



Welfare Reform and the Intergenerational Transmission of Dependence

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OVERVIEW

- We estimate the effect of welfare reform on the intergenerational transmission of AFDC/TANF participation.
 - Panel of mother-daughter observations, PSID 1968-2013
 - Quasi-experimental state-time variation in welfare reform
- Further, we address potential biases in estimating a causal pathway.
 - Endogenous selection into welfare
 - Life-cycle factors
 - Misclassification error

OVERVIEW

- There is a causal transmission of AFDC/TANF participation, yet welfare reform attenuated this transmission by at least 50%.
 - The causal pathway is stronger among black families, and selection accounts for more of the transmission for whites.
 - Estimates are robust across a variety of specifications.
- Given a broader definition of daughter's welfare participation, transmission does not change after welfare reform.
 - Persistence in intergenerational poverty status remains after welfare reform.



MOTIVATION

- The primary federal program for (cash) assistance to needy families in the 20th Century U.S. was Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
- Eligibility was restricted to those families meeting income and asset tests, and with dependent children under age 18. Over 90% of the caseload was single-mother families
- Funding was via a progressive federal-state matching grant
- States had some control over program rules under AFDC, but with substantial federal oversight

MOTIVATION

- A longstanding concern of some policymakers and commentators was a “culture of welfare” across generations
 - dependence on AFDC was transmitted from parent to child through knowledge and values
- There was an empirical consensus of a positive intergenerational correlation of AFDC participation
 - Duncan, Hill, Hoffman 1988; McLanahan 1988; Solon, et al. 1988; Gottschalk 1990, 92, 96; Levine and Zimmerman 1996; Borjas and Sueyoshi 1997; Pepper 2000; Page 2004

WELFARE REFORM

- Whether this channel reflected a causal “welfare trap” or a spurious “poverty trap” was less settled in the literature
- Rhetoric of politicians suggested little confusion on their part
- States began to aggressively experiment with AFDC in the early 1990s by applying for waivers from federal rules
 - 43 states had waivers implemented by 1996
 - Included time limits, work requirements, family caps, expanded asset limits and earnings disregards




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WELFARE REFORM

- In August 1996, the AFDC program was terminated and replaced with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
- Provisions of TANF expanded upon the state waivers
 - TANF funded with a federal block grant to states, and thus not an entitlement
 - States given more authority on program eligibility and design, e.g. mix of cash vs in-kind

Figure 1. Trends in AFDC/TANF Recipients and Expenditure





WELFARE REFORM

- Large literature on effects of welfare reform on participation, labor supply, family structure, health, consumption, saving
 - Surveys in Blank (2002); Moffitt (2003); Grogger and Karoly (2005); Ziliak (2016)
- Missing is research on whether welfare reform achieved one of its main goals of eliminating transmission across generations



INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION

- Our framework relies on the standard intergenerational transmission model of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986)
 - See surveys in Solon (1999) and Black and Devereux (2011)
- The canonical model involves regressing an outcome of interest of the child on the corresponding outcome of the parent
- We extend the basic model to allow the transmission channel to differ pre- and post-welfare reform
- Exploit quasi-experimental variation across states and over time

EMPIRICAL MODEL

For mother-daughter pair i , we estimate

$$W_{ist}^d = \alpha + \beta' \mathbf{x}_{ist}^d + \delta W_{ist}^m + \gamma P_{ist}^m + \theta P_{ist}^m W_{ist}^m + \varepsilon_{ist}^d, \quad (1)$$

$W_{ist}^d = 1$ if (adult) daughter (d) living in state s at time t is on welfare; 0 otherwise

$W_{ist}^m = 1$ if mother (m) is EVER on welfare prior to time t ; 0 otherwise

\mathbf{x}_{ist}^d are daughter controls, e.g. number of children, age

P_{ist}^m is an indicator for welfare reform in the mother's state of residence

$P_{ist}^m W_{ist}^m$ is an interaction of mother's welfare participation and state welfare reform

ε_{ist}^d is an unobserved error term

- **If welfare reform succeeded in reducing the transmission across generations, then we expect that $\theta < 0$.**

- Assumption: reforms under TANF are continuations of the reforms implemented by waiver states before 1996.


