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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

Konrad Mierendorff (UCL), joint with Yeon-Koo Che and Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim

Thursday 05 December 2019 15:30 - 17:00

Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

About this event

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion. Over time, a sender performs a series of experiments to persuade a receiver to take a desired action. Constraints on information flow force the sender's persuasion to take real time, and the receiver may walk away at any time without listening. In addition, persuasion is costly for both players. To incentivize the receiver to listen, the sender must leave rents that compensate his listening costs, but neither player can commit to her/his future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. But, for persuasion cost sufficiently small, there is a folk theorem: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)'s optimal persuasion and full revelation, as well as anything in between are obtained in MPE, as the persuasion cost vanishes.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

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