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Summer 2020

Friday  03 April 2020  13:00 - 14:00

CANCELLED

Martina Zanella (Department of Economics, LSE)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Work in Progress Seminars
Monday  04 May 2020  12:30 - 14:00

CANCELLED

Michael Whinston (MIT)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Tuesday  05 May 2020  12:00 - 13:30

CANCELLED

Ran Abramitzky (Stanford)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


Please note new venue


CEP/STICERD Applications Seminars
Wednesday  06 May 2020  12:30 - 13:45

CANCELLED

Xavier Jaravel (LSE)

IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE


IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Wednesday  06 May 2020  14:00 - 15:30

CANCELLED

Amos Golan (American University)

[pdf] Download Paper


Our classical statistical arsenal for extracting truth from data often fails to produce correct predictions. Uncertainty, blurry evidence and multiple possible solutions may trip up even the best interrogator. Info-metrics – the science of modeling, reasoning, and drawing inferences under conditions of insufficient and noisy information – provides a consistent and efficient framework for constructing models and theories with minimal assumptions. Situated at the intersection of information theory, statistical inference, and economic/econometric modeling, info-metrics reveals the simplest solution, model or story, that is hidden in the observed information. My talk will be based on my new book ‘Foundations of Info-Metrics: Modeling, Inference, and Imperfect Information,’ http://info-metrics.org/ in which I develop and examine the theoretical underpinning of info-metrics and provide extensive interdisciplinary applications. I will discuss the basic ideas via a small number of graphical representations of the model and theory and will then present a number of interdisciplinary real-world examples of using that framework for modeling and inference.


32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


Please note new venue


STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series
Monday  11 May 2020  12:30 - 14:00

TBC

Victor Aguirregabiria (University of Toronto)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Thursday  14 May 2020  14:00 - 15:30

CANCELLED

Xu Cheng (Yale)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series
Thursday  14 May 2020  15:30 - 17:00

Misinterpreting Social Outcomes and Information Campaigns

Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) , joint with Daniel N. Hauser

[pdf] Download Paper


This paper explores learning in a setting with social perception biases. Individuals learn from others’ outcomes but have a misspecified model of their preferences. When individuals systematically overestimate the similarity between their own preferences and the preferences of others - exhibiting the false consensus effect - this can lead to incorrect learning, while when individuals systematically underestimate this similarity - exhibiting pluralistic ignorance -- this can prevent beliefs from converging. We explore how information campaigns - releasing (costly) information about the state - can counteract these inefficient choices. We show that the duration - temporary or permanent - and the target - correct inefficient action choices or reinforce efficient action choices - of the optimal information campaign depend crucially on the form of misspecification.


ONLINE,


Please note new venue


STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Monday  18 May 2020  16:00 - 17:30
Note change in Time


Is Air Pollution Regulation Too Stringent?

Joseph Shapiro (Berkeley)

This paper describes a new approach to measuring the costs of environmental regulation, which we use to study the efficiency of the U.S. Clean Air Act. We exploit regulations that force new or expanding plants to pay incumbents in the same or neighboring counties to reduce their pollution emissions. These “offset” regulations create hundreds of decentralized local markets for pollution. We use transaction-level data on numerous bilateral pollution offset contracts over the last 30 years to compare these marginal compliance costs against leading estimates of the marginal benefits of pollution reductions. While economic efficiency requires equating the marginal compliance costs and the marginal social benefits of pollution reductions, we find substantial heterogeneity in benefit-cost ratios that we analyze in detail. Regulation has rapidly become more stringent, as mean marginal compliance costs increase in real terms by 5 to 6 percent annually. Guided by these estimates, we carefully discuss policy reforms that could increase social welfare.


