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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Outside options, reputations, and the partial success of the Coase conjecture

Jack Fanning (Brown University)

Thursday 17 November 2022 15:30 - 17:00

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

About this event

A buyer and seller bargain over a good's price in continuous time, the buyer has a private value v and a positive outside option w. Additionally, bargainers can either be rational or committed to some fixed price. When the sets of buyer values and commitment types are rich and the probability of commitment vanishes, outcomes are approximately equivalent to those when the can seller make an ultimatum at any price below the max{v/2,w}, where w and v are the lowest buyer value and outside option respectively. Although there is minimal delay, outcomes need not be efficient as the buyer sometimes chooses her outside option.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Sadia Ali:

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