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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Auctions with Frictions

Stephan Lauermann (Bonn University), joint with Asher Wolinsky

Thursday 09 December 2021 15:30 - 17:00

This event is both online and in person

This event will take place online.

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars or as online and in person. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, current restrictions mean in-person seminars are only open to members of the LSE community (those with a valid LSE ID card).

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom.

About this event

Much of the work on auction theory focuses on design aspects in situations motivated by formally organized auctions, like those held by government agencies. However, auction models are also convenient abstractions of less formal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. Existing models have to be enriched to capture certain frictions that are more salient in such informal situations. In particular, bidder participation may be the outcome of costly recruitment efforts, participation may be costly for the bidders as well, the seller's commitment abilities may be limited, and the seller's private information may be more consequential. This paper develops a model of auctions with such frictions and derives some novel predictions. In particular, outcomes are often inefficient, and the market sometimes unravels.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email:

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This event will take place online.