Institutionalization and Selective Repression: Evidence from Francoist Courts after the Spanish Civil War

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Repression in authoritarian regimes has become increasingly selective. While existing research links this trend to improved information and agent incentives, this paper offers an institutional explanation. I argue that institutionalization facilitates selective repression through two mechanisms: formalized procedures for information and decisions, and disagreements among agents resulting from discretionary power. I test this theory in Spain’s four-tiered military justice system after the Civil War, using archival data on over 11,000 death penalty cases reviewed by General Franco between 1939 and 1941. I find that written opinions by auditors at each level were associated with a higher likelihood of favorable outcomes. Disagreement among local-level auditors led to increased information requests, written justifications, and a greater probability of sentence commutations at higher levels. A 1940 order that introduced interpretive discretion further reinforced this pattern. These findings suggest that internal accountability and bureaucratic discretion within coercive institutions may restrain repression.