IDENTIFYING A CAUSAL PATHWAY

- Selection Bias within welfare regimes
- Life-Cycle Bias/Windows Problem
- Misclassification Bias
- Cross-State Mobility

MULTIPLE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION

- What constitutes “welfare”?
 - Families receiving AFDC are categorically eligible for Food Stamps/SNAP, and about 80 to 90% take up both
 - An individual on AFDC/TANF cannot also receive SSI, but families can combine benefits from different members
- Welfare reform may have reduced the transmission of AFDC/TANF while not necessarily welfare broadly defined

Figure 2. Number of Recipients in Food Stamps/SNAP and SSI



DATA

- Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 1968-2013
 - Survey Research Center (SRC) and Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) samples used in estimation
- Baseline restrictions:
 - Mothers and daughters living in same family unit at least 5 years when daughter aged 12-18
 - Daughters observed at least 5 years as an adult (upon first childbirth or formation of new family unit if at least age 14)
- 2,967 mother-daughter pairs with 56,206 total observations

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Sample Means

	Daughter	
	<i>Before Reform</i>	<i>After Reform</i>
<i>Currently Receiving?</i>		
AFDC/TANF	0.080	0.025
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, SSI	0.132	0.112
Food Stamps/SNAP	0.115	0.095
Years Before/After Welfare Reform	0.348	0.652
Age	28.251	38.684
Number of Children	1.245	1.100
Race: Black?	0.162	0.171
Race: White?	0.810	0.804
Resides in Same State as Birth?	0.759	0.703
	Mother	
<i>Ever Previously Received?</i>		
AFDC/TANF	0.270	0.068
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamps/SNAP, SSI	0.430	0.192
Food Stamps/SNAP	0.374	0.121
Mother-Child Family Observations		14.202
Daughter-as-Adult Observations		25.124
Total Observations	25,390	30,816



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RESULTS

- Graphical Evidence: Trends Over time
- Baseline and Selection
- ‘Windows’, Life-Cycle Bias, and Critical Exposure
- Mobility



GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE

- Correlation trends for any previous welfare participation are estimated by

$$W_{it}^d = \alpha_t + \delta_t W_{it}^m + \epsilon_{it}^d, \quad (4)$$

where W_{it}^d and W_{it}^m are the daughter's and mother's welfare indicator, respectively, and δ_t is the year-specific intergenerational correlation in welfare use

Figure 3. Trends in Intergenerational Welfare Transmission




Table 2. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF


	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mother's Participation	0.201** (0.017)	0.117** (0.020)	0.398** (0.089)
After Welfare Reform	0.076** (0.011)	0.105** (0.015)	0.160** (0.043)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.158** (0.017)	-0.162** (0.019)	-0.301** (0.083)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes
Daughter Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			21.330
Hansen J Statistic			6.512
p-value (J Statistic)			0.368
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206

Appendix Table 2. Alternative IV Specifications with Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mother's Participation	0.458 (0.594)	0.388 (0.593)	0.344 (0.547)	0.369 (0.583)	0.229 (0.506)	-0.063 (0.496)
After Welfare Reform	0.199** (0.045)	0.198** (0.044)	0.218** (0.048)	0.197** (0.043)	0.216** (0.047)	0.141** (0.031)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.388** (0.092)	-0.386** (0.091)	-0.434** (0.097)	-0.384** (0.089)	-0.428** (0.097)	-0.247** (0.068)
<i>Avg. Unemployment</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Max. Unemployment</i>		X		X	X	X
<i>Avg. AFDC/TANF</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Max. AFDC/TANF</i>				X	X	X
<i>Reform × Avg. Unemployment</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Reform × Max. Unemployment</i>	X	X		X		X
<i>Reform × Avg. AFDC/TANF</i>			X		X	X
<i>Reform × Max. AFDC/TANF</i>						X
Weak IV Test Statistic	6.023	6.235	5.428	7.283	6.004	11.450
p-value (Weak IV)	0.111	0.182	0.143	0.200	0.306	0.120
Hansen J Statistic	1.222	2.498	1.114	2.529	2.593	9.686
p-value (J Statistic)	0.543	0.476	0.573	0.639	0.628	0.139

Estimates include daughter controls and represent 2,967 daughters for 56,206 total observations.

