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Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

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About this event

In corporate elections, most votes are cast based on recommendations provided by for-profit proxy advisory companies. We develop a model of the voting advice market to explore how competition and demand for advice shape the slant of the advice o!ered. In the model, advisory firms compete via prices and advice procedures. Shareholders have heterogeneous goals, di!ering in the weight they place on financial returns versus nonfinancial (?social?) returns. In equilibrium, advisory firms tailor their advice to the preference of the average investor, which can skew voting outcomes away from those that would prevail if investors had full information.