Incentives and Motivations for Neighbourliness

LSE Housing in CASE with LSE Public Policy Group
What were we looking at?

• Research funded by Home Office Civil Renewal Research programme, part of a stable of 7 research projects overseen by IPEG, University of Manchester

• Looking at how informal social controls operate and are re-established

• How to create better conditions for pro-social behaviour

• In four study areas
Study areas

- Middlesbrough ‘control’ area
- Irwell Valley HA Gold Service scheme, Lower Broughton, Salford
- Blackthorn Good Neighbours Project, Blackthorn estate, Northampton
- Sanctuary HA Good Neighbour Declaration, Morningside estate, Hackney
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis for case selection</th>
<th>Crude measure of effectiveness of local authority (e.g. by CPA/BV ratings)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention at estate level to deal with anti-social behaviour?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• ‘Gold Service’ scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Irwell Valley Housing Association</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Good Neighbour Declaration’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctuary Housing, <strong>Hackney</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Good Neighbours Project’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blackthorn Estate, <strong>Northampton</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td><strong>Middlesbrough Borough Council</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Not studied</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What did we do?

• Mapping of similar work nationally
• Interviews with agency staff and active residents in each area
• Focus groups with non-active residents in each area (2 youth, 3 adult)
• 10% sample household survey across all four areas (total = 1,041 households)
Expectations of Neighbourliness

- People in all four areas have highly diverse conceptions of what good neighbourliness entails, ranging from
  - modern minimalism = unobtrusive co-existence plus a wave hello occasionally; to
  - British working class community openness = unlocked doors, mutual key-holding, resource-pooling, extended friendships and socializing, looking out for each other
  - many variants in-between.

- Perceptions of what should be fracture on lines of age, length of residence, previous experiences of other places, and ethnic group
Actual neighbourliness

- High levels of neighbourliness in practice (London exception but M’boro higher turnover):
  - 47% look after keys at least once a year
  - 80% do favours at least once a year and 60% monthly
  - 63% visit neighbours at home at least once a year, and 43% monthly
  - 85% say hello at least monthly
  - 46% know most or many people in neighbourhood, 12% do not
  - 29% trust most or many people, 16% don’t

- Peoples’ social contacts are mostly very restricted to small circles within the wider neighbourhood defined by
  - immediate residence – my block, my floor, my cul-de-sac, my end of the estates
  - a patchier, small circle of acquaintance or more congenial folk, often known through occasional contacts, childrens group, church, shopping
  - same ethnic or native language group (esp. Hackney)

- People don’t often talk more widely with others across the neighbourhood as a whole
Where is the social capital in ASB?

- Personal willingness to intervene via different paths
- Perception of the neighbourhood
- Worry and low confidence
- Level of participation in neighbourhood life
- Perception of the authorities
- Personal stake in the neighbourhood
- Attitude to measures and incentives

Pearson Correlation:

- **- 5 > x > 5**
- **- 3 > x > 3**
- **- 2 > x > 2**
The influence of how often respondents see police in their neighbourhood on ratings of police efforts to improve their neighbourhood.
The proportion of respondents who did not trust officials to back them up, by whether or not they would report problems caused by children to the authorities and by respondents’ level of confidence.

The **y-axis** in Figure 13a represent the percentage of respondents in each of the six categories who said that they would distrust authorities to back them up.
Stand-offs and misunderstandings or mutually supportive roles?

- Perceptions of authorities’ effectiveness are key
- Schemes are designed to put onus back on people
- But people come back to agency responsibility for enforcement
- The agencies see the neighbourhoods as very closed
- Agencies want resident support and a critical mass
- But most of our contact with the majority
- Who feel let down by the agencies and unable to form a critical mass
- Possible agency misunderstanding of how life works for majority
- Potential for alliances untapped?
### Ranking of measures to combat ASB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Scores top</th>
<th>Scores bottom</th>
<th>Net score (top minus bottom)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading local homes</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishing anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging community events</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish written rules of behaviour</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>-129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward the community</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>-190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarding individuals for good behaviour</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>-279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Response sets

**Top scoring measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour</th>
<th>Upgrading local homes</th>
<th>Punishing anti-social behaviour</th>
<th>Establish written rules of behaviour</th>
<th>Reward the community</th>
<th>Rewarding individuals for good behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to report anti-social behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading local homes</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishing anti-social behaviour</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging community events</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish written rules of behaviour</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward the community</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewarding individuals for good behaviour</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All correlations have p value < 0.01
Conclusions?

- Idea of rewards contested
- Criteria able to be put into practice may not by itself impact on wider behaviours
- New incentive schemes will be unfamiliar and controversial
- Existing schemes modest or narrowly
- Levels of detailed awareness low
- But, are positively evaluated when recognised
- Compared to other forms of interventions incentives appeal strongly to only a minority.
- Appealing to a minority not easily reached otherwise is important.
- People value incentives because of: direct benefits; clarity in rules; a sense that authorities taking ASB seriously.
- Good as a signal to change perceptions of authorities
Contact and further info

• Liz Richardson, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE  
  e.richardson@lse.ac.uk  Tel: 01642 384478

• Full report is available on Active Citizenship Centre website 
  www.active-citizen.org.uk and on Institute for Political and 
  Economic Governance (IPEG) website www.ipeg.org.uk

• The role of individual incentives within strategies promoting civil renewal Simon Bastow, Helen Beck, 
  Patrick Dunleavy, and Liz Richardson, LSE 2005