Incentives and Motivations for Neighbourliness

LSE Housing in CASE with LSE Public Policy Group

What were we looking at?

- Research funded by Home Office Civil Renewal Research programme, part of a stable of 7 research projects overseen by IPEG, University of Manchester
- Looking at how informal social controls operate and are re-established
- How to create better conditions for pro-social behaviour
- In four study areas

Study areas

- Middlesbrough 'control' area

- Irwell Valley HA Gold Service scheme, Lower Broughton, Salford

- Blackthorn Good Neighbours Project, Blackthorn estate, Northampton

- Sanctuary HA Good Neighbour Declaration, Morningside estate, Hackney

Basis for case selection		Crude measure of effectiveness of local authority (e.g. by CPA/BV ratings)	
		Medium/High	Low
Intervention at estate level to deal with anti-social behaviour?	Yes	• *'Gold Service'* scheme **Irwell Valley** Housing Association	• *'Good Neighbour Declaration'* Sanctuary Housing, **Hackney** • *'Good Neighbours Project'* Blackthorn Estate, **Northampton**
	No	• **Middlesbrough** Borough Council	Not studied

What did we do?

- Mapping of similar work nationally
- Interviews with agency staff and active residents in each area
- Focus groups with non-active residents in each area (2 youth, 3 adult)
- 10% sample household survey across all four areas (total = 1,041 households)

Expectations of Neighbourliness

- People in all four areas have highly diverse conceptions of what good neighbourliness entails, ranging from
  - modern minimalism = unobtrusive co-existence plus a wave hello occasionally; to
  - British working class community openness = unlocked doors, mutual key-holding, resource-pooling, extended friendships and socializing, looking out for each other
  - many variants in-between.

- Perceptions of what should be fracture on lines of age, length of residence, previous experiences of other places, and ethnic group

Actual neighbourliness

- High levels of neighbourliness in practice (London exception but M'boro higher turnover):
    - 47% look after keys at least once a year
    - 80% do favours at least once a year and 60% monthly
    - 63% visit neighbours at home at least once a year, and 43% monthly
    - 85% say hello at least monthly
    - 46% know most or many people in neighbourhood, 12% do not
    - 29% trust most or many people, 16% don't

- Peoples' social contacts are mostly very restricted to small circles within the wider neighbourhood defined by
    - immediate residence – my block, my floor, my cul-de-sac, my end of the estates
    - a patchier, small circle of acquaintance or more congenial folk, often known through occasional contacts, childrens group, church, shopping
    - same ethnic or native language group (esp. Hackney)

- People don't often talk more widely with others across the neighbourhood as a whole

Where is the social capital in ASB?

Level of participation in neighbourhood life

Personal willingness to intervene via different paths

Perception of the neighbourhood

Perception of the authorities

Personal stake in the neighbourhood

Worry and low confidence

Attitude to measures and incentives

Pearson Correlation

- 5 > x > 5
- 3 > x > 3
- 2 > x > 2

The influence of how often respondents see police in their neighbourhood on ratings of police efforts to improve their neighbourhood

The proportion of respondents who did not trust officials to back them up, by whether or not they would report problems caused by children to the authorities and by respondents' level of confidence

The **y-axis** in Figure 13a represent the percentage of respondents in each of the six categories who said that they would distrust authorities to back them up

Stand-offs and misunderstandings or mutually supportive roles?

- Perceptions of authorities' effectiveness are key
- Schemes are designed to put onus back on people
- But people come back to agency responsibility for enforcement
- The agencies see the neighbourhoods as very closed
- Agencies want resident support and a critical mass
- But most of our contact with the majority
- Who feel let down by the agencies and unable to form a critical mass
- Possible agency misunderstanding of how life works for majority
- Potential for alliances untapped?

Ranking of measures to combat ASB

	Number of times each option scores **top of out 7** and **bottom out of 7**		
	Scores top	**Score bottom**	**Net score** (top *minus* bottom)
Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour	444	101	343
Upgrading local homes	418	132	286
Punishing anti-social behaviour	371	155	216
Encouraging community events	225	203	22
Establish written rules of behaviour	164	293	-129
Reward the community	108	298	-190
Rewarding individuals for good behaviour	101	380	-279

Response sets

Top scoring measure	…and correlation with other measures scoring bottom						
	Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour	Upgrading local homes	Punishing anti-social behaviour	Encouraging community events	Establish written rules of behaviour	Reward the community	Rewarding individuals for good behaviour
Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour		-.11	…	…	.15	.11	.17
Upgrading local homes	-.13		…	…	…	.15	.19
Punishing anti-social behaviour	…	…		…	…	.15	.19
Encouraging community events	…	…	…		…	…	…
Establish written rules of behaviour	.10	…	…	…		…	…
Reward the community	…	…	.15	.13	…		-.10
Rewarding individuals for good behaviour	.26	.21	.16	.16	…	-.11	

Note: All correlations have p value < 0.01

Punitive set   **Incentives set**   **Community set**

Conclusions?

- Idea of rewards contested
- Criteria able to be put into practice may not by itself impact on wider behaviours
- New incentive schemes will be unfamiliar and controversial
- Existing schemes modest or narrowly
- Levels of detailed awareness low
- But, are positively evaluated when recognised
- Compared to other forms of interventions incentives appeal strongly to only a minority.
- Appealing to a minority not easily reached otherwise is important.
- People value incentives because of: direct benefits; clarity in rules; a sense that authorities taking ASB seriously.
- Good as a signal to change perceptions of authorities

Contact and further info

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- Full report is available on Active Citizenship Centre website www.active-citizen.org.uk and on Institute for Political and Economic Governance (IPEG) website www.ipeg.org.uk

- *The role of individual incentives within strategies promoting civil renewal* Simon Bastow, Helen Beck, Patrick Dunleavy, and Liz Richardson, LSE 2005