STICERD Work in Progress Seminars
Democratic Clubs
Patrick Blanchenay (Department of Economics, LSE)
Friday 03 May 2013 13:00 - 14:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
I present a standard model of supermodular matching, in which individuals can purchase a costly signal ('club fee') in order to be matched with a subset of the population. In such a model, there are generically an infinite number of sorting equilibria. I investigate how imposing that the median member of the club decides on the fee, can help reduce the number of equilibria. Preliminary results suggest that the strength of the supermodularity plays a critical role in the equilibria that can survive this requirement.
STICERD Work in Progress seminars are held on Fridays in term time at 13:00-14:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Philip Barteska and Alix Bonargent
For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe: l.chibwe@lse.ac.uk.
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