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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

"Auctions" by Invitation

Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern)

Thursday 24 May 2018 15:30 - 17:00

This event will take place online.

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars or as online and in person. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, current restrictions mean in-person seminars are only open to members of the LSE community (those with a valid LSE ID card).

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom.


About this event

∙ Focus is on costly recruitment of bidders - Rounding up bidders is costly - Obviously an important aspect of auction-like market situations ∙ Different issues to be discussed in the context of costly recruitment - Observability - Bidders' costly participation - Bidders' costly information acquisition. - Bidders' "excessive caution" in bidding. - Auctioneer's private information. ∙ Will use different variations on a basic auction model to highlight these different issues. ∙ The Lessons/insights include: - systematic inefficiencies. - certain effects of auctioneer's information on the price.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: a.nicholas1@lse.ac.uk.

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This event will take place online.