Figure 5. Mother's Participation Effect by Year Relative to Reform



‘WINDOWS’, LIFE-CYCLE BIAS, CRITICAL EXPOSURE

- AFDC/TANF Exposure by Minimum Family Observations
- Lee-Solon-type (2009) Age Adjustments
- Critical Exposure for Transmission by Daughter’s Age Periods

Table 3. Life-Cycle AFDC/TANF Exposure by Family Observations

	5+ Observations of Mother and Daughter			10+ Observations of Mother and Daughter		
	(4)	(5)	(6)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mother's Participation	0.201** (0.017)	0.117** (0.020)	0.398** (0.089)	0.202** (0.020)	0.139** (0.023)	0.382** (0.105)
After Welfare Reform	0.076** (0.011)	0.105** (0.015)	0.160** (0.043)	0.077** (0.010)	0.110** (0.018)	0.152** (0.056)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.158** (0.017)	-0.162** (0.019)	-0.301** (0.083)	-0.158** (0.015)	-0.173** (0.021)	-0.282** (0.100)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Daughter Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			21.330			20.480
Hansen J Statistic			6.512			7.727
p-value (J Statistic)			0.368			0.259
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967	2,469	2,469	2,469
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206	43,785	43,785	43,785
Mean Daughter Obs.	24.831	24.831	24.831	22.782	22.782	22.782
Mean Daughter's Age	32.932	32.932	32.932	32.152	32.152	32.152


Table 3. Life-Cycle AFDC/TANF Exposure by Family Observations

	5+ Observations of Mother and Daughter			15+ Observations of Mother and Daughter		
	(4)	(5)	(6)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Mother's Participation	0.201** (0.017)	0.117** (0.020)	0.398** (0.089)	0.201** (0.022)	0.142** (0.027)	0.421** (0.109)
After Welfare Reform	0.076** (0.011)	0.105** (0.015)	0.160** (0.043)	0.077** (0.016)	0.117** (0.021)	0.180* (0.072)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.158** (0.017)	-0.162** (0.019)	-0.301** (0.083)	-0.154** (0.018)	-0.165** (0.020)	-0.317** (0.112)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Daughter Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			21.330			19.080
Hansen J Statistic			6.512			8.038
p-value (J Statistic)			0.368			0.235
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967	1,808	1,808	1,808
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206	28,947	28,947	28,947
Mean Daughter Obs.	24.831	24.831	24.831	20.120	20.120	20.120
Mean Daughter's Age	32.932	32.932	32.932	31.078	31.078	31.078

Table 4. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
with Lee-Solon-type Life-Cycle Adjustments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Participation	0.201** (0.017)	0.201** (0.017)	0.200** (0.017)	0.222** (0.020)
After Welfare Reform	0.076** (0.011)	0.078** (0.011)	0.079** (0.011)	0.058** (0.009)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.158** (0.017)	-0.158** (0.017)	-0.157** (0.017)	-0.126** (0.017)
Daughter Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quartic on Mother's Mean Age	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Quartic on Daughter's Current Age	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mother's Participation × Quartic on Daughter's Age	No	No	No	Yes
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967	2,967
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206	56,206

Figure 6. Critical Exposure Period for Transmission





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SENSITIVITY ANALYSES

- Misclassification
- Cross-State Mobility
- Black-White Differences
- Welfare Reform Aggressiveness
- The Wider Safety Net

CROSS-STATE MOBILITY

- If daughters change states as an endogenous response to welfare policies, then transmission effects may be biased
 - Evidence of migration related to welfare generosity is mixed, though any effects are generally small in magnitude.
 - Levine and Zimmerman 1999; Gelbach 2004; McKinnish 2007; Kennan and Walker 2010
 - Also, limited evidence that state decisions to adopt waivers were not endogenous responses to welfare caseloads
 - Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, and Connolly (2000)

CROSS-STATE MOBILITY

- We test this by restricting the sample to daughters
 - Who live in the same state as their birth state
 - Who live in the same state as their mother
 - Who never change states

- We find evidence that the transmission effect is strongest for those who do not move, i.e. daughter geographic mobility reduces welfare transmission

BLACK-WHITE DIFFERENCES

- There is a vast literature on socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites
- Racial differences in welfare transmission are less evidenced, with the exceptions of Gottschalk (1996) and Pepper (2000)
- The risk of out-of-wedlock births is at least two times higher among blacks than whites, as is the risk of poverty in childhood
- Our estimates suggest that (1) pre-reform transmission was greater among blacks, (2) but post-reform reductions were also larger


WELFARE REFORM AGGRESSIVENESS

- States differed dramatically in the degree of aggressiveness in implementing welfare reform
- We implement a triple difference framework for transmission relative to reform aggressiveness
- Our estimates suggest that there were some permanent differences in states prior to reform in terms of the extent of transmission, but post-reform the less aggressive states “caught up” with the more aggressive ones

