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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Dynamic Screening: Why Weight Isn't Volume

Anna Sankjohanser (Toulouse), joint with Johannes Hörner (TSE CNRS)

Thursday 23 November 2023 15:30 - 17:00

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

About this event

We consider a continuous-time game between a buyer and a seller. The buyer privately knows how often he needs to trade. When he does, he can choose to either engage with the seller, who chooses what utility to supply, or search for an alternative. Because time is informative, the seller learns and adjusts her behavior over time. Without commitment, in the Markov perfect equilibrium, the seller starts with a pooling offer, before experimenting with occasional separating offers. Her payoff is non-monotone –in fact, quasi-convex– in her belief about the buyer’s type. With commitment, the seller can take advantage of limited-time offers to extract all the buyer’s surplus

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Sadia Ali:

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