STICERD Work in Progress Seminars
Happy Birthday? Manipulation and Selection in Unemployment Insurance
Kilian Russ (University of Bonn)
Friday 18 May 2018 13:00 - 14:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
This paper documents strategic delays in the timing of layoffs around an age-at-layoff threshold entitling workers to a four months increase in potential UI benefit duration in Italy. Manipulation is quantitatively important and of far-reaching consequences: 12.5\% of layoffs in the manipulation region are strategically delayed with affected workers increasing their average UI benefit receipt and non-employment duration by 3.0 and 7.1 months, respectively. Manipulators are highly selected on both observables and unobservables. Manipulation is most prevalent among female, part-time, white-collar workers with longer job tenure at small firms. We show that compared to non-manipulators: (i) manipulators would have had higher exit rates from unemployment at each point during the unemployment spell, and (ii) manipulators' benefit receipt duration responds 25\% stronger to the increase in potential benefit duration. We study the welfare consequences of our results and discuss implications for standard RD-estimates.
STICERD Work in Progress seminars are held on Fridays in term time at 13:00-14:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Philip Barteska and Alix Bonargent
For further information please contact Lubala Chibwe, either by email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Please use this link to subscribe or unsubscribe to the STICERD Work in Progress seminars mailing list (sticwip).