STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Delegated Bidding
Larry Samuelson (Yale)
Thursday 01 May 2025 15:30 - 17:00
SAL 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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About this event
We study an interaction in which principals must hire agents to bid in an auction. The agents can exert unobserved and costly effort to collect information about the value of the object. The optimal remuneration scheme must induce the agents to exert effort and then appropriately condition their bids on their information. The principals thus face a competing-mechanisms problem with interdependence valuations among the agents. We identify conditions under which the principals’ mechanismchoice game has a pure equilibrium. We characterize the distortions induced in the agents’ bidding schemes by the principals’ efforts to reduce the agents’ rents, and characterize circumstances under which these distortions induce overbidding.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Sadia Ali: s.ali43@lse.ac.uk.
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This event will take place in SAL 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, Sir Arthur Lewis Building, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
The building is labelled SAL on the map. Enter the building via Lincoln's Inn Fields.
