STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Two-stage majoritarian choice
Sean Horan (Universite de Montreal), joint with Yves Sprumont
Thursday 25 February 2021 15:30 - 17:00
Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
About this event
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the second is used to make a final choice. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen’s expansion consistency and Manzini and Mariotti’s weak WARP); and adaptations of two classical collective choice requirements (Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives and Saari and Barney’s no preference reversal bias). These rules also satisfy some other desirable properties including a version of May’s positive responsiveness.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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