THE WIDER SAFETY NET

- Did reform affect transmission for “welfare” defined broadly?
 - We re-estimate the models using AFDC/TANF, food stamps, and SSI participation as the dependent variable
 - Much less evidence of a post-reform reduction in transmission
- Did reform affect transmission of poverty status?
 - We examine correlations in mother-daughter income and poverty status over time
 - If anything economic mobility stagnated or fell

Figure 7. Intergenerational Transmission of Income/Poverty Status



CONCLUSION

- A focal aim of the 1990s welfare reform was to end dependence on welfare, and we find strong evidence that AFDC/TANF transmission decreased by at least 50 percent
- Causal transmission is identified robustly across a variety of specifications addressing major identification threats including selection bias, life-cycle bias, and misclassification bias
- However, when welfare is defined more broadly, the post-reform correlation falls by a more modest amount. Economic mobility of daughters stagnated or got worse after reform



CONCLUSION

- It is not obvious, however, what is the socially efficient intergenerational correlation of welfare outcomes.
- Positive attributes to intergenerational transmission of welfare knowledge may arise if take-up rates are low and learning helps needy recipients (Currie 2006).
- Future theoretical and empirical research is warranted for optimal transfer program design that incorporates knowledge spillovers across generations.



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ADDITIONAL MATERIALS



SELECTION BIAS

- Linear probability estimates of equation (1) are consistent under conditional mean independence: $E[\varepsilon_{ist}^d | \mathbf{x}_{ist}^d, W_{ist}^m, P_{ist}^m] = 0$.
- Bias occurs if mother's selection into welfare is correlated with her daughter's decision, e.g. via grandmother's generation (-t):
 $E[\varepsilon_{ist}^d \varepsilon_{is,-t}^m | \mathbf{x}_{ist}^d, \mathbf{x}_{is,-t}^m, W_{ist}^m, W_{is,-t}^g] \neq 0$.
- Cross-state welfare reform variation corrects for pre/post reform selection
- Challenge remains of separating out welfare trap (state dependence) from poverty trap (unobserved heterogeneity) within regimes



SELECTION BIAS

- If selection across generations is time invariant, then fixed effects will provide consistent estimates
- Define the daughter's unobserved error term components as

$$\varepsilon_{ist}^d = \lambda_i^d + \mu_s^d + \rho_t^d + v_{ist}^d, \quad (2)$$

where λ_i^d is a daughter fixed effect, μ_s^d is a state fixed effect, ρ_t^d is a common year effect, and v_{ist}^d is an idiosyncratic error.

- With fixed effects, the pre-reform effect of mother is identified by “word of mouth” transmission



SELECTION BIAS

- Our second approach is to use instrumental variables
- Instruments for mother's participation:
 - Average and maximum values of mother's previous:
 - Unemployment rates
 - AFDC/TANF benefit standard by family size



LIFE-CYCLE BIAS

- Mothers and daughters are typically observed over different ages with different life-cycle patterns of income or welfare use
Haider and Solon (2006), Lee and Solon (2009), and others
- Also, the length of observation window may vary between mother and daughter with shorter windows causing bias
Gottschalk (1992, 96), Wolfe, et al. (1996), Page (2004)
- Our solutions: (much) longer observation windows, and age adjustments ala Lee and Solon (2009)



MISCLASSIFICATION BIAS

- Misreporting of participation in and dollar amounts of transfers pervades all social surveys and has gotten worse over time

Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2015)

- Measurement error issues in intergenerational welfare participation:
 - Misclassification on left- and right-hand side
 - Nonclassical measurement error: typically false negatives
 - Correlated misclassification within family and over time



MISCLASSIFICATION BIAS

- Our solutions:
 - Long Panels
 - Reporting accuracy is increasing with length of panel (Bollinger and David 2005)
 - Daughter effects sweep out fixed propensity to misreport
 - Mother's participation is measured better in earlier years, her indicator for *ever participated* is less noisy, and instrumental variables help, as well
 - Parametric bias-corrections for daughter's participation on left-hand side (Bollinger and David 1997; 2001; Hausman et al. 1998)

Appendix Table 1. AFDC/TANF Reporting Rates for PSID




Table 7. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
by Geographic Mobility