ONLINE,


Please note new venue


CEP/STICERD Applications Seminars
Monday  18 May 2020  12:30 - 14:00

TBC

Jakub Kastl (Stanford University)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Thursday  21 May 2020  14:00 - 15:30

CANCELLED

Mikkel Soelvsten (Wisconsin University)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series
Thursday  28 May 2020  15:30 - 17:00

Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings

Daniel Garrett (TSE) , joint with Francesc Dilme

[pdf] Download Paper


We study relational contracting with an agent who has consumption-smoothing preferences as well as the ability to save to defer consumption (or to borrow). Our focus is the comparison of principal-optimal relational contracts in two settings. The first where the agent’s consumption and savings decisions are private, and the second where these decisions are publicly observed. In the first case, the agent smooths his consumption over time, the agent’s effort and payments eventually decrease with time, and the balances on his savings account eventually increase. In the second, the agent consumes earlier than he would like, consumption and the balance on savings fall over time, and effort and payments to the agent increase. Our results suggest a possible explanation for low savings rates in certain industries where compensation often comes in the form of discretionary payments.


ONLINE,


Please note new venue


STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Monday  01 June 2020  12:00 - 13:30

CANCELLED

Gordon Dahl (UC San Diego)

32L 1.04, 1st Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


CEP/STICERD Applications Seminars
Monday  01 June 2020  12:30 - 14:00

TBC

Jonathan Williams (University of North Carolina)

32L 2.04, 2nd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Wednesday  03 June 2020  12:30 - 13:45

CANCELLED

Florian Scheuer (University of Zurich)

IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE


IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Wednesday  03 June 2020  12:30 - 13:45

Local Elites as Tax Inspectors: Experimental Evidence from the DRC

John Weigel (LSE)

Historical states with low capacity often empowered local elites to collect taxes, despite the risk of mismanagement. Could this strategy raise revenues without undermining government legitimacy in fragile states today? We provide evidence from a field experiment in which the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central, in the DR Congo, randomly assigned city neighbor- hoods — spanning 48,000 households — to property tax collection conducted by agents of the tax ministry or by local city chiefs. Chief tax collection generated 53% higher compliance and 38% higher revenues. Although chiefs collected slightly more bribes, they were more honest in assessing and exempting properties, and they caused citizens to have more trust in the formal state. Examining a hybrid treatment arm in which tax ministry agents consulted with chiefs, as well as other survey evidence, we find that chiefs achieved higher compliance because they could use local information to tar- get households with high payment propensity, not because they could better persuade households conditional on having visited them.


IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE


IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Thursday  04 June 2020  14:00 - 15:30

CANCELLED

Daniel Ackerberg (University of California, Los Angeles)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series
Thursday  04 June 2020  15:30 - 17:00

A Double Revelation 'Principle' for Maxmin Auction Design

Ben Brooks (University of Chicago) , joint with Songzi Du

ONLINE,


Please note new venue


STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Thursday  04 June 2020  18:30 - 20:00

E-launch of World Sustainable Development Summit 2021

 

External Event


For further information please contact india.observatory@lse.ac.uk or call 020 7955 7615.
Monday  08 June 2020  12:00 - 13:30

CANCELLED

Owen Zidar (Princeton)

32L 1.04, 1st Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


CEP/STICERD Applications Seminars
Wednesday  10 June 2020  18:00 - 19:00

STICERD Morishima Lecture: Good Economics for Hard Times

 

Can Economics be harnessed for the common good? Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo’s bestselling book “Good Economics for Hard Times” makes the case for how economics can help us solve the toughest problems in some of the poorest places in the world. Based on a body of work that was awarded the Nobel in economics sciences, the book offers hope and practical solutions for a world without poverty.


ONLINE,


STICERD Special Events
Thursday  11 June 2020  14:00 - 15:30

CANCELLED

Michal Kolesar (Princeton)

32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH


STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series
Tuesday  16 June 2020  16:00 - 17:30
Note change in Time


TBC

Nicholas Bloom (Stanford & CEP)

ONLINE,


Please note new venue


CEP/STICERD Applications Seminars
Wednesday  17 June 2020  16:30 - 17:15
Note change in Time


TBC

Bhash Mazumder (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE


IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Thursday  16 July 2020  18:30 - 20:00

Evidence-based Policy for Palliative/End-of-life Care

 

LSE India Observatory Seminar


For further information please contact india.observatory@lse.ac.uk or call 020 7955 7615.
  
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