STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Nuclear Brinkmanship and Institution
Nicolas Bonneton (Mannheim)
Thursday 30 November 2023 15:30 - 17:00
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Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.
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About this event
This paper studies the interplay between political institutions and the likelihood of a nuclear war. In our model, two nuclear powers are in a state of conflict; civilians affect how extractive their institutions are; political leaders bargain and may resort to nuclear brinkmanship. We show that the country with a weaker conventional army is more autocratic, is the only one engaging in nuclear brinkmanship, and, in expectation is defeated. Unequal military power increases the likelihood of a nuclear war, with endogenous institutions acting as catalysts.
Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.
Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Christopher Sandmann.
For further information please contact Sadia Ali: firstname.lastname@example.org.
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