	<i>Daughter Same State as Birth</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Participation	0.219** (0.021)	0.134** (0.023)	0.448** (0.102)	0.479 (0.584)
After Welfare Reform	0.085** (0.014)	0.127** (0.018)	0.184** (0.054)	0.173** (0.039)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.171** (0.019)	-0.186** (0.020)	-0.339** (0.100)	-0.286** (0.069)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			18.950	13.350
Hansen J Statistic			4.765	12.380
p-value (J Statistic)			0.574	0.054
Number of Daughters	2,623	2,623	2,623	2,572
Observations	44,218	44,218	44,218	44,167

Table 7. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
by Geographic Mobility

	<i>Daughter Same State as Mother</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Participation	0.260** (0.020)	0.112** (0.025)	0.457** (0.089)	0.083 (0.288)
After Welfare Reform	0.098** (0.018)	0.086** (0.020)	0.141** (0.039)	0.106** (0.033)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.209** (0.019)	-0.178** (0.017)	-0.302** (0.066)	-0.220** (0.046)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			17.840	13.030
Hansen J Statistic			10.220	6.763
p-value (J Statistic)			0.116	0.343
Number of Daughters	2,763	2,763	2,763	2,684
Observations	36,875	36,875	36,875	36,796

Table 7. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF
by Geographic Mobility

	<i>Daughter Never Moves States</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Participation	0.235** (0.024)	0.131** (0.028)	0.481** (0.098)	0.751 (0.582)
After Welfare Reform	0.090** (0.017)	0.133** (0.018)	0.199** (0.057)	0.196** (0.045)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.188** (0.023)	-0.195** (0.019)	-0.373** (0.100)	-0.320** (0.074)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			16.380	9.670
Hansen J Statistic			5.077	15.110
p-value (J Statistic)			0.534	0.019
Number of Daughters	1,965	1,965	1,965	1,965
Observations	36,498	36,498	36,498	36,498

Table 6. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF by Race

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mother's Participation	0.085** (0.014)	0.046 (0.028)	0.057 (0.063)
After Welfare Reform	0.086** (0.012)	0.105** (0.016)	0.117** (0.028)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.082** (0.014)	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.179* (0.085)
Daughter's Race: Black	0.062** (0.018)		-0.305+ (0.170)
Black × Mother's Participation	0.106** (0.024)	0.073+ (0.037)	0.615** (0.236)
Black × After Welfare Reform	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.207 (0.157)
Black × Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.073** (0.024)	-0.146** (0.027)	-0.315 (0.208)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes
Number of Daughters	2,854	2,854	2,854
Observations	55,094	55,094	55,094

For specification (3), the weak IV test statistic is 22.950, Hansen J statistic 16.870, and p-value of the J statistic 0.154.

Table 8. Identifying Effects through Welfare Reform Aggressiveness

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Mother's Participation	0.215** (0.021)	0.122** (0.028)	0.536** (0.122)
After Welfare Reform	0.071** (0.011)	0.101** (0.015)	0.204** (0.060)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.168** (0.019)	-0.169** (0.023)	-0.424** (0.117)
Grogger-Karoly Instrument 3 (GK3)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.017)	0.119* (0.050)
GK3 × Mother's Participation	-0.043 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.042)	-0.335** (0.116)
GK3 × After Welfare Reform	0.018+ (0.010)	0.016+ (0.008)	-0.095* (0.046)
GK3 × Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	0.024 (0.031)	0.019 (0.022)	0.273* (0.110)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206

For specification (3), the weak IV test statistic is 24.880, Hansen J statistic 8.060, and p-value of the J statistic 0.780.

Table 9. Intergenerational Transmission of AFDC/TANF, SNAP, SSI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mother's Participation	0.269** (0.016)	0.098** (0.025)	0.401** (0.080)	0.258 (0.462)
After Welfare Reform	0.018 (0.013)	0.055** (0.013)	0.052 (0.033)	0.078** (0.027)
Mother's Participation × After Welfare Reform	-0.053** (0.019)	-0.086** (0.018)	-0.095 (0.061)	-0.142* (0.056)
Daughter Fixed Effects	No	Yes	No	Yes
Instrumental Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Daughter Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weak IV Test Statistic			21.330	11.450
Hansen J Statistic			10.770	6.942
p-value (J Statistic)			0.096	0.326
Number of Daughters	2,967	2,967	2,967	2,967
Observations	56,206	56,206	56,206	56,206