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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Conjugate Persuasion

Daniel Quigley (Oxford), joint with Ian Jewitt

Thursday 14 October 2021 15:30 - 17:00

This event is both online and in person

This event will take place online.

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars or as online and in person. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, current restrictions mean in-person seminars are only open to members of the LSE community (those with a valid LSE ID card).

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom.

About this event

We consider a class of persuasion games in which the sender has rank-dependent preferences. Like much of the recent Bayesian persuasion literature, we assume the receiver’s action depends only on her posterior expectation of a scalar state variable, and the sender may commit to a choice of experiment from a rich set (including, but not limited to, partitions). We consider settings in which the sender’s utility may be nonlinear in probabilities: this nonlinearity generates rank-dependent interests. The sender’s payoffs are otherwise linear in actions. In this environment, we geometrically characterize the sender’s optimal payoff from any information structure and identify the corresponding optimal experiment. For any prior distribution on a bounded support, we find that the sender’s optimal experiment must be monotone partitional. Moreover, our characterization admits a relatively simple analysis of comparative statics. We apply our analysis to several problems of economic interest: information design in auctions and elections, persuasion of an attention-constrained principal, and the design of investment projects when investors suffer from the `favourite-longshot’ bias.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email:

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This event will take place online.