STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Mihai Manea (Stonybrook)
Thursday 12 November 2020 15:30 - 17:00
Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
About this event
We study the welfare consequences of allowing the mechanism designer to withhold or damage resources in the optimal mechanism for bilateral trade with independent private values. We show that withholding monetary transfers or withholding the good from both traders is never optimal. Similarly, damaging the good for the buyer cannot improve welfare. By contrast, damaging the good for the seller may improve welfare in the optimal mechanism. However, such welfare improvements are feasible only if the damage hurts seller types with lower initial valuations more severely.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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