STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Disclosure and Incentives in Teams
Paula Onuchic (University of Oxford), joint with Jo?o Ramos
Thursday 05 October 2023 15:30 - 17:00
Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.
Please check our website listings and social media feeds @STICERD_LSE at X and @LSE-STICERD-CASE at Bluesky for updates.
To subscribe to our mailing list, please click here.
Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.
Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.
About this event
We consider a team-production environment augmented with a stage in which the team decides how to communicate their productive outcome to outside observers. In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team-outcomes when team-disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team?s outcome, and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer?s equilibrium attribution of credit and blame for the team?s successes and failures across team-members. Further, we show that, through this credit/blame-attribution channel, a team?s deliberation procedure determines individuals? incentives to contribute to team production. We then characterize productive environments where effort-incentives are maximized by unilateral disclosure protocols or procedures such that disclosure require more consensus.