IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar
Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement
Dina Pomeranz (Zurich), joint with Paul Carrillo and Monica Singhal
Wednesday 08 October 2014 16:30 - 17:30
Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
About this event
Reducing tax evasion is a key priority for many governments, particularly in developing countries. A growing literature has argued that the use of third party information to verify taxpayer self-reports is critical for tax enforcement and the growth of state capacity. However, there may be limits to the effectiveness of third party information if taxpayers can make offsetting adjustments on less verifiable margins. We present a simple framework to demonstrate the conditions under which this will occur and provide strong empirical evidence for such behavior by exploiting a natural experiment in Ecuador. We find that when firms are notified by the tax authority about detected revenue discrepancies on previously filed corporate income tax returns, they increase reported revenues, matching the third party estimate when provided. Firms also increase reported costs by 96 cents for every dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in total tax collection.
This seminar series is jointly organized by the IFS and STICERD.
IFS-STICERD Public Economics seminars are held on Wednesdays in term time at 16:30-17:30, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Stuart Adam (IFS), Monica Costa Dias (IFS), Xavier Jaravel (LSE), Camille Landais (LSE), Attila Lindner (UCL), Joana Naritomi (LSE), and Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE).
For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe, either by email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
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