STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Screening for breakthroughs
Ludvig Sinander (Northwestern University/University of Oxford), joint with Gregorio Curello (University of Bonn)
Thursday 13 May 2021 15:30 - 17:00
Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
About this event
We identify a new and pervasive dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the prompt disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce a model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivise disclosure via her control of the agent's utility. We uncover a striking deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: firstname.lastname@example.org.
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