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Jonathan de Quidt,
Paper No' EOPP 040: | Full paper
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Keywords: microfinance; market power; for-profit; social capital
JEL Classification: G21, O12, D4, L4, D82
Is hard copy/paper copy available? YES - Paper Copy Still In Print.
This Paper is published under the following series: Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers
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Abstract:Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures,considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits.
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