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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Disclosure and Incentives in Teams

Paula Onuchic (University of Oxford), joint with João Ramos

Thursday 05 October 2023 15:30 - 17:00

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

About this event

We consider a team-production environment augmented with a stage in which the team decides how to communicate their productive outcome to outside observers. In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team-outcomes when team-disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team’s outcome, and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer’s equilibrium attribution of credit and blame for the team’s successes and failures across team-members. Further, we show that, through this credit/blame-attribution channel, a team’s deliberation procedure determines individuals’ incentives to contribute to team production. We then characterize productive environments where effort-incentives are maximized by unilateral disclosure protocols or procedures such that disclosure require more consensus.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Sadia Ali:

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