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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Robust Aggregation of Correlated Information

Xiao Lin (U Penn)

Thursday 27 November 2025 15:30 - 17:00

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.


About this event

Decisions are typically made by drawing on multiple sources of information, yet the correlation among these sources is often hard to assess. We study robustly optimal strategies––those that maximize the worst-case payoff guarantee across all correlation structures. With two states and two actions, the robustly optimal strategy is strikingly simple: ignore all but the best information source. With more actions, the analysis can be extended by decomposing the problem into binary-action subproblems. With more states, we show a more sophisticated characterization of robustly optimal strategies via concavification. Our results offer a new rationale for why ignoring information can be optimal.”

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, both ONLINE and IN PERSON in SAL 3.05.

Seminar organisers: Dr Paula Ferreira Onuchic and Dr Christopher Sandmann.

For further information please contact Sadia Ali: s.ali43@lse.ac.uk.

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