Political Economy Research Seminar
Exposing the revolving door in executive branch agencies
Mara Faccio (Purdue University)
Tuesday 25 May 2021 14:00 - 15:30
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
We develop the first comprehensive mapping of the revolving door phenomenon in the U.S. by examining the work experience in executive branch agencies of 1,910,150 individuals covering top corporate positions in 373,011 firms. We document that the phenomenon is prevalent, with one out of three public firms employing a former regulator. Former regulators tend to be hired in response to or concomitant with increased regulation, or concomitant with firms receiving fines. More cheating-prone firms obtain benefits in the form of a lower incidence of fines after hiring former regulators. We do not observe other firms obtaining benefits on average.
The Political Economy Research Seminar is jointly organised by the Departments of Economics, of Government, and of Management, with financial support from STICERD.
It brings together scholars across multiple departments at the LSE and from nearby universities. The series consists of talks by external and internal faculty presenting theoretical or empirical papers on a wide range of topics associated with political economy.
These seminars are held on Tuesdays in term time at 14.00-15.30, in room MAR 6.33, unless specified otherwise.
Seminar coordinators: Timothy Besley (Economics), Tak-Huen Chau (Government), Stephane Wolton (Government), Noam Yuchtman (Management)
Contact gov.comms@lse.ac.uk to be added to the mailing list or for further information.