STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
"Auctions" by Invitation
Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern)
Thursday 24 May 2018 15:30 - 17:00
About this event
∙ Focus is on costly recruitment of bidders - Rounding up bidders is costly - Obviously an important aspect of auction-like market situations ∙ Different issues to be discussed in the context of costly recruitment - Observability - Bidders' costly participation - Bidders' costly information acquisition. - Bidders' "excessive caution" in bidding. - Auctioneer's private information. ∙ Will use different variations on a basic auction model to highlight these different issues. ∙ The Lessons/insights include: - systematic inefficiencies. - certain effects of auctioneer's information on the price.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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