STICERD Industrial Organisation Seminars
Estimating Equilibrium in Health Insurance Exchanges: Price Competition and Subsidy Design under the ACA
Pietro Tebaldi (University of Chicago)
Monday 17 October 2016 12:30 - 14:00
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About this event
To design premium subsidies in a health insurance market it is necessary to estimate consumer demand and study how different subsidy schemes affect insurers’ incentives. Combining data from the Californian ACA marketplace with a model of insurance demand and insurers’ competition, I identify and estimate demand and cost primitives, and assess equilibrium outcomes under alternative subsidy designs. I find that vouchers are less distortionary than subsidies calculated from market premiums, and — given age-heterogeneity in demand and cost — tailoring subsidies to age leads to an equilibrium where all buyers are better off and per-person public spending is lower.
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Industrial Organisation seminars are held on Mondays in term time at 12:30-14:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organiser: Alessandro Gavazza.
For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe, either by email: l.chibwe@lse.ac.uk.
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