STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Local Evidence and Diversity in Minipublics
Arjada Bardhi (Duke University), joint with Nina Bobkova
Thursday 10 March 2022 15:30 - 17:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
We study optimal minipublic design with endogenous evidence. A policymaker selects a group of citizens—a minipublic—for advice on the desirability of a policy. Citizens can discover local evidence but might be deterred by uncertainty about the policymaker’s adoption standard. We show that such uncertainty can be detrimental to evidence discovery even with costless evidence, civic-minded citizens, and ex ante aligned players. Evidence discovery is hardest to sustain under moderate uncertainty. The optimal minipublic has low diversity: it overrepresents citizens around the median citizen and underrepresents those at the margins. Our findings bear implications for the French Citizens’ Convention on Climate.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE or ONLINE AND IN PERSON at the same time.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: email@example.com.
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