STICERD Work in Progress Seminars
Patrick Blanchenay (Department of Economics, LSE)
Friday 03 May 2013 13:00 - 14:00
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars or as online and in person. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, current restrictions mean in-person seminars are only open to members of the LSE community (those with a valid LSE ID card).
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom.
About this event
I present a standard model of supermodular matching, in which individuals can purchase a costly signal ('club fee') in order to be matched with a subset of the population. In such a model, there are generically an infinite number of sorting equilibria. I investigate how imposing that the median member of the club decides on the fee, can help reduce the number of equilibria. Preliminary results suggest that the strength of the supermodularity plays a critical role in the equilibria that can survive this requirement.
This event will take place in 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH. The building is labelled on the map.