-0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.17***
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Own Initial Gift Card Value: 75	-0.10	0.00	-0.02	0.14**
	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Male	-0.01	0.10**	-0.10**	-0.01
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.044)
Income: Middle	-0.11*	-0.07	-0.28***	-0.04
	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Income: High	-0.11	-0.32***	-0.41***	-0.16**
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Age: 30-49	0.13*	0.08	0.08	0.27***
	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.076)
Age: 50-69	-0.11	0.21**	0.15**	0.36***
	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.082)
Age: 70+	-0.43***	0.20*	0.15	0.43***
	(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.110)
Education: Middle	-0.15***	0.02	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Education: High	-0.10	-0.12	-0.13**	-0.07
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.065)	(0.072)
Employed	0.07	-0.01	-0.26***	-0.12
	(0.063)	(0.087)	(0.059)	(0.087)
Unemployed	0.06	0.01	-0.12	0.11
	(0.089)	(0.130)	(0.083)	(0.134)
Retired	0.06	0.07	-0.05	-0.04
	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.093)
In Education	-0.13	-0.21	-0.30**	0.22*
	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.123)	(0.124)
Ideology: Left	0.44***	0.47***	0.50***	0.31***
	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.065)
Ideology: Right	-0.37***	0.01	-0.71***	-0.08

	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.090)
Constant	3.29***	3.82***	3.87***	3.74***
	(0.095)	(0.123)	(0.089)	(0.120)
Observations	2,733	2,188	2,733	2,188
R-squared	0.079	0.061	0.170	0.058

References

1. D. Engelmann, M. Strobel, *Games*, **1**, 4 (2010).

2. J. Hainmueller, Yiqing Xu, *Journal of Statistical Software*, **54**, 7 (2013).

3. Respondi, Our Answers to the 28 Esomar Questions for Determining the Quality of Online Samples and Online Panels, n.d.