STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Sequential Sampling Equilibrium
Duarte Goncalves (UCL)
Thursday 23 February 2023 15:30 - 17:00
32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH
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About this event
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents’ behavior and acquire information to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a disciplined model featuring an endogenous distribution of choices, beliefs, and decision times, that not only rationalizes well-known deviations from Nash equilibrium, but also makes novel predictions supported by existing data. It grounds a relationship between empirical learning and strategic sophistication, and generates stochastic choice through randomness inherent to sampling, without relying on indifference or choice mistakes. Further, it provides a rationale for Nash equilibrium when information costs vanish.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in 32L 3.05.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Marta Wasik by email: email@example.com.
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This event will take place in 32L 3.05, 3rd Floor Conference Room, LSE, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, London WC2A 3PH.
The building is labelled 32L on the map. Enter the building via Lincoln's Inn Fields.