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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Robust Monopoly Regulation

Yingi Guo (Northwestern University)

Thursday 03 December 2020 15:30 - 17:00

Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

About this event

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach. We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate subsidy. The optimal policy balances three goals: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email:

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