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IFS-STICERD Public Economics Seminar

Greener on the Other Side: Inequity and Tax Compliance

Michael Best (Columbia)

Wednesday 29 May 2024 12:30 - 13:45

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.


About this event

Do perceptions of inequity in property tax liabilities lead to delinquency? Horizontal inequity in public policy generates resentment among citizens. We estimate the impact that inequity in the tax code has on voluntary tax compliance in the context of the property tax in Manaus, Brazil. Using administrative data on the universe of taxpayers and a novel quasi-experimental design leveraging geographic discontinuities in tax liabilities and a large reform, we find that the elasticity of compliance with respect to inequity is 0.14–0.18, slightly larger than the elasticity with respect to a taxpayer’s own liability. A simple optimal taxation model draws out the implications of these responses for tax design, showing that compliance responses to horizontal inequity significantly dampen the optimal progressivity of property taxes.

This seminar series is jointly organized by the IFS and STICERD.

IFS-STICERD Public Economics seminars are held on Wednesdays in term time at 12.30-13.45 IN PERSON at the IFS.

Seminar organisers: Stuart Adam (IFS), Monica Costa Dias (IFS), Xavier Jaravel (LSE), Camille Landais (LSE), Attila Lindner (UCL), Joana Naritomi (LSE), and Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE).

For further information please contact Peter Levell: peter_l@ifs.org.uk .

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