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STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Global manipulation by local obfuscation

Fei Li (University of North Carolina), joint with Yangbo Song and Mofei Zhao

Thursday 04 March 2021 15:30 - 17:00

Due to the onging coronavirus outbreak, many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as online seminars. Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.


About this event

We study information design in a regime change context. A continuum of agents simultaneously choose whether to attach the current regime and will succeed if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to maintain the status quo. The optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation, some agents receive a signal matching the true strength of the status quo, and others receive an elevated signal professing slightly higher strength. Public signals are strictly suboptimal, and in some cases where public signals become futile, local obfuscation guarantees the collapse of agents' coordination.

Economic Theory Seminars are held on Thursdays in term time at 15:30-17:00, ONLINE, unless specified otherwise.

Seminar organisers: Dr Andrew Ellis and Dr Francesco Nava.

For further information please contact Annie-Rose Nicholas by email: a.nicholas1@lse.ac.uk.

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