STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Competitive Advertising and Pricing
Kyungmin Kim (Emory University), joint with Ilwoo Hwang and Raphael Boleslavsky
Thursday 06 May 2021 15:30 - 17:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
We consider an oligopoly model in which each firm chooses not only its price but also its advertising strategy regarding how much product information to provide. Unlike most previous studies on advertising, we impose no structural restriction on feasible advertising content, so that each firm can freely disclose or conceal any information. We provide a general and complete characterization of the equilibrium advertising content, which illustrates how competition shapes firms’ advertising incentives. We also explore the economic consequences of competitive advertising and investigate how a firm’s advertising decision interacts with its pricing decision.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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