Repression and Autocratic Consolidation

About this event

We develop a dynamic model of autocracy where repression suppresses dissent, possibly at the expense of policies that reduce popular discontent—and thus, future mobilization. Accounting for the possibility that repression could hasten or hinder autocratic consolidation, we identify a unique equilibrium that takes one of three forms: deterrence, where the autocrat is never challenged; instability, where challenges occur every period; or a mixed strategy equilibrium with periods of deterrence and periods with challenges. When repression hastens consolidation, the autocrat invests heavily in repression, so as to deter dissent and accelerate the opposition's defeat. When repression bolsters resistance, a tradeoff arises between deterrence and consolidation, and the autocrat may prefer to invite challenges. We then examine the effects of indirect foreign interference - such as sanctions or withholding foreign aid disbursement - aimed at protecting the opposition or promoting democratization. Even under ideal conditions, such interference cannot achieve both goals simultaneously.