Political Economy Research Seminar
Redistricting with Endogenous Candidates
Paola Moscariello (Princeton)
Tuesday 17 February 2026 14:00 - 15:30
MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY
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Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
I study partisan gerrymandering when district composition affects candidates’ policy positions and voters’ behaviour. In the U.S., primary elections determine competing candidates, with districts’ ideological composition shaping nominee selection. Thus redistricting affects not only which party wins but also candidates’ ideologies. I find that classical gerrymandering strategies backfire when candidates emerge endogenously, particularly where extreme voters may select non-viable candidates. However, when properly designed to account for voter affiliation and preference intensity, gerrymandering becomes more powerful than traditional approaches. Using optimal transport theory, I characterize the optimal redistricting plan, which maximizes ideological distance between competing candidates. I analyze implications for Congressional polarization and minority representation.
The Political Economy Research Seminar is jointly organised by the Departments of Economics, of Government, and of Management, with financial support from STICERD.
It brings together scholars across multiple departments at the LSE and from nearby universities. The series consists of talks by external and internal faculty presenting theoretical or empirical papers on a wide range of topics associated with political economy.
These seminars are held on Tuesdays in term time at 14.00-15.30, in room MAR 6.33, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar coordinators: Timothy Besley (Economics), Tak-Huen Chau (Government), Stephane Wolton (Government), Noam Yuchtman (Management)
Contact gov.comms@lse.ac.uk to be added to the mailing list or for further information.
This event will take place in MAR 6.33, 6th floor, The Marshall Building, 44 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3LY.
The building is labelled MAR on the map.
