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STICERD Econometrics Seminar Series

Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under partial identification

Joris Pinske (Pennsylvania State University)

Tuesday 25 October 2016 14:00 - 15:30

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

About this event

We study the problem of counterfactual prediction in discrete decision games with complete information, pure strategies, and Nash equilibria. We show that the presence of multiple equilibria poses unique challenges for the problem of counterfactual prediction even if the payoff structure is known in its entirety. We show that multiple types of counterfactuals can be defined and that the prediction probabilities are not generally point–identified. We establish the sharp identified bounds of the prediction probabilities. We further propose, compare, and contrast various decision methods for the purpose of producing a point prediction, namely midpoint prediction, a decision–theoretic possibility using a Dirichlet–based prior, and a maximum–entropy approach. On balance, we conclude that the maximum–entropy approach is the least of several evils. Our results have implications for counterfactual prediction in other models with partial identification.

STICERD Econometrics seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 14.00-15.30, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.

Seminar organisers: Professor Tai Otsu and Dr. Vassilis Hajivassiliou.

For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe, either by email:

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