How (not) to Solve the Guardianship Dilemma: Counterbalancing and the Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China

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Counterbalancing, a strategy to strengthen control of the military by weakening the command authority within it, is prevalent across many parts of the world. Yet, few studies have systematically examined the benefits and costs of this strategy at the micro-level. We exploit a unique historical setting to evaluate how counterbalancing affects the competence and loyalty of the military. Using geocoded data from archival and archaeological sources, we study a reform in China’s Tang Dynasty (618 - 907 CE) that fragmented the military commissioners’ authority over their armies. Difference-in-differences analyses document that the reform reduced the military’s threat to the regime: commissioner-led rebellions decreased. However, it reduced the military’s effectiveness, evidenced by an increase in soldier-led mutinies within the military, a higher probability of defeat in battles, and an increase in civilian uprisings against the regime. Our findings highlight the sharp tradeoffs of military control in settings with strong military corporate interest.